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- Preface -
This thesis is concerned primarily with long-term 
loans secured overseas by the Commonwealth, as agent for 
the Australian Loan Council, between June 1950 and June 19620 
These years saw the Commonwealth recommence new money 
borrowing overseas - a policy which continued until after 
the end of the periodo 
In selecting aspects to be covered in the thesis, 
an attempt has been made to answer questio~sevoked, in 
respect of foreign long-term loans, by a statement made by 
the Treasurer of the Commonwealth at the 1963 Annual Meeting 
of the International Monetary Fund o He said 
~I readily recognise that some forms of development 
capital carry with them their own problems and 
their own problems for the future, but I put our 
example forward as that of a rapidly developing 
country which can, by the study it invites, perhaps 
illumInate the path of others still in the earlier 
stages of their devel opmen t il 
The questions evoked at the time included -
How much, and at what costs, did the Commonwealth borrow 
overseas? 
What were the supply conditions like, and how did 
less-developed nations fare? 
Why did the Commonw2alth need to borrow overseas? 
What immediate influences determinE d its willingness to 
meet the costs involved ? 
What would have happened if the Commonwealth had not 
borrowed overseas? 
I 
Many ether subjects, including a lot that were 
interesting but peripheral, arose during the preparation 
of the material and had usually to be put asideo For only 
two of these is an explanation required. Supply conditions 
for private borrowings in the United States and drawings 
from the International Moneta ry FUnd have not been covered, 
primarily because they have attributes and purposes and 
supply conditions quite different from the long-term loans 
secured by the Commonweal tho 
,CHAP'rER I 
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CHAPTER I COHMONWEALTH AND STATE BORhOWINGS 
OVERSEAS TO JUNE 1962 
Ao BORROWINGS BEFORE 1950 
1. Borrowings to 1928 
Before Federation the States were active borrowers 
in London, which was their sole source of oversea loans. 
Indeed, because Australia had not a developed capital market, 
London was the main source of loans for the States . In 1901 
the States had only £29 million of domestic debt, co~pared 
1 
with £175 million in London, where 86% of State debt was 
located. 
The States continued their borrowings, both in 
Australia and overseasyfor another 27 years, until the Financial 
Agreement of 19270 Two States, New South Wales and Queensland, 
entered the New York market in the 1920s. 
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, did not begin 
borrowing until after the outbreak of the first World War. Its 
first oversea loan was raised in 1916 and in the 1920s it 
obtained loans in the New York market, where loans were 
comparatively easier to obtain o 
Although the Commonwealth raised eight out of 
eighteen oversea loans for State works under various agreements 
to co-ordinate Australian governmental borrowings , New South 
Wales raised more loans overseas than the Commonwealth during 
the period 1916 1927. New South Wales stood aloof from the 
attempts at voluntary co- ordination of borrowing activities 
which preceded the Financial Agreement during the First World 
War and again between 1921 and 1927. 
l. C ommonwealth Statistician, Finance Bulletin NO o1, p o17. 
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Details of oversea borrowing by the states between 
1915 and 1928 are given in Appendix I; the corresponding data 
for the Commonwealth appears in Appendix 110 The debts of the 
states and the Commonwealth in 1928 are shown in the following 
table. The development of the Australian capital market since 
1901 is evidenced by the change in the location of the debt of 
the Australian governments o In 1928 3 48% of their debt was 
domiciled in Australia, compared with 14% in 19010 
TABLE I : COMMONWEALTH AND STATE DEBT AT 30 JUNE 1928 
£ million 
Domestic London New York 
Commonwealth 220 133 (a) 
states -
New South Wales 89 155 
Victoria 93 60 
Queensland 40 64 
South Australia 51 42 
Western Australia 22 52 
Tasmania 11 14 
All States 306 387 
(a) Includes £84 million of indebtedness to U.Ko 
Government 0 
(b) Less than £500,0000 
17 
14 
5 
8 
2 
2 
(b) 
31 
Sources: Commonwealth Treasury, Budget Speech and Papers 
1928-29, p0100 for Commonwealth debt (which 
excludes amounts raised for the States) and 
Budget Speech and Papers 1929-30, po126 for 
State debto 
20 Borrowings between 1928 and 1950 
The Financial Agreement ushered in a new era in 
oversea borrowing by Australian governments, in that the 
independent borrowing authority of the States and of the 
8 
Commonwealth (except for defence purposes) was surrendered to 
the Australian Loan Councilo The states and the Commonwealth 
are represented on the Loan Council, and apart from permission 
for a state to borrow abroad issuing its own securities and 
the allocation of loan proceeds, which require a unanimous 
vote, all decisions are by majority voting in which the 
Commonwealth has two votes and a casting vote and the states 
one vote each (Clause 3)0 
la.-
The Financial Agreement was given supra-legislative 
authority through an amendment of the Constitution (section 
105A) and wa s the subject of two Commonwealth Acts : the 
Financial Agreement Act 1928, and the Financial Agreement 
Validation Act 19290 A subsequent amendment to the Agreement 
is contained in the Financial Agreement Act 19440 Loans for 
defence purposes are specifically excluded from the provisions 
of the Financial Agreemento 
The Financial Agreement requires that, with certain 
exceptions relating to a restricted right for oversea borrowing 
by states issuing their own securities and to temporary 
borrowings, all borrowings for the Commonwealth or the states 
are to be arranged by the Commonwealth (Clause 4), and that 
Commonwealth securities are to be issued for the money so 
borrowed o The Agreement established the Australian Loan 
Council, which comprises the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth 
or his nominee and the Premier of each state or their nominees o 
Under Clause 3(8) of the Agreement, the Commonwealth 
and each state submit to the Loan Council a new money borrowing 
programme for the ensuing financial yearo The Loan Council 
determines the total amount of the new loan programme for the 
year, allocates the programme between each state and the 
I ~ 1",-1' a..jN t-(JL(),,( , I"·)~fk~i. v r) .W / M"-;;tr,,,(k..) {L./ . ,w;;r <Vl1~ '[.; 
(.Y"yd...".;vv ~-4 Zlw /j~f.t..;)'y r7v'/·'l~LCf.., I 
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Commonwealth, and authorises the Commonwealth to arrange loans 
accordingly, subject to its approval of the terms and conditions 
of each loano The Commonwealth can, in any financial year, 
borrow only up to the amount of the loan programme decided upon 
for that yearo 
The Commonwealth and each State also submit 
statements of the amounts they require during each financial 
year for the conversion, renewal, or redemption of existing 
l oans (Clause 3(13))0 The Agreement requires borrowings for 
these purposes also to be made by the Commonwealth (Clause 4)0 
Thus the arrangements provided by the Financial 
Agreement constitute an overriding control over the amounts which 
the Commonwealth may borrow, either on its own behalf (except 
for defence purposes) or on that of the States~ during any 
particular financial year o The Agreement also led to a virtual 
cessation of State loan raisings in Australia and overseas. 
The Financial Agreement became effective in time 2 for 
the Commonwealth to float a few cash loans in London and one in 
New York before the closing of the London and New York markets to 
Australian (and other foreign) loans in 1929 and 19300 3 At the 
same time Australia's export earnings, which had been affected 
by deteriorating terms of trade since the middle of the 1920s 
2° The effective date of operation was 1927, the year in which 
the Financial Agreement was signed, but the Financial Agreement 
Act was not passed until 1928, and the Financial Agreement 
Validation Act after the referendum, in 1929. 
3° For references to the closing of the markets see the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Money and Banking (Canberra, 1937) 
paragraph 114 and Commonwealth Bank, Annual Report 19290 
1 0 
fell cata3trophicallyo The burden of oversea debt was 
unrelieved by any prospects of further loans and with interest 
liability rising to as high as 40% of export earnings at one 
time in 1930, it became particularly onerous, and led to 
considerable public antipathy towards foreign loans o The 
Commonwealth's borrowing activities overseas between 1930 and 
1950 were consequently related, with two exceptions, to the 
conversion of existing debto 
The Commonwealth's operations on the London market 
in the 1930s noticeably reduced interest liability on sterling 
debto Loans which carried interest rates of 5-6% were converted 
at effective rates of under 4%0 Many of the 38 conversion loans 
were floated to redeem loans on which the Commonwealth exercised 
its option to redeem before final m~turity4o During this period, 
most of those short-term securities located in London which were 
not already held by the Commonwealth Bank, and which amounted to 
£Stg38 million in 1930, were progressively purchased by the 
Commonwealth Banko In 1956 they were exchanged for securities 
denominated in Australian currency50 
Two cash loans were raised in London, one in 1938 
~s part of a loan for £stg7 million, of which £stg5 million 
was for the redemption of Sterling Treasury Bills not held by 
the Commonwealth Bank) and one in 1939 (for £stg6 million) 0 
These loans were notable for two reasons o Firstly, they were 
exceptions to the general run of conversion loans since 1930 0 
Secondly, they were raised for defence purposes, and were 
therefore not subject to Loan Council approval0 6 
4 0 C ommonwealth Treasury, Budget Papers (Budget Speeches and 
Public Debt)9 various dates o 
5 ~ ~9~4i;:.~, 1.'.,1 11 *0< 7f ,11 ... «1 1 h; r;, 'FJ-frA 1'{!'-6 oil ;ti, (Nt /. ·1.; or.) t/r V 
b. 7 
A further point of interest is that the Prime Minister at 
the time was R.G. Menzies who was Prime Minister also for the 
period under examination ~1950. 1962). 
11 • 
During the war years the Commonwealth floated 
only six loans overseas. All were for conversion of 
maturing London loans, and - as in the 1930s - advantage 
was taken of low interest rates to convert some of the 
loans before final maturity. The rate of redemption of 
sterling debt was quickened in the years that remained 
before 1950. The effect of the change in borrowing policy 
is reflected in the reduction of the level of debt compared 
with 1928. 
The following table shows the change in the 
level of oversea debt from the commencement of the period 
discussed in this section to 1940, and during the following 
decade to the end of the period, in 1950. 
,TABLE II: COMMONWEALTH D STATE DEBT OVERSEAS 
At 30 June - £Stg mil,l,ionLa2 iUS million 
Commonwealth State Commonwealth state 
1928 49 387 83 151 
1940 68 361 '77 136 
Change 1928-1940 + 19 - 26 - 6 ~ 15 
1950 64 281 7'7 119 
Change 1940-1950 4 ~ 80 
- 17 
(a) Excludes short term sterl i ng debt held by the Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia and war debt owed to the U.K. Government. 
Sources: As in Table I (for 1928 statistics); Commonwealth 
Treasury, Budget pap~rs 1940~~1 , pp.120, 121 (for 
1940); Appendix IV for 1950). 
Table II does not , of course , reflect the changes in 
exchange r a tes and their effect on the government's accounts. 
Table III provides the AUstralian currency equivalents of 
Commonwealth and State debt i.n 1901, 1928 and 1950. It 
120 
therefore summarises the debt situation, in domestic 
money terms, that faced the governments at the beginning 
and end of the periods that have been discussed and 
consequently reflects the effect of changes in exchange rates 
during the two periods (1901-1928 and 1928~1950) discussed 
so far. 
TABLE III: COMMONWEALTH AND STATE DEBT OVERSEAS 
£ million 
At 30 June ~ 1928 J22Q(a) 
Commonwealth 151 114 
State 175 418 405 
Total 175 569 519 
(a) Short-term sterling debt held by the Commonwealth 
Bank has not been included. 
Sources: Commonwealth Statistician, Finance Bulletin No.~, 
p.17 for 1901 figures; Commonwealth Treasury, 
Budget Speech and Papers 1928-29, p.100 for 
Commonwealth debt in 1928 which excludes amounts 
raised on behalf of the States, and Budget Speech 
and Papers 1929-30, p.126 for State debt, 1950 
debt is obtained from Appendix IV. 
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B. COMMONWEALTH BORROWINGS OVERSEAS 1950-1962 
The Australian currency equivalent of oversea debt 
in 1950 was £519 milliono In the next 12 years under a 
different (non-Labor) government the Commonwealth floated 43 
loans, of which 32 involved the raising of new money totalling 
£377 milliono Details of the loans are shown in Appendix IIIQ 
They were raised in five different countries and from the 
International Banko The borrowing policy therefore differed 
markedly from that of the preceding decade, particularly 1945 
to 19507 , and the level of activity was reminiscent of the 
years before 1930 0 It is symptomatic of this change in policy 
and activity that with one exception (the New York loan in 1954) 
all conversions were effected at high r rates of interest e 
The largest borrowlngs in erms of individual 
amounts and of the total borrowed I.!ame from the International 
Bank which provide~ $418 million (£186 05 mIllion) between 1950 
and 19620 The first loan, fo' $100 millj,n, was arranged afLLl 
a discussion between the President of the Bank and the Prime 
inister of Australia, and the Commonwealth secured an offer, 
at the time, of further loans of about $150 milll0n in the 
following five years80 As things turned out, the Commonwealth 
ot only borrowed a further $158 million over the years 1952, 
1954 and 1955, but secured two more loans in 1956 amounting to 
$5902 million o One of these was raised to help finance, 
t ogether with a private loan of $17 e8 million in the United 
States, the purchase of aircraft and equipment for Qantaso 
7°A d' ppen lX IV sets out the net change in oversea debt between 
1950 and 1962e 
8 e c 
.PoD., 1 December 1950, p . 3518 et seqo 
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Five years then elapsed before the Commonwealth secured its 
seventh loan from thR Bank in 1,)6,1" 
In London Australia raised only two new money loans, 
4in ilf-
totallIng ~4- million, but secur-ed fX124 million in convers' on 
operations o The timing of the conversion operat'ons, (between 
1952 and 1961) was largely de ermined by the dates of maturing 
loans (in contrast with the timing 0 ~onversion loans in the 
1930s), and the cash loans were within seventeen months of each 
ather in 1958 and 19600 
Although n(,t :'he largest supplier of funds, the New 
York market was the most constant S0urce of Commonwealth loans 
in the twelve years o After its re-entry to the market in 1954~ 
the Commonweal th ber: {)w~d tt ere in ear'h year except 1955. 
ash loans total 1 ed ojp 'J r. 
r efinanCIng loans totalllng ~ i(tl). 
The amount of individual .lOaLS (,t;;mained falrly constant at 
$25 million (£11 million) until 1962 when the value rose to 
$30 million (£13 milllon)~ 
Four loan3~ ea h f,r Swiss francs 60 milllon and 
t otalling the equlvalen ef £;5 mIllIon, were raised in 
witzerland o There wa. no continUIty to the borrowings: the 
f irst and second loans were raised In 1953 and 955~ while t~ 
l ast two were raised in 1960 and 19b1~ 
Canada and the ~etherlands supplied only three 
l oans between them totalling" $Can3S million (£15 million)+ 
Fl o 40 million (£5 million) respprtively. The two loans in 
Canada were SIX years apart. The loan in the Netherlands was 
f loated in 1961. 
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Private borrowings in the Unlted states of America 
were the fourth most important in value of the Commonwealth's 
sources of loansc Five loans aggregating $66 million (£29 
million) came from private borrowings between 1950 and 1962. 
The net change in debt is shown in Appendix IVc 
At £193 million it was significantly lower than the gross value 
of the Commonwealth's new money loans c The difference is 
accounted for by9 -
(a) 
(b) 
( c) 
(d) 
Some loans in London were not converted (£Stg11c7 
mlilion 3t% of N.S.W. securlties maturing in July 
1950 and a £Stg3c2 million W.A. loan maturing in 
April 19550), others were only partially converted 
(£stg16 million of a £Stg20 million loan was 
converted in April 1958 and smaller amounts were 
redeemed of loans maturing in April 1959~ December 
1960 and June 1961) and securlties issued before 
June 1950 were repurchased in the London market o 
These amounted to the eq~ivalent of £37 millionc 
Purchases of bonds in New York (where only $US24 
million of 1955 securities amoun~to $US72 million, 
and only $US30 million from $US43 million of 1962 
securities were converted, and other securities 
issued before June 1950 w~re repurchase0)c These 
amounted to the equivalent of £31 million c 
Compulsory amortisation payments were made on loans 
raised during the period from the International Bank 
(£37 mililon repaid), commercial sources in the 
United States (£10 million repaid). New York (£8 
million), Canada (£2 million)~ and'Sinking Fund 
purchases were made in the London market (amounting 
to £1 million)o 
The proceeds of two loans llsted in Appendix III 
(the I.B.RoD. loan of January 1962, and the New 
York loan of June 1962, together totalling the 
equivalent of £58 million) were received after 
30 June 19620 
9cThe statisti s are derived from Commonwealth Treasury, 
Budget Paper[ and National Debt Commisslon Annual Reports, 
durlng the period 1950-19620 
The amounts obtained from the various sources , 
and the net change in debt , between 1950 and 1962 are 
summarised in the following table 
TABLE IIIA~ LOAN RAISINGS A D NET CHANGE IN DEBT 
Amount Rais~ Change In 
Sourc~ 
New York 
Commercial 
Switzerland 
London 
Canada 
Debtor ~ 
Commonwealth 
States 
Total 
Curr~U~:i: ~ 
$USm. 4-17 0'7 
$USm o 18909 
$USm. 65.8 
S .f.mo 24-0 00 
£Sm. 27 . 0 
$C . m. 35.0 
£m o 
£me 
Source ~ Appendices III and IV 
Re financ in~ Debt 
234.5 
90.1 ) 116 02 ) 
24-0 00 
99.5 - 4- . 1 
32.4-
Net borrowing overseas by all governmental a thorities 
in the period was £9 million less again at £184- million1° This 
reduction is almost entirely due to a reduction from £26 million 
11 to £17 million ln semi~governmental debt overseas , I reflecting 
the withdrawal of Australian authorities f r om oversea sources 
of new money loans. 
10. 
Commonwealth Statisti cian~ Austra~ian Balance of Paymen1§ 
1961-62. 1962-63 and First Half 1961: 4, Appendix II. 
11 • 
Some further variation is due to the use of different 
exchange rates in the two sources (I.M.F. par rates as aga·nst 
day~ to-day rates ) and the use of face value of debt (ioe . 
inclusive of discounts on issue ) in the figures of debt 
outstanding. 
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C. TERMS AND CONDI'I'IONS OF PUBLIC LOANS RAISED 1950~1962 
10 London 
The terms and conditions of loans floated in London 
are summarised in Appendix Vo Amounts have varied from 
£Stg7 to 20 mill10n while final maturity dates have been 
placed at from 10 to 20 years after flotatlon e Most loans 
provide an option to redeem two to three years before final 
maturIty, but on some loans the Commonwealth has had no right 
to early redemptiono This suggests that optional redemption 
provisions (like the interest rate and issue price) were 
adjusted to suit prevailing market condition~ o 
The flotation expenses paid by the Commonwealth 
amount to about £1011eO per cent fo nash loan and f106 eo per 
cent for a converSIon loan o The ltems which enter Into these 
expenses are: -
Fee for managing flotation 
UnderwritIng Commission 
t% 
1% (for cash loans 
or 
~% (for converSIon loans) 
Commission to banks and brokers t% 
Advertising, postage etco 0 005 per cent 
When the flotatIon expenses are subtrac ed from the Issue price, 
the interest cost to the borrower on a 20 year loan which yields 
5067 per cent to the lender wi]l be 0013 per cent high~han the 
Yield, iee o 5e80 per cente The underwritIng and management 
charges are less than the Commonwealth paid in any other centreo 
There are three servIcing charges: the cost of 
running the Inscribed Stock Registry at the Reserve Bank of 
Australia's London Branch, the stock exchange fee and a revenue 
18. 
earning tax imposed on the transfer of securities. The 
Registry costs about £Stg 100~000 per annum for managing 
the whole sterling debt (over £Stg 300 million), the stock 
exchange fee is nominal, and the tax is met by the payment 
of 0.01 per cent annually to the United Kingdom Government on 
the outstanding amount of each loan. 
The amounts raised in London, and the interest 
cost and period to final maturity are shown in the following 
table. 
July 
Novo 
Octo 
Feb. 
Oct. 
Mar. 
Feb. 
July 
Jan. 
TABLE IIIB: COMMONWEALTH LOA S IN LONDON •. AMOUNTS, 
INTEREST COSTS AND LIFE 
Amo}1-lll ~~ Co§t Period to Maturit~ 
£Stg.m. % Years 
1952 11.8 4092 10 
1953 10.8 40 : 9 15 
1956 6095 5087 16 
1958 16 00 6. 16 18 
1958 1500 5081 20 
1959 ( 1000 50 T+ 14 
( 10.0 5069 20 
1960 12.0 5 ?j o . • 20 
1960 1309 6 .. 29 20 
196~ ( 10 00 60 4 ~ 14 ( 10 00 6032 22 
20 New York 
The main terms and conditions and the cost to the 
Commonwealth of public loans floated in New York are shown in 
Appendix VI. The loans have extended for fifteen years (for 
flotations before June 1958) and twenty years (after June 1958)0 
They all carry a condit i on tha t amounts will be paid off the 
principal semi annually, and this has reduced the average life 
of each loan. The following table shows the interest cost? 
amou_t and life of loans raised on the New York market. 
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IlJiP /NffIlfS-r('OSI 
TABLE lY...: THE "LIFE-Ii OF COt:1MQNWEALTH LOANS IN NEW YORK 
Date ,~& Amount, f' r' ... Jd tc Averdg§lE ) /[J.JJ $m o M>at~l'tJ:- L1fe y. 
~ 
June 1954 '+ -/7 25 15 11t 
June 1956 !j. (J/J 25 15 11t 
March 1957 ~. Jt.J 20 !5' 11i 
April 1958 D'/tO 25 15 11t 
Oct o 1958 7-. 6 T 25 20 10t 
Sept o 1959 b-~3 25 20 11 
April 1960 1-10 25 20 11 
Oct o 1960 J'~H- 25 20 11 
July 1961 ~';:3 25 20 11 
Jan o 1962 6 -07 30 20 11 
June 1962 (b) ~./j 30 0 11 t 
280 
(a) Average life is calculated in this and subsequent tables 
as the average period during which the borrower has 
control of the money o 
(b) Proceeds not received until July 1962 0 
Source: Derived from Registration Statements lodged by the 
Commonwealth with the Securit es and Exchange 
Commission, Washington G 
The amounts of the loans remained relatively stable, 
with most being for $25 million, but a relatively expensive one 
in 1957 was for only $20 mill10n while a successful $30 million 
refinan ing loan in January 1962 apparently encouraged both 
borrower and underwriter to seek bigger loans and a cash loan 
floated in the following June was also for $30 m1lllon
o 
Optional redemption provisIons of New York loans 
show that these have not been partlcularly flexible: the early 
loans were redeemable at par between 12 and 15 years af er 
flotation, the April 1958 Joan between 1j and 1c) years and 
the later 20 year loans, bpt~een 17 and 20 years ~ 
20 
As a result of pressure from the Commonwealth the 
underwriting "spread " dropped from 2 5/8% for the 1954 , 1956 
and 1957 loans to 2t% for subsequent loans o The charg e 
comprised 0075% for managing the loan~ 00875% (formerly 100%) 
for underwriting, and 1t% for selling the bondso Other 
flotation charges amount to about $50,000 and include ~ 
(i) Registration fee paid to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission; 
(ii) New York Stock Exchange fee for listing ; 
(iii) The costs of printing the bonds and prospectus; 
and 
(iv) Authentication of bonds, and other miscellaneous 
costs o 
The charge made by fiscal agents covers the paying 
of the coupons and management of the sinking fund o The paying 
of the coupons costs /oo05$~~or the first 10,000 coupons; 
~~ J J~ #Oo045(~for the next 10,000, andfOo04~~for the remainder o 
Sinking Fund charges are 1/8% of all bonds purchased through 
the fund plus brokerage of 1/8% on repurchases, or the costs 
of calling bonds for redemptiono The total charges for these 
functions, and for cremating the securities through the life 
of a loan amount to about $60,000 - $100,00012 0 
30 SWitzerland 
The amounts and conditions of Commonwealth loans 
floated in Switzerland between 1950 and 1962 are set out in 
Appendix VII. They show little variation from loan to loan 
by comparison with London loans o 
12 0 E l' 1 ar ler loans, which were not fully amortised, wer e ess 
expensive to service because the final redemption charge 
Was only 1/40 per cent of the principal amount, instead of 
1/8.per cent for purchasing or calling bonds for redemption 
dUrlng the life of the loan o Other charges include the 
annual listing fee for the stock exchangeo 
;.. 
21 
The terms of the first loan included a unique 
provision (for a Commonwealth loan) in that bondholders could 
elect for the payment of interest and repayment of principal 
either in Swiss francs or in Australian pounds at the (fixed) 
rate of 1000 francs = £102010100 
Interest is payable annually on the 1960 and 1961 
loanso Some reduction in costs results from this arrangement, 
which can be regarded as allowing the Commonwealth (by 
comparison with semi-annual payments) to borrow about £137,000 
free of interest for about 7t years, ioe o the equivalent of six 
months interest for half of every year o 
The flotation charges paid by the Commonwealth 
include underwriting and managing charges~ taxes and the costs 
of printing the bonds and initi~lly listing the issue on the 
stock exchangeo The underwriting and managing charges were 
3t% for the 1953 loan, were reduced to 3% for the 1955 loan, 
but returned to 3t% for the two later loanso The flotation 
charges have reduced the proceeds of the loan by between 50C 
and 508% (the second loan was the cheapest and the latest, the 
dearest) or by an average of 5040%0 
Servicing charges in Switzerland comprise fiscal 
agency fees for paying and destroying pald securities and stock 
exchange listing feeso (The underwriters are also the 
Commonwealth's fiscal agents.) The charge for paying coupons 
rose from t% on the first two loans (when interest was paid 
half-yearly) to t% of interest paid on the latest loans o The 
charge for redeeming the bonds rose after the 1955 loan from 
t% of face value to 003%0 Servicing costs were between 350,000 
francs (on the second loan) and 435,000 (on the latest loan)o 
1k ~J /~.~ li.t~tdtii ~~ 4- ~1(/r;S3 
k· J'%(Cf55) j. / t:j (irW) ,Wt/ S:Ofj (/16). ~ 
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4 0 f§..!:ill da 
The terms of the loans are shown below:-
TABLE V : TERMS OF COMMONWEALTH LOANS IN CANADA 
Date Amount Interest Issue Average $ million Rate Price Life 
--r % Yrs o 
Yield 
% 
Octo 
4 1955 1500 98t 12 
March 
1961 20 00 5t 98t 13 07 
The final maturity dates of the loans are 1970 
and 1981, but annual sinking fund payments commencing 2 years 
after flotation were designed to retire about 40% and 60%, 
respectively, of the pr incipal before final maturity o The 
Commonwealth had the option to redeem the 1955 loan at prices 
ranging from 102t% in 1958 to par in 1967 0 The 1961 loan may 
be redeemed from 1971 at 102% and at a price which decreases 
by t% for each subsequent year until the redemption price 
reaches paro 
The flotation costs amounted to $320~000 and $410,000 
or 2013 and 2005% respectively of the face value of the loans o 
Underwriting charges totalled 2%, and the remaining costs were 
incurred in printing the bonds, listing the loan, and legal 
expenses 0 The interest cost to the Commonwealth was 40 )+0% 
for the 1955 loan, and 6015% for the 1961 loan o 
Fiscal Agency charges were similar to thos e in New 
Yorko 
50 Netherlands 
The one loan of 40 million Guilders (£5 million) 
carried an interest r at e of 5 per cent, was issu ed a t par~ 
and finally matured twenty years after flotationo A s inking 
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fund is to commence five years after flotation and this reduce 
the average life of the loan to 13 years o The Commonwealth may 
redeem the loan at 101t% from 1971 to 1975, and~ thereafter, at 
101%0 
Flotation expenses amounted to 109 million florins 
or 4!% of the loan o This amount was paid to the underwriters, 
who paid all the usual flotation charge~ o Interest cost to 
the borrower came to 5052% 0 
Servicing charges comprise the customary fiscal 
agency fees, which ~ as in Switzerland ~ are paid to the under-
writers, and listing fees o The fiscal agency fees are t% of 
interest paid and 1/8% of principal repayments, plus s light 
additional charges for cremation of pald securities, and amount 
to 140,000 guilders (about 0035% of the face value) over the 
life of the loan o 
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TERHS AI D CCJNDIT IONS OF OTHER LOANS 1950,1962 D. 
10 International Bank Loans 
The International Bank loans to Australja were made 
for the purposes specified in the seven loan agreements o The 
first six loans were to be used for the purchase of the ImpJcts 
specified in Appendix VIII. The seventh loan was to help 
finance both local and foreign currency expenditure of portion 
of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electricity Scheme o 
The main terms of the loan~ are shown in the following 
table 0 
'l'ABLE VI . TBht18 OF I~BoR~Do LOANS . 
Loan Amortisation Interest Full life, p.verage Lifgia) 
Rate Years Years 
Aug 0 1950 1955-75 
--r 
1 t . 25 18 
July 1952 1957~72 4,* 20 14 
March 195"4 1957-69 l~ 1 5' 10 
March 1955 1958-70 4-,3/8 1 ? 10 
Novo 1956 1964-66 itt 10 9 
Deco 1956 1959-72 4i 16 "1 1 
Jan o 1962 1966-87 5~ 25 17 
(a) Approximate 0 
Source: 
The duration of the loans varied, because the Bank's 
policy was to adjust the life of each loan a~cording to the 
life of the equipment purchased with the financeo Repayments 
were made during the life of each loan and increased each six 
months by an amount roughly equivalent to the reduction in the 
amount of interest due o 
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for examplE .wer four years with the loan ln 1962 0 Durjng the 
drawing pet'lods the Comm· Jnwea 1 th (and any other borrower, wa'· 
required to pay a camml tmE'nt fee of t% orl the undrawn portiono 
The Bank made a practice of sellJng borrowers! 
obligations (l oeo the Bank's entiTlement to 1 t8r~st payments 
and prinelpal repayment· ) 0 When tht:!st:! obllga ions were sold 
above par (1 080 when the y eid ~as 10wer than the rate of 
interest payable by the borrower)~ the Bank customarlly reduced 
the interest payable by the debt r. The CommonwealthVs 
obligations were sold from time to time, leading to some 
adjustments in the interest payable by the Commonwealth 1)" 
2 " Loans from. Commercial SQ~r( e~, 
Th8 sources, ntpfH lctteS ani dlrations of he. 
loans are shown jn App~ndl x G.! • t-:d ':1 cmmi tmer+ '8 
of t%, except for the 1960 oan rIGm the Export Impo t Ban~ o 
The loan prorpeds wer_ all used lor the pUIchas 
of aircraft and equlpment to Qantas Jr T.A A. 
1 j 0 'rh e Bank's lendIng pollcies are discuss8d fllly 1n Chapter II 
and the Bank's pro e ures are described in the Textual App nd v 
(i) 
( i:1) 
( ii i) 
When funds are re~eived from overseas by the 
ComllJnnweal th ~ the foreign currenr'Y proceeds (unless used foc 
current transactions as they were with the loans for T.A.Ao 
and Qantas) are addEd to Australia's internatlonal reserve" 
and the Reserve Bank ('l'pdi t s the Commonweal th G .vernment 
wi th the equivalent in A' 5t ral ian CUI !'en Yo Thus the pu.rposes 
or any luan ~an be des ~~·1.b8d elther aIJl.!O dIng to the uses 
made of the foreIgn u_rrenny or the In...:al f'urrency equIvalent 0 
Prospectuses lssued reC't""'ntly for flaw YvIk .Loans have combined 
IJa.. 
the two with statements similar t(;: "The net dollar prnC'eea..:> 
ococ will be added to +-hp Commonwealth's lnternational reserves o 
The Aust r alian curren~y equl valent' 0 .0. wlll be applied towards 
capi tal expendl tu.rl.;~ b > I DJ! f l!Lll 'pd undc:r he annual borruwlng 
programmes of th. C m~ d r ar. 1 u· 
TABLE VIr: 
Loans flom 
London 
New Yorh. (a) 
Swjtzt,rland 
Canada 
Netherlands 
Internatlolal 
Bank(b ) 
Commercirl 
Sources(c) 
Total 
RE'.f.L,~l !l& 
~1aturing Df-O 
1 J T o 4 
)f-(l o 
§pec ... f2- ed 
lB!1:?..o I. t s 
Ih9 G 8 
!Jns:gecifled 
Pur:goses 
33 ,, 8 
149 01 
Source: Appendix IIf and loan agreements and prospectuses . 
7 
(a) Excl des June: 1,,-)62 loan amlJunt.lrl~ ) 1:.. J o mJ ... 1JOn 1 
t h P r () !...! e e U 0 1 t~ .! , J 
(b) Includes one .loan uf rl, 0 I m ill or: for Qan+ as and 
excludes the Jdnua~y 196) loan wh ch 1as for 
unspecified purpos s but had l:.ut bEen drawn upon 
before 30 June 196J o A classification of imports 
by industries is provided In Appendix VITlo 
(c) AIrcraft loans for Qantas or T.A.A. and lncludes 
£13 mill ion borrowed. from -:he B.A:port - ImpoI't BUlk 
of ~vashingtcn .. 
The use of the forelgn urrcr:ry pro eeds was 
specified only for refinan'l~g ... o~ns G rrnwlngs on behalf 
of Qantas and 'I ,.AoAo, and loan c .secured from the I ternational 
!:lank 0 The Interna t i or 0' BaLk l Cl. 11~ua: ... y fall uwed t.he rule s·1 
out in lts ArtIcles ttlat loans shall be fr,r specifled projtj"'t e 
However, some countrIes including Aus+ralia have been absolved 
from this requirement o Or ly tw~ A stI'cllla'S loans ~ the 
fifth and seventh ~ 'W~T"r' T () r I) r- ,1 p wrlll +"t e remaindpI' ( £.l 
for the purcha:se of lmp r ~ m~r. II or ., 
imports whjch w~'re set t i again 1 < cln dre shown dl 
Appendix VIII. The seventh loan~ f) 1 .1 Eo. Jr, v,y MuuntaIns Schcm~ 
was again In the na turL. of an ,x ('cptl on) In t hat the use of +-11e 
foreign current;y wa!::l not Sp""{,l~led but drawIngs could be set-
against expendi tur8s mac E' (In t r.f· pro Jet- In Aus trali an 
currency o 
When the CeJlIlffi' nWt;>09. 1 til 1 0rr n'ldd t re finan -; 
maturing debt the forejgn eu 'pnf'Y pru eeds were spent by flL. 
Commonwealth, as wer8 the proceeds of loans for T A.Au and 
Qantas o No counterpart funds in Australian currency were 
credited to the Commonwealth faT tht'se 1 an 0 The foreign 
+' .1.10 
, 1 
currency pro eeds of publ i . ('ash ] oans and of si x of the 
Internatiorlal BAnk loans were sOld to the Reserve Bank and 1 e 
Comme nwea 1 th ..... 1 S 'rl~di ted wi r h t h8 ellU 1 va 1 ent amount in 
AUstralian ("urrene ' 0 
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The amount of Australian currency equivalent 
generated was, from Table V/h £285 millIon 14. Of this, £269 
million was contributed by the Commonwealth to the 
Commonwealth's s~ecial or public loans in Australia or was 
applied directly to state Works and Housing programmes15• 
The remaining £16 million was accounted for by Commonwealth 
needs - possibly payments due from the Sl .~lng Fund on 
International Bank loans. , ~ ~/tt{tfuv 
These uses of foreign loan proceeds ( whether;(in 
foreign or Australian currenCY) have, however, primarily a 
legal meaning. There is no way of knowing what activities 
would have been displaced had the loans not been received. 
It would be an impracticable ex~rcise, in any case, to attempt 
to trace the ramifications of each ddditional portion of 
expenditure throughout the Australian economy . Thus, while 
the published purposes of oversea loans are useful for financial 
accounting, they do not lend themselves to an assessment of the 
economic significance of the loans, which is dealt with later 
in the thesiso 
14· Th e Australian currency equivalent of all I.B.R.D. loans 
exc~pt the Qantas loan ($US9 million) was paid into the 
Natlo~al Debt Sinking Fund, which invested in Commonwealth 
~esu!~ties/issu~d in public or special loans in Australia. 
UCr;,- - tJ*'! 'I- 'f'MM 1/.,.. -1./1-""'" 
15. S ee Appendix X 
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A T V T 
STATE LOANS OVERSEAS 
1915-1950 
A. PUBLIC LOA! S RAISED IN Lm DON 
Year Amount 
Interest Issue Purpose 
Rate Price 
£m. % % 
New South Wales 
1915 2 4i 99t Conversion 
1915 5 4i 99t New Money 
1916 2 5 99 New Money 
1916 3 5t 100 New Money 
1917 3 5...l 98 New Money 
1917 3 5t 99t IJe11 Honey 
1918 10 5t 100 Conversion 
1918 3 5t 100 Conversion 
1919 3 5t 99t rev' Money 
1919 3 5t 98 Hew Money 
1920 2 5t 98t Conversion 
1920 3 6t 100 r ew Money 
1920 4 61 100 New Money 
1921 3 6
2 95t New Money 
1922 7 6 97 Conversion 
1922 5 4t 95 Conversion 
1923 4- 5 98t New Honey 
1923 6 4t 94 New and Conver-si.on 
1924 10 5 100 NevI and Conver-sion 
1924 12 5 97t Nev: and Conver-SlOD 
1925 7 5 98t Ne\oJ Honey 
1926 4 5 98 New Money 
1926 4 5 97 I ew loney 
1927 1 1 5t 99 Conversion 
1927 7 5t 99t New Money 
Victorla 
1915 2 l~ 100 New wney 
1919 3 5t 100 Conversion 
1920 2 6t 100 Conversion 
1922 4 5t 99 r~ ew lvloney 
1922 3 5 100 Conversion 
1923 5 5 99t New doney 
1923 9 5 99 Conversion 
1924 6 4-i 97t New Money 
1926 3 5 98t New Money 
1927 4 5 97t New Money 
.Queensland 
1915 12 % 99 Cnnversion 
1919 2 6
2 98t 1 el,o. 1101 ey 
1924 13 5t 99t Conversiu.l 
1924 4 5 97t New Money 
1925 12 5 99 Conversion 
1926 3 5 98 Ne\oJ Honey 
'J: 09 A 
Year Amount Interest Issue Purpose Rate Price 
£m. % ~ 
South Australia 
1915 2 5 99 Conversion 
1917 1 5t 97 Conversion 1921 3 6t 100 Ne\of Honey 
1922 3 6 96 Ne\o! Money 
1923 2 5 99 New Noney 
1923 2 5 99 New Money 1924- 2 5 98 } ew Honey 
1925 1 5 98t ConverSlon 1926 2 5 98 New Money 
1927 3 5 98 New and Conver-
sion 
1928 3 5 98 New Money 
Western Australia 
1916 5 100 (New Money 
1920 2 5t 98 ( 
1921 3 6 95t ( 
1922 2 5 96 ( 
1923 3 4i 95 ( 
1924- 2 5 98 ( 
1925 3 5 98 ( 
1927 2 5 97t ( 
1928 3 5 98 ( 
Tasmania 
1921 2 6t 100 (N el,,, Honey 
1923 1 5 99 ( 
1925 1 5 98 ( 
B. PUBLIC LOM S RAISED IN NEW YORK 
Year Amount Interest Issue Purpose 
$ID. Rate Price %- % 
Queensland 
1921 12 7 99 New Money 
1922 10 6 96~- Ne,,, Money 
New South Wales 
1927 25 5 96t New t-loney 
25 5 96t New ~lOney 
Source:- London Stock Exchange Official Year Book~ 
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COMMONWEALTH LOANS 
A. PUBLIC LOANS RAISED IN LONDON 1915-1950 
No. Year of Issue Amount Issue Int. Maturity Purpose 
Price Rate 
£stg.M. % ; 1 1916 4.0 100 1920-22 State Public Works 
2 1917 305 98 ! 1922-27 do. 3 1917 4.5 98i 1922-27 do. 4 1918 408 9% 1922-27 do. 
5 1921 500 95 6 1931-41 War and Repatriation 
6 1921 500 96 6 1931-4:1 Redemption of London 
Treasury Bills and 
Repatriation purposes 
7 1922 5.0 91 6 1931-41 Public Works and 
Redemption Treasury 
Bills 
8 1922 500 96 5 1935-45 doo 
3 1923 705 99 5 1935-45 Public Works, Migrat-
ion and Redemption 
Treasury Bills 
10 1924 1000 100 5 1935-45 do. 
11 1924 600 97i 4i 1940-60 do. 
12 1925 500 99~ 5 1945-15 Repayment of temporary 
loans in London 
13 1926 6.0 99i 5 1945-75 Migration, Public 
Works and Redemption 
of Securities 
14 1921 1101 98 5 1945-75 Conversion of Loans 
2,3 and- 4o (£1,039,000 
transferred to Aust.) 
15 1921 700 98 5 1945-15 Migration, Cwltho and 
State Works, Repay-
ment of temporary 
""loans in London & 
16 1921 700 91! 
redemption. 
5 1945-75 do. 
17 1928 800 98 5 1945-75 ~igration, Cwlth. & 
State Public Works and 
Redemptions 
18 1928 7.0 98 5 1945-75 Migration and Works. 19 1929 800 98 5 1945-15 do. 
20 1929 1204 97 5 1945-75 Conversion of Q'ld. 
loan due 1926-29 
21 1~32 12.4 97i 3i 1936-31 Conversion of N.S.W. 
loans due in 1932. 
22 1933 906 100 4 1955-70 Conversion of N.S.W. 
23 1933 11.4 99 3t 
loan due in 1933 
1937-38 Cenversion of N.S.W. 
S.A. and Tas. 6~ 
loans due 1930-400 
3 1 
---------------------------'-----------------
No 
24 
2~ 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
3 
44 
45 
Date of ]so.jue 
(Prospectu~) 
1933 
1933 
1933 
1934 
1934 
1935 
1935 
1936 
1936 
1937 
1937 
1938 
1938 
1939 
1939 
1941 
1941 
1942 
1945 
194~ 
194 
194'7 
Amount 
£Stg.M 
17.2 
21 00 
16.6 
2204 
21 07 
ISSUE; 
Price 
% 
99 
98 
99 
97 
99 
100 
100 
95~ 
99 
96.1-2 
9'{ 
99 
100 
100 
99 
98 
100 
98 
100 
100 
Int. 
Rate 
% 
4 
3d. z 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3-i 
3 
Maturity 
1948-53 
1946-49 
1964~74 
1956-61 
1939-41 
1955-58 
194'1-43 
1950-52 
1951-54 
1952-56 
1955~70 
19 1-64 
1942-44 
1944 
1961~66 
1967-71 
'1970··7) 
Purpose 
Conversion of loans 
of N.S. W., Q'ld. 
S.A. and W.A. 
Conversion of loans 
5,6, and 7 and loans 
of N.S.VI. anJ. S.A. 
Conversion of lo~s 
of NoS.W., Vic., 
S.A. and Tas. 
Conversion of loans 
of N.S.W., Vic and 
Q.'ld. 
Conversion of loans 
S.A., .A. and Tas. 
Conversion of loans 
8,9, and 10 
Conversion of loans 
of N.S.W. and Vic. 
Conversion of loans 
of N.S.W. 
Conversion loans of 
N.S.W., S.A. and • A .. 
Conversion of Loan 21 
Conversion of loan 23 
Defence and Redempt~ 
ion of London 
Treasury Bills. 
Conversion of Loan of 
S.A. 
Defence 
Conversion of loans 
of Tasmania 
Renewa, of loan 30 
ConverSl0n of loan 11 
and loans of Vi c. and 
Qt ld. 
Conversion of loan j2 
Con lrsion of loans 
12 to 20 inc. and 
loans of VIC., S.A., 
.A. and Tas. 
(£34,3119567 transfer-
ed to Australia.) 
Conversion of loans of 
N. S. W. 
Conversion of loan 41 
Conve~sion of loan ~4 
and 1 "1..Yl of W.A. 
32. 
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3. 
li£,. ~ Amount ~ Int. Maturitz Purpose 
of Issue ~ ~ 
£stg.M. % % 
46 1948 13 9st 3 1963-65 Conversion of loan of 
N.S.W. £5m. transferred 
to Australia 
47 1948 10 100 3 1964-66 Conversion of loans of 
Vic.,Q'ld., S.A. and 
Tas. £4,587,951 
transferred to 
Australia 
48 1948 15 100 3 1965-67 Conversion of loan 26 
and loan of Vic. 
(£6,252,995 transferred 
to Australia) 
49 1949 13 100 3 1972- 74 ConversiDn of N.S.W., 
W.A. and Q'ld. loans. 
50 1949 15 100 3 1975-77 Conversion of 
Loan 25 
B. PUBLIC LOANS RAISED IN NEW YORK J2J~-J220 
No. Year Amount ~ Int , Maturit;y Purpose 
of ISSue ~ Rate 
$M. % % 
1 1925 75 99t 5 1952-55 New Money (a) 
2 1927 40 98 5 1947-57 New Money (b) 
3 1928 50 9~ ~ 1928-56 New Money 4 1946 20 100 1954-56 Refunding of N.S.W. 
loans. 
5 1946 25 9~ 3t 1956-66 6 1947 45 99 3V 1957-62 Refunding of loan 3. 
7 1947 ( 19 91t 3t 1955-57) Refunding of loan 2. 
(19 97t 3t 1957-67) 
(a) Raised to refinance a maturing internal loan. 
(b) Raised to refinance a maturing London loan. 
Source: ~ommonwealth Treasury, Budget Papers (Public Debt -
Chronological Tables) and Prospectuses. 
LOANS 
l.i3.R.D. (a) 
Auo • 1 'j)0 ?9) 
Ju.l. 1952 66) 
hc:..r. 1954- ( /6) 
hare 19)~ ( 111 ) 
flJov. 1956 ( 1 ) 5) 
Dec. 1956 (1 56) 
Jan. 1962 (309) 
New York 
June 1956 (b) 
Mar. 1957 (b) 
Apr. 1958 
Oct. 19 )8 
0ept.1959 
pro 1960 
Oct. 1960 
Jul. 1961 
Jurl. 1<;.62 
Commercial Loans 
ov. 1956 
Juno 1958 
Sep. 1958 
AU5. 1960 
Deco 1960 
SWitzerland 
Nov. 1/53 
Feb. 1955 
hare 1960 
Mar. 1961 
London 
Oct. 1958 
Feb. 1960 
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TEL 
July 1950 to June 1962 
A. CASH LOANS 
Amount Interest 
million 
($U. s . ) % 
100.0 4-} 
50.0 4-1 
54-00 lrf 
54-.5 4-3/8 
9.2 4-4-
)0.0 4-i 
10000 4-1ZoZ 5t 
($ U.S.) 
7.0 4t 
2.9 5 
25.0 4-i-
25.0 5 
25.0 52 
25.0 5t 
25.0 5t 
2500 52 
~ 182. ~ 52 
in the United States 
($U.S. m) 
17.~ 4-i 
13.0 4-- 5/8/4-t 
3.0 4-l-
200 5i-
~M.Ji 5t 
(Swiss Frc1.Dcs) 
60.0 4-
60.0 3* 60.0 4-2 
60.0 24-0 . 0 4-2" 
(£ stg.) 
1 5.0 5'2 
12.0 ~ )2 
·f'. 
IS;'uf; Aust. 
i=iice Eg' i va-
lent 
% £ million 
Par 4-4-.6 
Par 22.3 
Par 24-. 1 
Par 24-.3 
Pa.r 4-. 1 
Par 22.3 
Par 4-4 • 6 ( 1 b 5. 0 ) 
98 2 3. 1 
Par 1.3 
99 11 . 2 
972 11.2 
97 11 .., • c. 
972: 11 • ~ )8 11 .2 
97 11 . 2 
')72 ~(b4-.8) 
Par 7.9 
Par 508 
Par 103 
Par 0.9 
Par ~ (29.4) 
99 6. 1 
992 6. 1 
99 6. 1 
100 2..J. (24-.5) 
98 18.8 
99 ~ (3"3.b) 
L.clllada 
o~t. 19)5 
Jviar. 1961 
etherland.., 
Deco 1961 
($ Can.) 
1500 
20.0 ~ 
(fl) 
4-0.0 4-0.0 
34 
-2-
4-
5~ 
5 
602 hl (14-.--
l-'ar 
(a) These loan~ were drawn Ll various currencies ($U. S. , 
$Can., Jwiss francs, D.Mks) and tne amounts shown are the 
equi valent in ',/iU . I..J . The Aus tralian equivalent has be8n 
calculbted from the ~urrencies mad8 fvailable (excert 
for loan 309 )~ in calculating the total £ equivalento 
(b) Combined cash and refinancing loan o 
_ f· 1") ·· 
35 .. 4 ,t, .. 
ArpT~/r 
OV BHuEAS BY THE COMr .ONWEALTH 
July 1950 to June 1962 
bo CONVER~IUJ LOANS 
Interest Aust. 
Amount Old rate New rate Issue EQUIVa 
(Per cent)(Per cent) Price len~ 
London (£ stg.) % % £million 
JuL 1952 11.8 32 % 98 14.8 
Nov. 1953 10.8 3~ 4 9% 13.5 Oct. 1956 7.0 3l 52 97i 8 7 Feb, 19)8 16.0 3 6 99"2 20.0 Mar. 1959 ( 10.0 3 .. 52 99) (10.0 99) 25.0 
Jul. 1 )60 13.9 3 6 98 17.4 
Jan. 1961 (10.0 3.} 6 97-'iJ (10.0 ~ 97"2) ~(124.4) 
ew York ($ U.S.m.) 
Dec. 1954 25.0 ) 3~ 99 11 .2 Jun. 1956(b) 18.0 3~- 4-~ 9~ 801 Mar. 1957 (b) 1 701 3~- 5 Par 706 Jan. 1962 ~ -3/8 5i 98t 13.4(40.2) 
90 . 1 
TOTAL CO~VERSION £164.6 million 
TOTAL CA0H 
GRAND TOTAL 
Less amounts not r eceived by 30 June 1962 
January 1962 I.B.R D. 44.6 
£376.9 million 
£541 .5 million 
June 1962 New York Loan ~ 58 00 
Total loans received 483.5 
(b) Combined cash and refinancing loan. 
Source: Common~ealth Treasury ~udget Papers (Public Debt 
section, and Government Securities on Issue at 
3') Jun 1962) 
( 164.6) 
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CHAPT ER II 
'. '-
3 6 
~v 
NET CHANGE IN OVERSEA DEBT 
London New IoB.R oDo Canada Nethnds. Switz. Aust~ York la) Equiv. 
£Stgomo $m. $m. $mo Flom. Sw. fr .m .. £Amo 
Common~~~lth (b) 
Debt at 
300 6.50 64.0 76 . 6 114.2 
30 0 6 .. 62 75 .. 2, 124.0 23405 15 .. 6 7.1 18907 27902 
CHAN ·E + 11 .. 2 + 4704 +234.5 + 1506 + 7 .. °1 + 18907 + °165.C 
States 
Debt at 
30 0 6050 281 0 4 118. 9 404 .. 8 
30. 6052 266 01 187.7 16 . 8 32.9 5003 43207 
CHANGE 
- 15.3 + 68 .. 8 + 16 08 + 3209 + 50 03 + 27.9 
CQmmon~es.lth and 
States 
Debt at 
300 6050 34504- 195. 5 519.0 
300 6062 341 . 3 311 07 32 . 4 40.0 240 0 0 71109 
CHANGE 4. 1 + 116 . 2 + 23405 + 32 04 + 40 00 + 240. 19209 
(a) The amounts shown are U .. So dollar eqUivalent of LB.RoDo debt, but conversions into 
the Aus t.rali.an currency equivalent have been made from the. currencies repayable to 
the Banko 
(0) Short~term terling debt held by t:8 Commonwealth 
Tepatria+wd ~O Australla has been omitted . 
S ul'",E3 ~ 'rr.t'1J1we'llth Treasu y Budget Papers (Public Debt) 
in 1950 and subs~quently 
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'l'illU1S OF PUl~LIG 
----~ate n~~C-d _~JJU1_y 1~)? -- I --'-" I1ovemb01' October February October I·larch 1959 
_-1.93) 1956 ...l222.. _ _ 1.<D~~ ( a) 
~urity D6.t..;~3 (b) 1960-62 1966-68 1970-rl2 197/~-r/6 1')75-78 1973 976-79 
aunt -:,stg lm. 11.8 10.8 6.95 16.0 15.0 10.0 10 .0 
Interest Rate % 4-~ 4 5-~ 6 5t 5t 
~ 
Issue Price 98 9%- ~. ~ 9%- 98 99 
U:n.derwriting 118 108 70 159 188 200 £stg lOOO 
~kerage £stg iOOC 25 24 15 35 35 45 
Olther £stg lOOO 6 21 6 10 29 13 
Yield to Investor 4.75 4.05 5.'74 6.05 5.67 5.60 5. 59 . ; (c) I? 
Interest Cost 4092 4.19 5. 87 6.16 5.81 5074 5.69 
~ (c) 
(a) Cash loan . 
(b ) The Conunol1Vlealth hQ.d the option to r edeem at par during the period shown . 
(c) To final maturity date . 
Febru 
1260 ( :rl 
1977 -80 
12. o 
5-k-
99 
150 
27 
7 
5.5 9 
5.7 
Sc:mrce : ,Q.oJIlIllonj-lea~th Budg~t...J:illL<rr.~ & Secll~i'~~es _9..11 J?::Llt.,e , various dates (cost adju:' Lc·d "0 
Q)tl'-1,(vl 0 af f/c1<.ihfl of Iv ns it7 J.on(i~f} ), 
APPdJDIXV 
- -- -----
.tl~lYi9~O I Janu' j 1<.,'6 1 
'I Ljr/7-30 1<)75 1 )81-83 
13 .9 10.0 10.0 
6 6 
98 97-} 
139 200 
32 45 
8 11 
6.16 6.27 6.21 
6.29 6.41 6.32 
'.l111ary 1 ~6 1 loan ).1 
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TERMS OF PUBLIC ISSUES IN NEW YORK bY THE CO.·iEONWEALTH PENDIX VI 
Between June 1950 and June 1962 
.-' . ' ~ . .-
.. ' , -. j 'I '. 
Date of I ssue: Dec. 1954 June 1956 Harch 1957 April 1958 Oct. 1958 Sept. 1959 
Haturity: Dec . 1961 June 1971 March 1972 May 19.73 Nov. 1978 Sept. 1979 
Optional redemption from (a) Irs. % Irs. % Irs. % Irs. % Irs. % Irs. % 
0-4 103 0-3 103! 10-11 102 10-12 101t 10-12 101t 10-14 101 
4-8 102 3-6 10~ 11-13 101 12-13 101 12-14 101 14-17 10~ 8-12 101 6-8 101 12-15 100 13-15 100 14-17 10~ 17-20 100 . 
12-15 100 8-10 101 17-20 100 
10-12 10~ 
12-15 100 
Amount: $25 m. $25 m. $20 m. $25 m. $25 m. $25 m. 
New Money: $ 6.7 m. $~9m. $25 m. $25 m. $25 m. 
Interest ~ 4i% 5% JJtI, 5% ~ 
Issue Price: 99 9~ Par 99 97! 97 
Sinking Fund: $485,000 $485 ,000 $385,000 $485,000 $640,000 $675,000 
COI:IIllences : Dec. 1956 June 1958 March 1959 N~ 1960 Nov. 1959 Sept. 1961 
Retires % of debt: 5~ 5a.£ 5a.£ 50% 100% 100% 
Underwriting: 2 5/8% 2 5/8% 2 5/8% $ ~ ~ 
Other Expenses: $63,000(i%) $63,000(~ ) $50 ,OOO(~) $55,000 (i%) $55 ,OOO(~) $50,000(~) 
Net proceeds: 96 1/8% 95 5/8% 97 1/8% 96i% 941$ 9.$ 
Redemption yield: 3.86% 4.67% 5% 4.84% 5.20% 5.75% 
Cost to borrower . 
(over average life); 4.171> 5.00% 5.34,£ 5~ 1 '~ 5.67~ 6.23% 
Fiscal Agents (b) Morgan Horgan Morgan Morgan Horgan Morgan 
Guaranty Guaranty Guaranty Guaranty Guaranty Guaranty 
and Chase and First 
Manhattan National 
City Bank 
(2.) A.t the prices shown. (b) Hor ban :}"larant y Trust wer e sinking fund and 
counte rsi ( ning agents . 
Scurce : Regirtration State~eDts lodged with the Securitie s Exchange Commission , Washington, 
fo r each loan. 
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_. ~ 3 9 ,.. i.7 A 
TBRHS OF .k'<J.b.uI", ~SSJES [H I,E .) nY THE COHMOTJWEAL'fr. ." " -~ 
netween June 19 ')0 ang June 1962 
VI (2) 
Date of Issue; April 1960 Oct. 1960 June 1961 Jan 1962 June 1962 
Haturity: April 1980 Oct. 1980 June 1981 Jan 1982 July 1982 
Optional redempt i on from (a) Yrs . % Yrs. % Yrs. % Yrs. % Yrs . % · 1 
10-14 10l~- l~-14 102 10-14 101 10-14 102 1011-
I 
10-14 i 
14-17 100t 14-17 101 14-17 10~ 14-17 101 14-17 10( 
17-20 100 17-20 100 17-20 100 17-20 100 17- 20 10 
Amount: $25 m. $25 m. US$25 m. U5$30 mo U5$30 m. 
Nev Money: $25 m. ~25 mo US$25 m. u5$30 m. 
Interest 5i% $ 5i% ~ ~ 
Issue Price: 97t 98 97 9st 97i-
Sinking Fund: $/J75,000 $675,000 $675,000 $810,000 $833,000 
Commences: April 1961 .Oct. 1962 July 1963 Jan 1964 Jan 1965 
Retires % of debt: 100% 100% 100% 100% 10~ 
Underwri ting : ~ ~ ~ ~ $ 
Other Expenses: $52,000 (.;%) $44,000(f,t) $42 ,000 (i%) $47 ,OOO(~) $46 ,OOO(-t%) 
Net proceeds; 9 /~ 9$ 9~ 9$ 9~ 44/0 
Reaemption yield: 5.4£% 5.42.% 5.15% 5.6"5% 5.71% 
Ccst to borrover 
(over average life): 5. 9a.b 5.84% 6.23% 6.07~ 6.15% 
Fiscal Agents (b) Horgan Horgan Morgan Morgan Morgan 
Guaranty Guaranty Guaranty Guaranty Guaranty 
(a) At the: :,i ces s ho'l,..rn. (b) llorgan Gua r anty Trust wer e sinking fund and 
c ounte rsi~ning agents. 
So..:!' ce: Rer is t r~ tion St ~ i~ E rnents lodged with the Securities Exchange CC:!l!Ilission, Wa shington, 
1 or E:a ch l oan. 
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TERMb OF PUBLIC I~SUES IN 8WITZERLAND BY THE COMM )NWEALTH 
Betwpen June 1950 and June 1962 
Date raised November 1953 February 1955 March 1960 
~lnal maturity December 1968 March 1970 Mar~h 1975 
First optional maturity December 1965 March 1965 March "970 
Amount 60m. Sw. Francs 60m .Sw. Francs 60m .Sw. Francs 
% % % 
In erest rate 4 3i 4i 
Is ue price 99 99i 99 
Unde.Lwritlng 3 2i 3 
Management 1 i 
1 
"'2 "2 
Taxes -
Issue 1.2 1 .2 1 .2 
Coupon 0.78 0.68 0.9 
Negotiatlon 0 , 1 0.1 0.1 
Cantonal 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Listing 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Printing 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Net Proceeds 93.36 94.46 93·24 
Redemption Yield 4.09 3·79 4.59 
Int erest Cost 4.62 4.25 5,15 
Source: Commonwe&~~h Treasury Budget Papers (Public Debt) . arious years, 
and Loan J~f",reement s 
", l.i .. 
APPENDIX VII 
March 1961 
March 1976 
March '971 
60m. Sw . Francs 
% 
4~ 
100 
3 
1 
2" 
1 .2 
0.9 
0.1 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
9 .24 
4.';0 
5.05 
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41 APPEr DIX VIII 
EXPENDITURE FROM INTERNATIONAL BANK LOANS CLASSIFIED 
ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY 
SUS MILLION TOTAL 
Indust;y Loan-~ 66 96 111 155 156 3USM. 
Forestry, Agriculture, Land 
Settlement 26.4 20.9 16.5 15 . 6 17.1 96.5 
Railways 13.9 2.7 1.5 3.2 6.8 28.1 
Coal Mining 2.9 2.9 
Other Mining 2.4 0.9 3.3 
Electric Power 25.7 1.6 0.5 0.3 28.1 
Road Transport 11. 7 12.0 12.9 14.0 50.6 
A' r Transport 6.0 21.2 7.7 9. 2 44.1 
Industrial Development 12.0 3.3 2.3 14.8 12.1 44. 5 
Industrial Tractors and earth 
moving equipment 19.6 19.6 
TOTAL 100.0 50.0 54 . 0 54.5 9.2 50.0 317.7 
(a) As at 30th June 1962 no dTaWlngs had been made under Loan 309. Drawings under earlier loan agreements were 
completed by 31 March ]959. 
(b) Calculated from the $ equivalent of the borrowings. 
(c) Source: Annual Reports to Parliament under the International Monetary Agreemerlt Acts 1947 and 1959. 
(a) 
£M. (b) 
43.1 
12.5 
1.3 
1.5 
12.5 
22.6 
19.7 
19.9 
8.7 
141.8 
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T~Rlv1S AND C 
FROM 
, Average 
Final Life 
Date Lender or Manager Amount Interest Maturity o-Rate Date Loan 
(a) 
$ mo % Yrs : Mths~ 
QANTAS 
Novembe r, 1956 Morgan Stanley & C0 8 17077 4t 30 0 68 64 4 · 11 
· 
June, 1958 Chase Manhattan Bank 13 0 0 4~ 31012 8 64 3 · 1 
· 
41-
December 7 1960 Export-Import Bank & 30 0 0 5t 30 0 90 68 4 · 0 
· Boeing Airplane COG 
ToAoAo 
September 7 1958 J . P. Morgan & Coo 30 0 4i 30.6 0 64 2 : 9 
August, 1960 Chase Manhattan Bank 2.0 5t 1.,12 0 65 2 · 10 
· 
(a) Period between average drawings date and average repayment date. 
Source: Commonwealth Treasury, Departmental Papers, and Loan Actsa 
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43 • '.. '" 'T~' .' ~ "- . 1 °. APt'El'-lDIX X 
THE FINANCI G OF STATE WORKS AND HOUSING PROGRAHHES 
£ million 
51-52 52-53 53-54 54-55 55-56 56-57 57-58 58-59 59-60 60-61 61-62 
Commonwealth Subscriptions 
- from oversea lo~ns 27 19 ~4 33 25 3 9 - - - -
- other 133 119 55 20 75 96 82 10 55 90 7 
Total 160 138 7S 53 100 99 91 10 55 90 '7 
Used by Commonwealth 7 6 5 3 12 7 8 7 26(a) 4 1 
Commonwealth Assistance 153 132 74 50 88 92 83 3 29 86 6 
I 
Other Subscriptions . 
-
- internal loans 71 58 126 130 99 99 106 178 148 118 225 
- oversea loans 3 1 11 29 43 26 16 
State Loan Pr ogr ammes 224 190 200 180 190 192 200 210 220 230 247 
(a) Includes £20 million advanced to Queensland for the Mt. Isa-Townsville-Collinsville railway. 
Source: Commonwealth Treasury, Commonwealth Payments to or for the States, 1962 Table 23. 
(Amounts have been rounded to add) 
--
Total 
I 
I 140 I 
742 
882 
- 85 
896 
1,3513 
129 
2,283 
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CHAPTER II - THE SUPPLY OF LOANS THE INTERNATIONAL BANK 
The International Bank was the Commonwealth's chief 
source of new money loans between 1950 and 1962& The Bank 
represented a significant, new organisation to facilitate the 
international flow of capitalo Its charter, embodying a 
wartime ideal of the allied nations, was framed to provide a 
flow of funds for the twin postwar needs of reconstruction and 
developmento The Bank's organisation and modus operandi 
~on sequently merit the fairly full examination given in this 
chapter. 
A. THE BANK'S FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE 
1. The purpose of the Bank 
The International Bank was formally established on 
27 December 1944, when its Articles were accepted by a majority 
of the nations which participated in the Bretton Woods Conference. 
The underlying purposes of the Bank, which are to guide "all its 
decisions", are set out in its Articles of Agreement 1 as:~ 
1 
"(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of 
territories of members by facilitating the 
investment of capital for productive purposes 000 
(ii) To promote private foreign investment, and when 
private capital is not available on reasonable terms, 
supplement private investment 0 0 0 
(iii) To promote long range growth of international trade 
by encouraging international investment 000 
(iv) To arrange loans so that the more useful projects are 
dealt with first • • 0 
(v) To have due regard to the effect of international 
investment on members' internal business conditionso " 
Article 10 
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These underlying purposes are supplemented by 
"cond1.tions on wh1.ch the Bank may guarantee or make loans ,, 2 : -
2 
"The bank may guarantee, partiCipate in, or make 
loans to any member of any political sub-division thereof 
and any business, industrial, and agricultural enterprise 
in the territories of a member, subject to the fo l lowing 
conditions : 
(i) When a member in whose territories the project 
is located is not l.tself the borrower, the 
member or the central bank or some comparable 
agency of the member which is acceptable to the 
Bank, fully guarantees the repayment of the 
principal and the payment of interest and other 
charges on the loano 
(ii) The Bank is satisfied that in the prevailing 
market conditions the borrower would be unable 
otherwise to obtain the loan under conditions 
which in the opinion of · the Bank are reasonable 
for the borrower. 
(iii) A competent committee, as provided for in 
Article V, Section 7, has submitted a written 
report recommending the project after a careful 
study of the merits of the proposalo 
(iv) In the opin1.on of the Bank the rate of interest 
and other charges are reasonable and such rate 
charges, and the schedule for repayment of 
principal are appropriate to the project. 
(v) In making or guaranteeing a loan the Bank shall 
pay due regard to the prospects that the borrower, 
and if the borrower is not a member that the 
guarantor, will be in position to meet its 
obligations under the loan : and the Bank shall 
act prudently in the interests both of the 
particular member in whose territories the project 
is located and of the members as a whole. 
(vi) In guaranteeing a loan made by other investors, 
the Bank receives suitable compensation for its 
risk. 
(vii) Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank, shall , 
except in some special circumstances, be for 
the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction 
or developmento " 
Article IV, Section 3 provides:-
Article III , Section IV. 
4 7 
"(a) The Bank shall furnish the borrower with such 
currencies of members, other than the member in 
whose territories the project is located, as are 
needed by the borrower for expenditures to be 
made in the terrltories of such other members to 
carry out the purposes of the loan o 
(c) The Bank, if the project gives rise indirectly to 
an increased need for foreign exchange by the 
member in whose territories the project is located, 
may in exceptional circumstances provide the 
borrower as part of the loan wlth an appropriate 
amount of gold or foreign exchange not in excess 
of the borrower's local expenditure In connection 
with the purposes of the loan~1l 
2. The Organisation of the Bank 
Membershlp of the Bank is open to any nation which has 
joined the International Nonetary Fundo At 30 June 1962 there 
were 79 members, and these are listed In Appendix 10 
All the powers of the Bank are vested in a Board of 
Governors which represents the members and makes decisions by a 
majority of the votes casto Appendix I shows the distribution 
of voting power between memberso The United States has 29% 
of the voting power followed by the United Kingdom with 12%, 
France and Germany 5%, India 4%, and after them Canada, China, 
the Netherlands and Australia with between 305% and 2.5% of the 
voting powero Nations of the American continents have, in total, 
39% of the votes o 
Most of the powers of the Board of Governors, which 
meets once a year, have been delegated to 18 Executive Directors, 
who once agaln represent member nationso These Directors elect 
the President of the Bank, who acts as their chairman at 
meetings, but has only a casting vote. 
The President is head of the operating staff of the 
Bank and, subject to the direction of the Executive Directors 
on questions of policy is responsible for the conduct of the 
ordinary business of the Bank, organisation of its staff and 
apPointment and dismissal of its officers and employees. 
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B. TH~ VISTRIBUTIO~ OF BANK LOAtS 
The amount of loans approved by the International 
Bank for Australia - $US417 million - came to about 7% of total 
loans approved by the Bank between 1950~51 and 1961-62. 
The geographical distribution of loans is shown in 
Appendix II. ASla and the ~iddle East was the area which 
received the largest share of loans, wlth the Western hemisphere 
coming secondo Africa received two and one half times the amount 
~ 
Mustralia obtained o 
An analysls by countries shows a notlceable imbalance 
between the amounts borrowed by different member countries . 
Over 70 per cent of the loans to Asia and the Middle East went 
to three countries: India Japan and Pakistan o Of a total of 
$1000 million lent for use ln Africa3 9 $800 million went to 
South Africa or to the dependencies of European powers . In the 
Western hemlsphere, although loans were granted to slxteen 
countries, Mexico received 25%, and six countrles received over 
80%, of the loanso 4 
If the lo~ns are analysed according to the degree of 
development of the recipient countries. a further imbalance is 
noticeable o Appendix III sets out the six main borrowers at 
30 June 1950, at 30 June 1957 (when the Bank's lending had 
gathered momentum) and at 30 June 19620 On each date, four 
of the six main borrowers were developed nations 5 . At 30 June 
1962, seven of the twelve borrowers who had obtained more than 
3°Loans to France and Belgium that were apparently destined 
for Africa have been added to the figure shown in Appendix 110 
4 
°I.BoRgDo, Seventeenth Annual Heport, Appendix K. 
5°Loans guaranteed by a country have been taken as being lent 
to that countryo Countries classifled as developed are those 
so classified by the Articles of the International Development 
Associatione 
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$200 million in loans were also developed natlons & In all, 
11 developed nations, representing 26% of Bank borrowers, 
secured over ~O% of the Bank ' s loans between 1950 and 1962 & 
Furthermore, nearly one third of the loans to under-developed 
countries were made to privately-owned or partly privately-
owned firms, including subsidiaries of forelgn companies. 6 
With loans being dlstributed towards developed 
countries it is perhaps not surprising that Australia, a 
developed capital-importing country, became one of the heaviest 
borrowers from the Banko At 30 June 1950, the Commonwealth had 
secured no loans from the International Bank , but with the 
extension of lending by the Bank after that date it became the 
Bank's leading borrower within a few years & At 30 June 1962, 
it was still the fourth highest borrower from the Bank e From 
at least 1955 onwards it was the largest borrower per head of 
populationo 
The theoretical upper limit to the Bank's lending was 
set by the resources available to it o Within this limit, the 
policles of the Bank determined the pattern of lending o Thus 
the Bank's policies - in combination with the Commonwealth ' s 
demand pattern7 - also determined the amount borrowed by the 
Commonwealth. 
6%BoR.Dw, Press Releases relating to the loans concerned 
7· See Chapter V. for a discussion of the Commonwealth ' s demand 
pattern o 
The upper limit of the Bank's lending was legally set by 
Article III at "one hundred percent of the unimpaired subscribed 
capital, reserves and surplus of the Bank" , but this limit does 
not appear to have placed any restriction, in practice , on the 
amount of the Bank's lending . 
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c. THE BANK'S HESOUHCES~ 
The Internatlonal B nk had increasingly large funds 
at lts disposal from 1950. The Bank's assets increased three-
fold from $2,102 million to $6~829 million, in the following 
twelve yearso These funds came from capltal subscriptions, 
borrowings, the resale of borrower's obligations, repayments, 
and earnlngs on the Bank's lnvestments. 
The paid-up capital of the Bank lncreased from $861 
million at 30 June 1950 to $1~722 million at 30 June 1962. 
At the latter date the Commonwealth's subscription was $533 
mlllion, $480 mlllion of WhlCh was callable only if required 
to meet the Bank's obligations while $5,330,000 had been paid 
In dollars and $11,970,000 in demand notes In Australian 
currency. Although many more countries had by 1962 permitted 
the Bank to use that part of the subscription represented by 
securities payable in the member's own currency, capital 
contrlbutions dlminished in importance as a source of funds 
during the twelve yearso 
The Bank's funded debt rose from $261 mlllion at 30 
June 1950 to $2 521 at 30 June 1962 0 Thls increase reflected 
the lmproved avallability of funds from member countries, and 
from Switzerland (which although not a member, h d established 
a firm relationship with the Bank). The Bank's debt at 30 June 
1962, is shown in the following table according to currency of 
obligations: 
8. The financial information in this section is derived from 
I.B.R.U., Flfth and Seventeenth Annual Reports. 
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TABLE VIII: DEBT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANI\ AT 30 JUl E 1962 
Currency of Obligation 
United States Dollars 
Belgian Francs 
Canadian Dollars 
Deutsche Marks 
Italian Llre 
Netherlands GUllders 
Pounds sterling 
Swiss Francs 
$ mlllion equivalent 
1,900 (a) 
10 
31 
2'15 
24 
31 
51 
199 
2 521 
(a) Includes amounts borrowed outside the United States o 
In 1965 Escott Reid (The Future of the World Bank, 
I~B~RoD , September 1965, po22) could say that 
investors outside the U.S. held 57% of the Bank's 
debt. 
Borrowers' obligations held by the Bank are sold, 
usually to private instltutions, to augment the Bank's funds o 
The volume of sales increased towards the end of the 1950s, 
again reflectlng the greater availability of funds for 
international investmento Although the increasing demand for 
these obllgations meant that longer-term obllgatlons could be 
sold, sales of obligations with more than 10 years to run before 
m turity remained rare, primarily because of the investment 
preferences of banking and other fInancial institutions. 
The upper limit of the yield the Bank is able to 
offer purchasers is set by the contemporary cost of Bank 
borrowing9 so the Bank, which did not guarantee obligations 
9°The earning rate on the obligations at the time the Bank made 
the loan is not, of course, relevant to the raising of funds at 
some subsequent dateo evertheless, the Bank was affected by the 
rate of lnterest the borrower paid on the obligations becau~e the 
Bank, as a matter of policy, reduced lts charges when a 
borrower's oblieations were subsequently sold at a lower yield. 
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sold between 1950 and 1962, had lIttle opportunity to attract 
buyers to securitIes who::se life, or the low stGtus of the 
country issuIng the securities, made buyers look for a higher 
yields Consequently the length of the Bankts loans, and 
creditor-status of the countries to which it lent affected 
markedly its opportunities for "turning over" lts funds through 
the sale of obligationso 
The Bank was, however, not extended for funds at any 
tlue between 1950 and 19620 Admittedly, capital subscrIptions 
were increased in September, 1959, but this was primarily to 
ensure that its uncalled dollar capital would be large enough 
to cover its outstanding dollar debt, thus allowing its United 
States dollar loans to be classified as guaranteed by the U.S 
governmento In 1950 it had $575 million in cash or invested 
(includIng $1307 mIllion from the Special Reserve) awaiting 
lending opportunIties, and this was equivalent to 97% of the 
amount out on loan to memberso In June 1962 cash and investments 
were $1,930 millIon (including $22306 million from the Special 
Reserve), equivalent to 65% of the amount it had out in loans 
to members o ost of these Idle funds were invested in the UnIted 
States - either in government obligations or in bank time 
deposits. 10 
One effect of having this amount invested in the 
UnIted States was to reduce the amount of dollars apparently 
provided by the United States for a capital-hungry world o The 
retention of funds in the U.So could have been the underlying 
motive for the Bank maintaIning lending poli ies WhlCh allowed 
10. f d' d The Bank had of course, funds committed or rawIngs un er ~oans already approvedo However, in addition to "Idle" funds, 
lt could count on an inflow of money from repayments and fut~rl? 
borrowIngs to meet these commItments. 
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the lending of only a portion of the funds availablec 
ftlternatively, incomplete utilisation of the Bank's funds could 
have been a result of an unconsciously rigid application of 
rather narrow .onditions for lending. This point is raised 
again later in the chaptero 
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D. TIlE BALKS LENDING POLICIES 
In order to place the Bank's policies within an 
overall context, It is useful to consider, in general terms, 
the implications of United States' and other countries' 
influence on the formulation and interpretatlon of Bank policies o 
A person with some years experience on the Bank's staff said 
quite recently 11:_ 
"In the early years of the Bank, it was inevitable 
that it should have been dominated by the United States 
and Great Britain and that it should have an American 
flavour and ideology o It was founded in 1944 when 
Western Europe was in eclipseoeoIt was therefore 
essential that the headquarters of the Bank should be 
in the United States, tRat its President should be a 
citizen of the United States and that the United States 
should have a predominant voice in determining Bank 
policyo Too many British still think of it (the Bank) 
as an Amerlcan bank, that is, a Unlted States Bank o 
Too many Western Europeans still thlnk of it as an 
Anglo American Banke Too many people in low income 
countries still think of it as a bank run by the rich 
countries o " 
The President of the Bank between 1950 and 1962 was 
Eugene Black, a former employee of the Chase Manhattan Bank, to 
which he returned after leavlng the International Bank o The 
Chase Manhattan Bank had been engaged in international lending 
for decades, and Black could have been expected to bring with 
him the conservative financlal approach of an international 
banker 0 He would understandably see the Bank's activities from 
the viewpoint of a cautious lender, rather than from the view-
POint of a country In need of development capital o 
The influence of the United States, or of the United 
States and the United Kingdom, was not, of course, unlimited o 
Too arbitrary exercise of lnfluence would have alienated members, 
5 5 
and the Bank's activity or membership could have been 
jeopardisedo In particular, the advent during the late 1950s 
of numbers of "emerging " nations, vrith their general community 
of feeling, would almost certainly have led to some change in 
policies to make these nations feel that their needs were 
catered for. 
1. The Effect of Bank Loan Terms 
The interest rates charged by the Bank between 1950 
and 1962 are set out in Appendix IV. The rates rose above what 
'tne Commonwealth paid on other loans during part of the period 
1956-57 to 1959-60. However for much of the period 1957 1961, 
it seems that the Bank was mor~ demanding in its conditions of 
the Commonwealth, until after the Commonwealth was no longer the 
leading borrower. 12 
The terms of the loans, including, as well as the 
interest cost, the average life of the loans, were not designed 
to meet the needs of under-developed countries. These countries, 
which had a large appetite for development funds, could afford to 
service only a small fraction of their requirements at rates of 
interest and amortisation provisions applied by the Banko 
Yet the Bank could have reduced its charges had it 
wished 13 • The Bank's accumulated profits totalled $224 million 
at 30 June 1962. Subsequently, it introduced "soft er" terms 
12 0 The Commonwealth completed drawing the earlier loans in 
1959-60. An unsuccessful approach was made to the Bank by 
Queensland for a loan for the Mto Isa-Collinsville railway, 
which failed because the Mt. Isa Company would not guarantee 
a minimum amount of freight for the line (see e.g. Courier 
Mail, Brisbane newspaper, 10 April 195 The Treasurer, in 
the report quoted in the Textual AppendixJshowed an obvious {)V~/~, 
desire for loans later in 1959, (while the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme was in progress) ~ k /U:.CU t:f.7J ()~fll.. ((~ff;fN./~J'd,,'-~r) fJ()r6~/~-'fd,/~{6. 
13 0 The method of calculation of Bank charges is described in 
the Textual Appendix. 
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for under-developed countries which ~ in addition to the 
establishment of the International Development Association _ 
suggests that the growing influence of the emerging nations 
had made itself felt o However, for virtually the whole twelve 
years to June 1962, the Bank made no signiflcant change in its 
charges to cater for the inability of under~developed countries 
t o meet its loan terms. 
At the same time a considerable proportion of the 
frr eign debt of under-developed countries was in the form of 
loans made or arranged by suppliers of imported gOOdS 14 o Since 
these loans had to be repald within a much shorter period, and 
usually carried a higher interest rate than Bank loans, it is 
tOft (01 nqi 0. {fO'l(eJ.-
clear that many under-developed countries usps Rot ablo to borrow 
as much in the form of supplier-credits as they could have 
afforded on the terms extended by the Bank o Consequently, as 
with the Commonwealth, other Bank policies must have been 
responsible for limiting the loans to under-developed countries, 
while the Bank preferred to keep funds idle o 
At the end of the period a number of the Bank's 
borrowers were according to the Bank15, "nearing t he l i mit" 
of the amounts they could borrow on the Bank's terms o 
2. The Capacity of the Borrower to Repay 
The Bank regarded many factors as important in 
determlning the capacity of a country to repay a loan, as well 
as eXisting commitments of a country's export earnings16 _ 
14·Examples of this type of loan can be seen particularly in the 
EXport Import Bank loan arranged by the Commonweal th o Towards 
the end of the 1950s representatives from a number of countries 
which exported capital goods agreed that exporter-credits should 
not be of more than five years duration o 
15. 5 I.BoRoDo, Eighteenth Annual Report, p .• 
16. 
loB 0 R • D • 't< -e-p-#:i:-t 0 p . 31 . I .l 
_.Iu 4Jrn-trL R 010 k, I,f-C. {l'bf.{i'.I1Jd; ' p~j,U f! s"'dff"'Qf'd(} J (1"ll fl J ¥,dlfPt51 
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"The judgement required therefore involves, among 
other things, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
government administration and of the business community, 
the availability of man gerial, supervisory and technical 
skills, the scale and character of lnvestment and the 
economic and financial policies which are likely to be 
followed, particularly as they affect the level of 
domestic savings and the flow of foreign private capitalo" 
As is shown in ChapterTV, the Commonwealth's debt 
servicing burden remained quite light in relation to both 
national income and export earnlngso Government and business 
administration were effective, and managerial and technical 
skills adequate to meet the Bank's criteria o The factors 
considered important in determining the borrower's capacity to 
repay which made Australia's ne~d for Bank loans less urgent than 
less developed countries were, without exception, easily met by 
the Commonwealtho 
While these criteria would not be difficult for 
Australia to meet, nor, for that matter, any other developed 
country whlch encouraged foreign private capltal, under-developed 
countries generally could flnd difficulty in meeting them o 
Indeed, apart from India - with its carry-over of administrative 
and managerial skills from colonial days - and countries such as 
MexlCO which had struggled towards a relatively higher plane of 
development - under developed countries would have grave problems 
in meeting the criteria o 
Repayments on Bank loans usually, and interest payments 
always, commenced before investments became revenue-earning. 
Consequently, unless there was a further inflow of capital from 
the Bank or other sources, a project financed by the Bank 
norm lly occasioned a net outflow of capital and interes t in the 
early ye rs of its existenceo This outflow would be more onerous 
for a badly developed country than for Australia o To avoid this 
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net drain, a country would need either to invest in pr ojects 
that became quickly profit-earni ng, or to have a progr amme of 
borrowlng that would have the effect of " turning over t! its 
earlier loans o 
However, before the Bank could commit itself to 
providing finance over a period of years 17 , the borrowing 
country would need to submit a long=term programme o This 
requlrement would have been frequently beyond the administrative 
cRpac ity of more backward nations, although the Bank provided 
substantial technical assistance toward this end 18 0 Those which 
had such programmes - eog o India (and Pakistan which combined 
with India on the Indus Waters Scheme) and countries like 
Mexico which had struggled to a hlgher level of development - were 
exceptions o 
Toward the later years of the period 1950~1962, 
apparently wlth rising pressure from "emergent" countries and 
their developed "relatives t! , loans were approved for rural area 
development schemes which were fairly rapidly revenue producing o 
Both Rhodesia and Nyasaland secured loans for the development of 
agricultural areas - for surveying, fencing, feeder roads, stock 
and processing mills o These schemes opened the way for more 
borrowing by under-developed countries19 o 
17 0 AS it dld for Australia, South Africa, India and Japan o 
18 0 33 I.B.R.Do, OPoCit . , p o • 
19 0 The effects of a large increase in primary production on 
the balance of payments of primary- oroducing countries deserves 
some commento The terms of trade 01 these countries deteriorated 
in the 1950s o An increase in production might well have reduced 
their export earnings - depending on the elasticity of demand . 
5 ) 
30 Lending for the Foreign Exchange Component of Specific 
ProJects 
The Bank's Articles require that loans made shall, 
except in special circumstances, be for specific projects, and 
only the foreign exchange component shall be financed 20 • 
Accordlng to this requirement a borrower must 
(except in special circumstances) select a project and be 
prepared to flnd the local currency portion of the funds required 
for its completiono A developed country, it would seem, should 
lave a number of projects being undertaken at anyone time o 
One of these .~ preferably one of such hlgh priority that it 
would be readily accepted by the Bank (and would therefore, in 
any event, have been undertaken in the absence of Bank financing) _ 
could be submitted to the Bank as the basis for a loan . The 
resultant loan WOUld, in effect, lead to an increase in the 
capacity to import, and thus have the actual effect of permitting 
the borrower to lmplement a lower priority undertaking . 
Consequently, 3 developed borrower would not normally find 
dlfflculty in complying with the Bank's criteria in this respect~ 
criteria which in many cases must, for the reasons mentioned, be 
somewhat superficial o 
If State works are taken into account, Australia 
should have found these criteria also rather easy to meet, even 
though the Commonwealth has only a few areas in which it under-
takes projects o However, no loans were secured for State projects. 
Indeed, the Commonwealth took all the proceeds of Bank loans 
between 1950 and 1962, and was only on the sldelines when 
QUeensland approached the Bank for a loan for the Mt o Isa raIlway 
20· S ee Note 2. eto seq. 
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in 1959 G It is possible - perhaps probable - that the 
Commonwealth preferred the States not to unaertake borrowings, 
although the States must also have preferred the cheaper 
internal loan market unless they could secure the Loan Council' . 
consent for any oversea loan they raised to be additional to 
their loan programme o This support would; In general have 
been hard to obtaln o 
As it was, among the seven loans the Bank advanced to 
t he Commonwealth only two - one for Qantas in 1956 and the other 
ln 1962 for the Snowy Mountains Scheme = were for proJects G The 
bulk of the borrowlngs were "general purpose" loans to allow the 
purchase of a miscellany of lmports o The Commonwealth in this 
way was exempted from the provislons of the Bank s Articles
o 
The Snowy loan was the occasion of a further exemption 
from the Bank's usual criterla o The loan covered both local and 
foreign currency expenditures, and not just the foreign exchange 
component o Slmilar exemptlons were given during the period to 
other developed countrles such as Japan, Israel and Norway on 
the grounds that each borrower was "a apital equipment producing 
country2~" 
While developed countries were apparently Ilttle 
hampered by the application of this Bank policy, it is doubtful 
if the same can be said of those competing borrowers which were 
under-developed o These countries, with few projects under way 
~ich had a significant foreign exchange component, would have 
had to design a project wlth the hope of Bank finance, which, 
when approved, would have had to be supplemented by local 
resources o Instead of the Bank loan permittlng an addltional 
lower priorlty project, under-developed countries, it seems, 
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would usually have put aside one or more projects that might 
require prlmarily local currency expenditure in order to 
concentrate on the project financed by the Banko The Bank's 
policy of lending only the forelgn exchange component of a 
specific project was certainly not designed to meet the needs 
of backward countries, and mast have discouraged some from 
seeking Bank finance o 
The Bank appeared to recognlse this difficulty in the 
late 1950s and made a slight attempt to overcome ito Loans were 
made to development banks~ eog o in India, Pakistan and Iran, for 
relending to industry o The effect was ~ the same as for the 
general purpose loans to the Commonwealth, i oeo to provide 
additional lmport capacity o In general, these loans would have 
assisted the private rather than the publjc sector o The Bank ' s 
attitude on the development of the private sector lS outlined 
under a subsequent headingo 
4. Encouragement of International Investment 
The requirement placed on the Bank to encourage 
lnternational lnvestment affected its willingness to lend in two 
wayso In the first place the Bank required developed countries 
to evidence their preparedness to borrow In the international 
marketso Secondly, the Bank required would~be borrowers to come 
to a settlement concerning any foreign debts that were overdue o 
The Commonwealth should have encountered no difficulty, 
at least after 1957, in meeting the Bank's requirement that 
COuntries who could do so should approach the international 
markets for a, least some of the funds they required o Norway 
and Japan were two other developed countries which borrowed both 
on the markets and from the Banko The stimulus given by the Bank 
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ln this way would have led to greater competition between 
developed countries on the markets, and perhaps have slowed 
down the granting of loans to these countries by the Bank o 
The Bank's insistence that any international debts 
in default should be settled before the Bank lent, was set out 
in the followlng terms 22 : _ 
"the Bank will be unable to asslst them 
(would~be borrowers) until they make appropriate 
efforts to reach a fair and equitable settlement 
of their debtso" 
Inl s policy did not affect the Commonwealth but did militate 
against a few would~be borrowers . It delayed the granting of 
loans (and reduced the net finance available to would-be 
borrowers who had to find the funds to settle their debts) o 
Two countries who were in need of foreign funds - Greece and 
Indonesia were still in default at 30 June 1962 and had been 
unable to secure loans from the Bank o 
5. Encouragement of the Private Sector 
The Bank stated23 "that to the greatest extent 
practicable, competitive industry should be left to private 
enterprise"o When a government did participate in an industrial 
project the Bank reqUirea 23 II that government's participation 
would be compatible with efficient operation and will not have 
an unduly deterrent effect o~ private enterprise ". The Bank 
went even further by SaYing 24._ IIMost Bank loans are for basic 
utili ties highways, railroads, power facilities, irrigation and 
22oIoBoRoDo, ~Cito, p041 0 The justification for such a firm 
stand by the Bank seems rather slim o Many original creditors 
would have dlsposed of their holdings of bonds in default and 
others would have wrltten them off to experience . It could be 
relevant that many United States banks participated in the 
indiscriminate lending of the 1920so 
23. 
IoBoRoDo, OPoClto, p0370 
2~. 4 I.BoR.Do, Op.Cito, p. 30 
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reclamation projects and the lik8 ~ which are an essential 
condition for the growth of private enterprises". 
Of these pollcies, Escott Reid said25 _ 
"The Bank's ideological bias again1public 
ownership of manufacturing industry has until recently 
been so strong that to most Western Europeans it, too, 
has been a demonstration of the domination of the Bank 
by predilections and prejudices peculiar to the 
United States oll 
Nevertheless, the Bank made loans to Yugoslavia, where the 
private sector was strongly discouragedo still, the Bank's 
pol icy had important effects on other countries 0 Immediately 
before a loan was granted to Israel for the Dead Sea Works, 
Ltd o, in 1961, for example, the Israeli government divested 
itself of a large part of the capital of the company to private 
. t 26 l nves ors 0 
Perhaps more significant in deterring would-be 
borrowers was the restrictlon on the type of project that the 
Bank lent foro The loans were, as can be seen from Appendix II, 
directed towards the lnfrastructure required by the private 
sector: electric power generation received the most funds, then 
transportation followed by secondary and primary industryo 
There were no loans for social purposes such as housing, health 
and education27 • Consequently, an emergent nation with limited 
funds and a need for expenditure on both utilities and social 
25 oEscott Reid.· 0 Cl·t p 21 po ., •• 
26·I ~ BoR Do Seventeenth Annual Report~ p0220 
press release relating to the loan where the 
action was indicated as being in accord with 
wishes. 
27·Until after 30 June 19620 
See also the 
government's 
the Bank's 
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works could find difficulty in securing a Bank loan unless it 
was prepared to divert its domestic funds toward utilities, 
which would attract a Bank loan o 
At the same time, the Commonwealth's ability to 
borrow should not have been restricted in any way by the Bank's 
attitude toward government enterprise e A loan was obtained for 
Qantas in 1956, and portions of previous loans were used for 
T.A.Ao But, overall, the Commonwealth was not interested, 
~etween 1950 and 1962 in fostering government enterprise at the 
expense of the private sector . 
6. Other Factors Affecting th~ Bank's Lending 
The Bank's lending to the Commonwealth does not seem 
to have been fully consistent with the policies already outlined . 
In many ways Australia met the Bank's criteria e She 
had an essentlally private enterprise economy, had met all her 
international debt obligations, was a consistent borrower from 
the international markets, and provided excellent security for 
the Bank's loans o All of these go far toward explaining why the 
Commonwealth became the Bank's heaviest borrower by 1957, despite 
(or, perhaps more accurately, because of) her developed economy 
and a population of between 10 and 11 million people o 
Why, then, did the Commonwealth's borrowings fall so 
markedly in the subsequent years? The costs of borrowing are 
not a sufficient exploration o Four of the leading borrowers at 
30 June 1962 were developed countries - Japan, France, Australia 
and ItalY e But France's borrowings after 1957 were on behalf of 
non~metropolitan France, and Japan was not a western country o 
Perhaps the explanation lies in a growing pressure by non-
western, and particularly under-developed countries, against 
what they saw as "a bank run by rich countries,,28
o 
It can be understood, with the great need for capital 
throughout the world, that for Australia to have been the largest 
borrower from the Bank at any time was somewhat anom OUS o As it 
was, in 1962 Australia had borrowed almost $~O 2er capita from 
;~'lJ3 f !ls~J;;oWy 
the Bank whereas India and Japan had secured HlP SR l,ciH:e t~o 
per capita o It is reasonable therefore to assume that pressure 
from "emerglng" countries - pressure WhlCh later led to the 
ostablishment of the International Development Association and 
to the inauguration of " softer" loans from the Bank itself - was 
an important force in correcting an anomulous situation e 
Perhaps the same pressure was responsible for the 
reduction in the percentage of the Bank's funds that was invested 
in the United States o This conclusion would hold whether the 
retention of funds had resulted from the wish of the United 
States Government or from the conservative attitude of the Bank's 
management o However , if the conservative attitude of the Bank 
was responsible, Australia might have been expected to maintain 
her rate of borrowing, while less developed countries increased 
theirs o For Australia to have her rate of borrowing reduced 
suggests that the Bank was inhibited in extending its rate of 
utilisation of funds, i oeo, that the Unlted States Government was 
endeavouring to keep a significant proportion of the Bank 's 
assets invested in that country. If this suggestion is correct, 
then between the pressure from under-developed countries on the 
one hand and the United States on the other, Australia slipped 
from her dominant position o 
28 0 See Note 11. 
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INTERNATIONAL BANK MEMBER AND THEIR VOTING 
POWER AT 30 Jm~E 1 962. 
Member 
Afghanl.stan 
A-rgentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgl.UITl 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Burma 
Canada 
Ceylon 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Irelan 1 
Israel 
Italy 
<Tapan 
Jordon 
Korea 
Voting Power 
Percent 
cf Total 
2012 
020 
1078 
029 
3047 
038 
053 
3047 
053 
015 
018 
089 
015 
017 
014 
016 
045 
4081 
4. 81 
032 
.33 
015 
018 
014 
018 
3069 
L09 
015 
.18 
.38 
026 
10 72 
3J)9 
n 10 
Member CJwer 
Percent 
of Total 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Libya 
Luxembourg 
Malaya 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Pdnama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Saudi Arabia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sudan 
Sweden 
Syrian Ar ab 
Republic 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United Arab 
Republic 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
.20 
.33 
.89 
042 
.16 
2.57 
.86 
014 
041 
071 
1. 0 1 
o 11 
.14 
027 
056 
047 
044 
1.01 
1.01 
. 20 
1 . 01 
020 
. 38 
. 24 
063 
.59 
Venezuela 074 
Viet-Nam .24 
Yugoslavia .59 
) , 
.c...c... rI..~ , 16/{~ L"r-h"L...du.-.. ~~ ic4j.;. u4IJ. 
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(SuS mill~on net 0 ~a.ce~lations and refundinpS) 
-
To al Africa Asia and Australia Europe Western Middle ~ast Hemisph€ a 
"-Grand Total 6,544.4 885.1 2,184.9 417.7 ,443.5 1,613(~ 
Dev!lopment Loans: Total 6,074.6 885.1 2,184.9 417.7 i 946.7 1,613.2 I 
f.lec"Lric Pov.:er 2,213.8 247.4 293.0 12';1.3 388.0 956.1 r-
TId.!1sportati.)r.. 2,078.2 429.2 949.9 132.3 68.4 498.4 
l\&.ilrvads 1,031.0 274.2 584.8 37.3 2.3 132.4 R.oad 631.1 87.8 152.0 50.9 
- ~40.4 Slipping 12.0 
-
- - 12.0 
-Port and Waterways 283 . 2 17.2 193.5 
- 46.9 25.6 Air lines a.ld Airports 56.9 
- 5.6 44.1 7.2 
-Pipelines 6/1- . 0 50. 0 1,1..0 
-
- -
Comm .... icatio s 26.8 4.4 
- - 0.2 22.2 
Agriculture and Forest~ 504.7 59.1 16q.5 103.4 87.8 84.9 I F~rm Mechanization 121.1 
- 89.4 2.0 29.7 I Irrig~tior, Flood Control 306 .5 35.0 154.9 6.0 73.3 37.3 L<...!'d and Farm Improvement 49. 3 22.1 13.6 6.0 2.1 5.5 I Crop Processing and Storage 7.0 10 J - - 4.2 1.8 L1 estock Imp~ovement 
.2.6 1.0 I. U 
- -
10.6 I Fore t~ 8.2 
- - 2.0 6.2 
-
I 
..J Indus ,r:v 1,019. 1 105.0 497.5 52.7 312.3 5 .6 I Iron and Steel 350.3 - 314.2 13.4 22."" -Paper and t-' l.p 138. 7 - 4.2 1.1 113. ! 20.0 F rtlli.ze and Chem~cals 82.0 
- 25.0 0.2 56.8 
- [ O+her Indu"'t ""ies 97.0 - 5.2 23.7 58.8 9.3 I Min~ng 203. ) 101.0 54.5 14.3 11.9 21.8 I Wate 3upply 2.0 - - - .0 I -
I u8 Dt!veloomen" Banl.3 I 1/') .6 4 . 0 94.4 - i,b o7C . .le'" . 'wO'5. r 40. 75~ - (; .C -I r ... -I - - r--l--- -.... ct n Loa: ..... 49b.8 I 
- -- '"t96.S 
I I 
... .-
., , < ~ Seven"l-r6'~nth Annual Repo,t /,16 
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30 June 1950 
Country 
France 
Netherlands 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Denmark 
Belgium 
ect) According 
~ 
250 
222 
90 
60 
40 
16 
AP E~DIX ..L 
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INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING 
Six Main Borrowers (a) 
at 
30 June 1957 30 June 
Country ~ Country 
Australia 318 India 
France 268 Japan 
India 240 France 
Netherlands 221 Australia 
Brazil 169 Mexico 
Italy 165 Italy 
APPENDIX III 
1962 
$m. 
846 
488 
419 
418 
406 
300 
to loans approved, but not necessarily disbursed. 
Source: I.B.R.D., Annual Reports, 1949- 50, 1956-57, 1961-62. 
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INTEREST RATES CHARG~D BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANK 
1950-51 to 1961-62 
1950-51 (a) 
1951-52 (a) 
1952-53 (a) 
1953-54 (a) 
1954-55 (a) 
1955-56 (a) 
1956-57 (a) 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
4t 
4t3/8-4t~4t 
ltt-44-7/8 
5~447/8-4t 
4i 
4i 
5~5t-5t5/8 
5t5/8-5i-6~5t~5t5/8-5t~5t3/8 
5t3/8-5i-6 
6-6t-6 
5i 
5t 
(a) In these years the Bank charged a lover 
rate on shorter-term loans. 
Source: I.BoRoDo, Press Releases. 
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CHAPTER III THE SUPPLY OF LOANS 
A. INTRODUCTORY 
The United Nations has published statistics of the 
international flow of capital which remains in the recipient 
country for one year or more. Statistics showing the net flow 
of capital during the period 1951-1961 in the form of 
donations and investment (either as 'Official and Banking' or 
as 'Private') are provided in Appendix I. Only ten nations 
were net exporters of capital and, of these, only f~had a 
substantial net outflow - the United States, West Germany, 
... 4rvvtV 
the United Kingdom and France \:aile Switzerland~lca tac 
pomainaCF e 
Australia was not a recipient of donations, nor of 
official loans 1 , but it obtained loans from foreign banks 2 
and also private investment in the form of direct and portfolio 
investment. This chapter is concerned with that portion of 
portfolio investment raised through flotations by the 
Commonwealth and other borrowers in the public markets 3 
overseas . These loans form part of the gross outflow from the 
countries where the Commonwealth floated. 
Since capital inflow in one form or another is 
set off against outflow, including outflow in the form of 
public loans floated by foreign borrowers, the aggregate of 
1°An exception was a loan made to South Australia for the 
development of Radium Hill. The loan, for the equivalent of 
£4 million, was secured from the Export-Import Bank and the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Commission, and was repaid by 
30 June 1962. 
2· As has been explained in the preface, the supply of loans 
from foreign banks is not covered in the thesis. The Common-
wealth's loans from U.S. banks were obtained as finance for 
exports from the United states. The Commonwealth, as is 
discussed in the following chapter, secured them as an 
intermediary for its two airlines. 
3 The word market (or public market) is used in this chapter 
(indeed, generally throughout the whole thesis) to mean the 
institutional complex associated with the stock exchanges. 
2 
these loans cannot be directly related to the amounts s~own in 
Appendix I. Nevertheless it is reasonable to expect that any 
country which made a significant amount available to other 
countries in the form of public loans would have been a net 
exporter of capital. This statement is certainly true for 
the period under consideration. Those countries whose public 
markets provided sufficient loans to be r egarded as 
international capital markets between 1950 and 1962 were the 
United States (the New York market), the United Kingdom (the 
4 London market), SWitzerland, the Netherlands and West Germany 0 
Other capital exporting countries supplied occasional 
public loans o Sweden permitted about $US70 million to be 
floated in its market by Denmark and orway in the twenty 
years following World War II. The Belgi~ market provided a 
loan for the International Bank, while Italy - quite late in 
the period - allowed a few international organisations to 
secure loans from the Italian market. There was, however, no 
appearance of permanence or continuity in foreign flotations; 
each loan seeilled to be an isolated episodeo 
Even capital-importing nations provided some loans 
through their capital markets o The Commonwealth, for example, 
borrowed in Canada 5 and so did the International Banko The 
4·Where one city has become the accepted financial centre , the 
country's capital market seems to acquire the name of that city, 
even though subscriptions came from throughout the country. 
Where no single city pre-dominates, it is usual for the name 
of the country to be used to describe the market (e.go the 
Swiss , the German and Netherlands markets). 
5°Another example of a market in a capital-importing country 
providing a foreign loan was an I.B.R.D . loan raised partly in 
Austriao 
Ii 
. 
. 
.' 
Ii 
I: 
I: 
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times when these loans were obtained followed periods of 
parti cularly buoyant current account balances? The floating 
of loans in capital-importing countrles is of interest mainly 
because it highlights the lack of direct relationship 
between the amounts of foreign loans and the amount of net 
capital outflow. 
A variety of factors affected the Commonwealth ' s 
ability to borrow overseas in the international capital 
markets. Of basic importance a re the size of the economies 
and the different saving habits of the populations in the 
countries concerned, but these require no special explanation 
here. The matters discussed in this chapter are the economic 
conditions in the lending countries during the period under 
discussion, governmental restrictions on foreign investment 
and the competitive position of the Commonwealth in relation 
to other foreign borrowers, leading to an explanation of why 
the Commonwealth obtained 36% of foreign loans in the London 
market~a but only 5% of those floated in New York, 5% in 
SWitzerland, 3% in the Netherlands and none in Germany?b 
6. 
Canada had a high level of net private inflow from the United 
States and the Canadian market had significance primarily as 
an oddity in providing these loanso The Commonwealth's advent 
on the Canadian market in preference to all other borrowers 
except the International Bank can be explained in similar terms 
to some of the conclusions drawn. 
6a . 
To provide a consistent basis of comparison with other borrowing 
countries , this percentage includes loans raised by all Aust r alian 
borrowerso The percentages are derived from Appendices IV to VII . 
6b o 
After this chapter was formulated three useful publications 
on the security markets - by the Bank of England , the Unit ed 
States Treasury , and H.J . Abs - came to hand. Ea ch is refer en ced 
in footnotes but in addition provided confirmation and amplificati on 
of many points in section B, particularly, and in section Do 
, 
, 
\ 
I 
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B. SOURCES OF FUNDS 
1 0 The Role of the Markets 
Appendix II sets out the Gross National Product, 
Gross Domestic Capital Formation and net issues in the five 
international capital markets and in France (which has been 
included for comparative purposes)o It is noteworthy that 
net market issues are a different percentage of each country's 
Gross Domestic Capital Formation o At one end of the scale we 
have the London market with net issues at 23% of Capital 
Formation, while the remaining countries ranged from 10% to 
16%0 The effectiveness of the markets as institutions for 
mobilising capital obviously varied considerably from country 
to country and, in all countries, the markets' capacities 
restricted the amount of foreign, as wEll as domestic, loans 
that could be floated 
Of the markets listed in Appendix II, only three _ 
the London, Swiss, and New York markets - emerged from the war 
as operating institutionso The institutional structure of the 
capital markets in Germany, France7 and the Netherlands was 
7tL 
completely disrupted and their restoration was a gradual process o 
Partly because this restoration was incomplete 9 and partly for 
other reasons the five international capital markets provided 
varying percentages of the domestic capital requirements of 
their countries and each had a somewhat different institutional 
structure 0 
The funds theoretically available to all the markets 
included domestic saving, funds derived from the conversion of 
7' The French market has been included for comparative purposeso 
I 
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assets (e.g o from the redemption of maturing secJrities) and 
money from non-residents seeking investment o Only a portion 
of these funds is channelled to the marketso In addition, 
not all of the funds arriving at the market are invested in 
fixed interest securities, some, perhaps most, is invested in 
equity securities of some form or another o The choice between 
te€ fixed interest and equity ~ investment would be affected 
by both the erosion by inflation of fixed interest investments 
(an important influence in the period 1950-1962) and the rates 
of interest paid on these investments (which Appendix III shows 
to have risen markedly during the period). However, since the 
amount of net issues shown iq Appendix II includes both equity 
and loan issues, the figures are not influenced by the choice 
between equity investments and loans, but instead indicate 
the proportion of investible funds that is channelled to the 
market 0 
Governmental saving is a part of the savlng which 
would not normally be channelled to the marketo The effect 
of this diversion would differ between countries o In Europe, 
much more than in the United states, governments have extended 
their activities in social insurance, public utilities and 
manufacturing since World War II. Consequently, much more of 
national savings in these countries has come under governmental 
control, with a resultant diminution in funds flowing to the 
capital marketo 
The savings of businesses also tend to be used for 
self-financing (including direct investment overseas) rather 
than to be free for investment on the market. Partly because 
of the lack of funds on the market, businesses in Germany were 
granted generous depreciation allowances after the war, and 
-
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although the proportio~ business savings r prp~ented 01 domE.,,~. 
saving fell toward 1960, self-fin9.ncing vIas still common
e 
In 
France, businesses still met 64% of their own needs in 1961 and 
1962, while the Radcliffe Committee said (in 1957) that retained 
earnings were the most important source of capital for indu~ JI ial 
expansion in the United Kingdomo The rate of self-financing by 
United states corporations appears to have been at least as 
high as in ~uropeo Although corporation savings could, ln part, 
be placed with banks or directly on the market (since savings 
and capital requirements would not be balanced in each 
corporation) businesses would give preference to their own needs 
(at home or abroad), possibl'y even when this expansion 
represented an uneconomic use of their funds. 
Household saving, plus the savings of non-profit 
institutions, therefore forms the bulk of the funds usually 
fairly free for investment on the marketc This means that, 
apart from 'leaks' from the two sources already discussed, the 
markets, at the end of our twelve year period, could look 
toward obtaining between about 15% (in Switzerland) and 41% 
(in France) of gross domestic saving8 0 In oaFlioF yoaFs, the 
pOFeontag06 lTore different, o,go bgugehgld gavings in Gor~any 
weI e less tl9:8:fi 20% 13et~{oon 1950 and 1955 aad ia 1955 these 
8° The remaining figures are: Germany, 21%; United States, 28%; 
Netherlands 31%; United Kingdom~ 33%0 From HoJo Abs, The 
European Security and New Issues Market - a report presented to 
the Institute International d'Etudes Bancaires, November 1964. 
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However, even household savings were fr lUPl t Y 
diverted from the market o Nowadays, these savings are deposited 
more often than not with financial intermediaries such as 
savings and commercial banks, pension funds and investment 
trusts. The existence of such intermediaries often fa~ilitates 
the functioning of the market by the mobilisation of investible 
funds into fewer hands 0 Conversely, as these organisations 
come to control larger amounts, they can make their investments 
without using the facilities of the marketo The extent to which 
they use the market's facilities has an important influence on 
its sizeo 
In the United states, lnsurance companies held about 
one third of all fixed interest securities at the end of 19620 
In the United Kingdom, insurance companies were at least equally 
important as investors, and the same appears to be the case in 
Switzerland and the IJetherlands o In France and Ger~any (where 
they contpibuted to only about 10% of net security acquisitions) 
they are not so firmly associated with the marKet and, in any 
case, were much smaller than their English counterparts9 o The 
remaining funds were directed towards mortgage loans or private 
placements for which non-marketable securities were received o 
Commercial banks in general seem to prefer shorter-
term loans than are available on the market, but in Germany and 
Switzerland they are large holders of securities and act as 
underwriters 0 In both countries they hold a considerable amount 
90 U•S • Treasury, Economic Policies and Practises - NOn 3. 
A Description and Analysis of Certain ~uropean Capital Markets, 
Joint Committee Print, Uc~. Government Printing Office, 1964, 
p . 28. 
..... "'" . - -
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of non-marketable securities from private placpments
o 
French 
banks , by endorsing and renewing short-term bills created 
vi~tually their own capital market. Continental savings banks 
have also participated in direct lending outside the market~ 
but are important as subscribers in the Swiss market
o 
Investm nt trusts provide an alternative depository 
for savings o They are important in the United States (where 
their assets were over $20,000 million in 1962, having increased 
fourfold in tel. years)10~ Switzerland (where their assets 
multiplied six times between 19)0 and 1962 to total Swiss 
f r ancs 6,000 million11 ) and in the United Kingdom12 • The growth 
of these trusts was stimUlated by inflation, and the trusts often 
favour ed equity invest ents. However, they did not as 
frequently make direct placements as other financial 
intermediaries, and therefore tended to make more use of the 
mar ket. Their weakness in the Netherlands and Germany and 
their prohibition in France could well have weakened the 
markets in these countries \oThere the flow of savings would 
have been channelled to othpr types of institutions. 
While it is not practicable to compare the influences 
described above in a sufficiently precise fashion to arrive at 
the percentages shown in Appendix II, it is easy to see why the 
markets are so restricted for funds, and why some of the 
markets are r elatively more important than others o 
10 oAbS , Op.Cito, p.35 
11 ·U .S. Treasury, Op Cito, p.276 
12o Ibid ., p.238 
I~ 
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Two further implications arising from th~ nr'aE~~ 
of a capital market should be stressed. ~len borrowers and 
lenders find a market to be inadequate for their needs, they 
naturally formulate alterrative arrangements outside the market& 
An inadequate flow of funds also makes the provision Gf capital 
less efficient and increases costs of borrowing o Because of 
these two factors, a market tends to perpetuate its weakness o 
2. Capital Inflow 
The lack of direct relation between net capital 
exports from, and of gross (and for that matter, net) foreign 
flotations in, ea h country has already been mentioned o 
Among the net capital exporting countries there were many who 
were recipients of foreign investment, and this investment 
could well augment directly, or indirectly by competing in 
I ~ related fields with domestic investment, the funds flowing 
I 
I: I 
to the capital marketo 
In some countries, the amount of capital inflow 
would be greater than that taken into account in Appendix I, 
which covers investments in securitles with one year or more 
to run before maturityo This would be particularly true of 
the United states and the United Kingdom, which have the 
currencies most commonly used for international reserves and 
for trading transactions o Other countries which invested their 
reserves in sterling or dollar securities would hold a fair 
percentage in Treasury Bills or time deposits with less than a 
year to maturity, and the amounts held in this way would 
augment the inflow already taken into account for the U.S. 
and U.Ko 
, 
I 
r 
I 
I 
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Capital inflow supplemEnts domestic fund~~ By 
increasing the amount of money available, capital inflow 
increases the flow of funds to the capital market directly _ II 
I; fo r example by the purchase of shares and other securities 
I' 
on the exchange - or indirectly, by replacing domestic funds 
whi ch could go in part to the market o (In the United states 
mar ket , considerable subscriptions to foreign loans have been 
made f r om outside the United states, but since these 
subscriptions affect foreign loans in particular, they are 
discussed later~) 
The United States and the United Kingdom were not 
the only two countries to hold ' substantial amounts of foreign 
curr ency between 1950-1962. The Netherlands market was in a 
hi ghly liquld position (and was opened to foreign borrowers) 
in 1954, as a result of low wages and prices and an influx 
of foreign money130 Swiss investment trusts depend on non-
14 Swiss investors for about one third of their funds ,while 
Swiss bank investments on behalf of foreigners was estimated 
a t $2,500 million 5. After convertibility was achieved i n 
1958 , there was also considerable direct investment, and 
foreign portfolio investment in Germany equities and in loans 
floated by Germany public authorities16~ 
130Swiss Bank Corporation, Prospects, Basle, April 19630 
14 0Bank of England, International Investment - The role of 
se cur ity mar kets, Quarterly Bulletin, 0une 1963, P.106. 
15 0 u.S • Treasury, Opo Cit., p0276 0 
16' I bid pp .157 and 1580 
, 
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Consequently all the countries with internatlona~ 
capital markets were recipients of foreign investment, much of 
which went to the money market (short term securities) or to the 
capital market either by portfolio investment directly or 
Ii through a financial intermediary. The desire of the two 
countries with international currencies to encourage the 
I 
investment of foreign funds (in contrast to SWitzerland which 
limited the scope for investment of foreign money) led them to 
ensure that their capital markets provided adequate facilities 
for investment e~go by offering varieties of government 
I ' securities and using governmental saving to support their 
loans
17
. The markets in these countries therefore benefited, 
I 
not merely by the placement of foreign funds, but also from the 
benevolent care of their governments~ 
1
7
·
By way of contrast, the French government did not borrow long-t~rm in the market between 19~9 and 19620 
I~ 
I 
I 
, 
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C. CHANGInG ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
1. The Effect of Foreign Exchange Restrictions 
Following the 1939-45 war all Buropean countries 
introduced exchange controls and even in 1962 those controls 
affecting foreign borrowing were still generally in operation. 
In France formal authorisation was required for direct and 
other investments abroad but approval appeared to be obtainable 
without difficulty except for the flotation of foreign issues 
on the French market 18 • The permission of the Bank of England 
was required in the United Kingdom, and while this was 
obtainable freely after 1958 for direct investment 19 , it was 
not so for portfolio investment 20 and foreign loans were 
restricted to members of the sterling area from 195121, 
Capital flows between members of the Benelux Economic Union 
(established in 1960) are intended to be free but Belgium 
permits all exports of capital at higher, unofficial rates of 
exchange except for the flotation of foreign issues 22 ; the 
Netherlands similarly controls foreign issues while permitting 
use of the unofficial exchange rate for other capital exports
c 
The Swiss National Bank regulates, primarily by agreement Vlith 
the commercial banks, the amount of foreign long-term loans 
18· U•S • Treasury, Ope Cit., po120 o 
19· Ibid , po255o 1958 was the year in which sterling became 
convertible o 
20 o Ibid Po257o 
--, 
21· Ibid p.262, 
- - , 
22· Ibid p.66 . 
- -, 
: 
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floated in the Swiss market 23 . 
Ger~any, however, relaxed controls on foreign 
i ssues in 1958, although the government still had the power 
to r egulat e foreign exchange if it wished 24 • Thus the Germen 
market became as free from governmental r egulation as the New 
Yor k market had been between 1950 and 196225~ These two were 
exceptions to the general run of capital markets during the 
per iod under consideration o 
Where borrowers had free access to a market, 
increased foreign borrowings might be expected to follow a 
downturn in domestic economic activit Yo During periods of high 
domestic activity, competition from domestic borrowers tends 
to force foreign borrowers from the market, partly by their 
demand prices being exceeded, and partly through the sheer 
quantity and frequency of domestic issueso Any subsequent 
period of tight credit would make foreign borrowings even more 
difficult, but in the subsequent chase of the cycle while there 
was a slackening of domestic economic activity we could expect 
to see a reduction in interest rates and an increase in foreign 
lending until domestic demand fo r capital grew againo 
In those countries where exchange controls were 
maintained (ioeo in all markets but few York and, later in the 
23o Ibid , p0277-278. 
24· Ibid , p.156, 158 0 
25· And , indeed, until the introduction of the Interest 
Equalisation Tax in 19630 
, 
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period, Gernany), a reduction in public loans to for~~~n 
borrowers appears to have been an early step taken to protect 
external balanceso 26 A number of reasons exist for other 
forms of capital export being given preference, including:-
a. The ease of controlling foreign issues; 
b~ The cessation of foreign issues did not entail 
the disruption of long term planning or 
commitments by domestic organisations or of 
governmental aid programmes; 
Co The greater earnings of direct investment helped 
future external balances more than portfolio 
investment; 
do Institutional loans were more frequently used for 
export finance than were public issues; 
eo ~ More influence csn , probably exerted at 
governmental level by organisations which made 
direct investment in, or institutional loans to, 
foreign countries than by those who invested in 
foreign publIC loans o 
Controls might therefore be expected primarily to 
have accentuated the effects of normal cyclical influences on 
foreign loans o Foreign lending was cut off, rather than 
declined, and generally remained at lower levels than Interest 
rates would have perrnitted o Again interruptions to foreign 
260 The same prioritIes can be seen in the introduction of the 
Interest Equalisation Tax in the United states two years before 
efforts were made to reduce direct Investment and institutional 
lending 0 
I 
, 
I 
~ 
, 
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flotations lasted longer in Switzerland and the Netherlands 
where controls existed, than in the United States after 19~. 
This may help to explain why the inverse relationship one 
would expect between the interest r a tes shown in Appendix III 
and the amount of foreign borrowing set out in Appendices IV 
to VII is not at all marked. The use of annual averages for 
interest rates, and annual totals for foreign loans, also 
blurs the relationship. Consequently, it is preferable to 
sketch briefly the changes in economic conditions and to 
link these with the amount of foreign loans. This is done 
° th f 11 ° to 26a ln e 0 oWlng sec lons o 
Before relating domestic activity and foreign lending 
in the individual markets, two long-term influences might be 
mentioned. One is the effect of war damage on the capacity of 
most European countries to export capital in the early 1950's, 
which is mentioned below in relation to the individual markets , 
and is noticeable in the detailed figures used in compiling 
Appendix 10 The second is the upward secular movement of 
interest rates as countries abandoned the cheap money practices 
of the early post war yearso A similar movement in Australian 
interest rates, and in the costs of the Commonwealth's foreign 
loans~ is shown in Chapter Vo 
20 Economic Conditions in the United States 
I The pattern of foreign borrowing in a free market, 
I' 
I 
I 
which has been described above, can be seen in operation in the 
United States between 1950 and 19620 
The United States' post~Korean boom approached 
its end in 1953 when interest rates rose sharply. In the 
following period of reduced activity and slackness in the 
market and declining interest r a tes, preparations were made 
for a Belgian and an Australian loan, both of \vhich were issued 
26a. 
The information on economic conditions is derived mainly from 
TY'lh':>'Y'Y'I!:lt-;('\Y'll M('\Y'lAt-!:l'Y'V Fllnn. Annlll'll Renort!=:. various issuesn 
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at the end of 195427. A simi lar aggregate amCJllL" (a..., 
$50 million) was raised in the following year by foreigr. 
borrowers located outside North America, but interest rates 
rose again and even Canadian and Internat'onal Bank borrowings 
fell to a low level o 
The tight fiscal and severe monEtarYj measures 
introduced in 1955 were not completel! relaxed until early 
1)58, when the discount rate of 3.5% prevailing in C'vember 
1957 fell to 1075%0 The volume of foreign borrowing (excluding 
Canada and the International Bank) inrreased in 1957 and rose 
to $240 million in 1958 0 International Bank borrowing 
recommenced in 1957, after a wo year absence from the market, 
and the Bank and Canada between them raised almost $700 million 
in 1957 and in 19580 The period of easy money in 1958 saw a 
peak in borrowings both by the International Bank and by 
!V~tlI. borrowers located outside tLe ,<' Amerlcar CO!l~lneIl 0 • 
/a'z<"~~  I~ Although there wa~ no Zrct'nJIx J::!a~_rriCjC~ ~~~in 1958, forelgn borrowings continued at a relatively 
high rate until toward the end of 1959 1 when interest rates 
rose above the statutory limit for United states government 
bonds 0 Australla's September 1959 loan was floated shortly 
after a sharp increase in interest rateso Foreibn borrowings 
fell but were not completely discouraged in 1960, when 
Australia raised more than half the loans secur8d oy non-N~7h 
American borrowers o The long-term governmental bono rate 
continued at a somewhat lower level until JilllC 1l )2, and the 
27 0 8ee Appendix IV for the amount of foreign loans floated 
between 1950 and 1962 in the New York market o 
, 
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flotations by foreign borrowers (excluding the In~ernationa: 
Bank and Canada) continued to rlse o They reached $261 million 
in the first half of 1962 0 
3 . Economic conditions in the United Kingdom 
It was not until 1954 that the United Klngdom 
government felt able to allow government s of the British 
Commonwealth to borrow for general programmes of developmento 
Even then it added 28 : 
"The United Kingdom Government will therefore 
wish to be sure, first, that the programmes as a 
whole are in conformity with the general policy of 
concentrating on the improvement of the St erllng 
Area's balance of payments, and secondly, that the 
country concerned is making an adequate contribution 
from its own resources o It is also necessary in the 
general interest for the timing of any such borrowing 
to be carefully regulated o" 
The announcement followed an easing of monetary 
conditions in 1953, accompanied by approvals for additional 
foreign loans o In 1954 approvals were given for the same 
amount 29 0 However in 1955 a series of rises in t he Bank Rate 
made investors hold off (in anticipation of further rises) 
and no major issues, domestic or foreign , were floated in the 
first six months o Interest rates remained at a high level 
until 1958 while the government strove to protect the country's 
external balances from movements of short term funds 
occasioned by the Suez crisis, trade imbalance and the fear 
of devaluation of sterlingo 
28°communique issued after the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' 
Conference, January 19640 
29 0 See Appendix V for the amount of foreign loans floated 
between 1950 and 1962 0 There are press statements to the effect 
that the Australian Prime Minister had secured appr oval to float 
a loan towards the end of 1954 ~ This loan did not eventuate. 
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It was not until 1958 that the amount 01 f01fl~ll 
loans rose noticeably. Borrowings from the Export-Import 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund had helped tide the 
country over h8r crisis, and the government showed its 
confidence by maklng sterling convertible, by lovrering interest 
rates to encourage domestic investment (which had fallen 
dangerously in the previous years while investment goods were 
exported) and permitting a larger volume of foreign issues o 
Foreign loans, which had fallen to £14 million in 1957 increased 
to £66 million in 1958 0 
The amount of foreign loans was reduced to £48 
million in 1959, and early in 1960 deflationary measures were 
again introducedo By June of that year the Bank Rate was at 
6%, and governmental securities were being sold to force the 
long-term interest rate up~ Apart from a slight easing in 
the first half of 1961 - when Australia and New Zealand floated 
loans - conditions re~ained tight on the market ~nd there were 
no further foreign borrowings until 1962 when interest rates 
were allowed to fall againo 
40 Economic conditions in Switzerland 
Switzerland's capacity to export capital wa not 
adversely affected by the war. Her traditionally important 
sources of funds - tourism and investment earnings _ which 
normally more than compensated for her customary tr~de deficit, 
were supplemented by forelgn-owned funds seeking safety in the 
franc 0 Des pi te the government's effort s to dis courage the inflovr 
of "funk" money (by maintaining low or even negative rates of 
interest on foreign deposits and preventing foreign investment 
""""" -I 
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in real estate) the inflow continued for most of the p~I'i l(,: 
1950-1962, and the caoital market, except for a year or two, 
provided a continuous streaill of foreign loans o 
The ~arket, which had been re-opened to foreign 
borrowers in 1947, was slow in accepting foreign ifsues, no 
doubt due in part at least to the international economic and 
political situation, and bank loans and direct and individual 
portfolio invGstment were virtually the sole means of capital 
export 0 However public loans increased from Swiss francs 50 
million in 1951 to 428 million in 1955 and 2b5 million in the 
first part of 195630 0 During the last three years the small 
trade surplus of 1953 had turned to a deficit in 1954, which 
doubled in the following year and redoubled in 1956, when the 
market was closed to foreign borrowers. 
Measures were introduced to reduce domestic 
consumption and the government succeeded in keeping interest 
rates at low levels by world standards o By the end of 1958 
capital inflow. including repatriated funds, and the reduction 
of the trade deficit permitted the market to be re-openedo 
The volume of loans was allowed to increase in each 
subsequent year and reached a peak of Swiss francs 1,012 
million in 1961 0 
300See Appendix VI for foreign loans floated in Switzerland 
between 1950 and 19620 
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5. Economic conditions in the IJetherlands 
The ~Tetherland' s tradi tional posi tion as an 
exporter of private capital was weakened by war damage and by 
outlays required to supnort Indonesia and Surinam in the early 
post-war years, By 1)53, the increased capacity of ~he 
economy, the decline in investment in the colonies, and 
foreign purchases of Dutch securities had increased the volume 
of capital available o In 1954, the market was opened for 
foreign borrowing, and in the next year foreign loans totalling 
FL 277 million were approved3 'o 
A growing trade deficlt and the reduction of capital 
inflow led to the closing of ' the market at the end of 1955, 
leaving it free for the consolidation of municipal loans
o 
Alt hough the etherland's foreign debt was reduced in the 
intervening period, the market remained closed until 1961, 
when foreign loa~s amounved to FL507 millionc The amount of 
foreign loans authorised for 1962 was reduced to give more 
scope for borrowing by the private sectoro 
310See Anpendix VII for forelgn loans floated in the 
Netherlands between 1950 and 1962. 
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D. OTHEh FACTORS AFFECTInG FGREIGf BORROWII G 
1 . Restrictlons on Investors 
It has been customary in developed countries for 
trustees, and institutions such as savings banks, life 
insurance companies and pension funds which act in a trustee 
capacity, to have the scope of their investments restricted 
by legislation o This restriction is overtly designed to 
protect their funds from ill-advised investment, but has an 
important effect in providing a captive market for certain 
borrowers and partlcularly for domestic government securities
o 
Most foreign loans (n all tne international 
"1Uj~-dIJA.J. ftn"' 
capi tal market s were e1 .Jr.. ~ ~ . '0 to " _lx b subs cr iptions 
from trustee-type investors between 1950 and 1962. In New 
York and London there were important exceptions among the 
foreign borrowers. In New York, Canadian governmental 
securities were expressly excluded from the restrictions, and 
"colonial " government issues (inc.:ludlng tne Commonwealth's) 
were given simil r preferential treatment in Lonnon. The 
effects in the two cases were dIfferent: virtually all foreign 
issuers in London could accept subscriptions from trustees, 
while Canadian borrowers were effectively singled out from the 
general run of foreign borrowers in the United States
1 
and 
Canadian issues became identified with domestic rather than 
with foreign loans o 
As well as Canadian issues, any issues in ew York 
which were guaranteed by the United States government were 
eligible as trustee investments o As a result, Panama's loans, 
the interest and prinCipal of which were made first chErges on 
the Panama Canal rentals payabl> by the U.3. Government, and 
International Bank dollar loans, whlch were balned Ly 8 
uncalled capital subscription of the Unlted states government j2 , 
came within the scope of trustee investments o However, the 
legislation of the several states required in many cases 
separate negotiation, and although Bank securities were ear~y 
accepted as trustee investments in I evr York State - which was 
the main financial centre - the Bank spent several years 
negotiating with other States o 33 
The freedom of savings banks and life insurance 
companies to invest in forelgn bonds was widened somewhat 
during the twelve years as a rt>sult of efforts by foreign 
borrowers, underwriters and he institutions themselves
o 
The relaxation was gradual, but legislation in 1956 which 
permitted New York Insurance companies to invest a higher 
percentage of their funds in foreign loans was regarded as 
noteworthy by the financial press o New York insurance companies 
represented a large portion of lnsurance business In the United 
states, ana the New York Tlmes in commentlng on the legislation, 
said34:~ 
"At the end of 1955, the assets of life insurance 
companies in the United states totalled more than 
$90,000,000~000a About 40 per cent of this was held by 
four great New York companies 0 00 if the proposal just 
enacted goes into effect, an additional $3)0,000,000 of 
life insurance trust money would become eligible for 
investment in foreign securities other than those of 
Canada. " 
32 •See Chapter lIe 
33 See Appendix VIII for the restrictive effect of State 
legislation on subscriptions to Commonwealth loans, 
34 e 1bi£ I April 1956 , p. IO. 
I j 
Despite the r elaxation that occurred before 1962, 
some types of financial i nstitutions could still invest only a 
fraction of their funds in for eign loans o Consequently, with 
the exception of a favour ed few , foreign borrowers were able to 
tap only portion of the funds flowing to the Lew York and 
continental markets o Since the markets are greatly dependent 
on financial institutions, and many of these are trustee-type 
institutions , this barrier to investment restricted the 
volume of foreign loans and must have increased the costs 
of borrowing. 
The extent of the variation in cost might be partially 
indicated by the 35 year Republic of Panama loan which was 
floated in April 1958 to yield 4~75% - pre~isely the same as 
a 20 year City of Montreal loan floated at about the same time o 
Such a comparatively low cost could not be expected from a loan 
to which trustees could not subscribe. Of course, the effect 
of the guarantee was not only to broaden the market for 
Panamanian securities, but also to give both trustees and 
othe r inve stors a greater assurance that payments on the loan 
would be met - a subject which is discussed in the following 
se ctiono 
20 Investors' Attitude to For eign Bonds 
The int er est r ates shown in Appendix III relate to 
domestic governmental bonds and therefore do not r eflect the 
added yield required by investors from foreign bonds o If the 
averag e of the additional yield r equired for foreign issues in 
ea ch market were to be a dded to the appr opriate interest rates 
shown in the appendix , the resultant figur es would provide an 
index of int er est yields on foreign bonds in each market
o 
I' 
I' 
I! 
I ~ 
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A most impor tant determinant of the extent of the 
margin between the r ates offered on foreign and domestic 
government bonds is the difference in risk as calculated by 
investorso Other influences include the restrictions on 
t r ustee - type of investment, which has been discussed already, 
and taxation advantages that commonly accrue from domestic 
governmental bonds o These latter influences, however, remained 
largely unchanged35 in the international capital markets between 
1950 and 1962 except for the relaxation on investments by New 
York financial institutions discussed in the previous sectiono 
Consequently, the risks associated with investments 
in foreign bonds at different times between 1950 and 1962 can 
be compared fai r ly accurately by isolating the additional yield 
offered on foreign bonds o It is of course, important that a 
comparison of yields be based on averages over a sufficient 
period of time to isolate the effect of different interest-
payment dates and of episodic disturbances to yields - such as 
a political announcement on foreign matters, or of official 
sales or purchases of domestic government securities o 
Table IX shows the average yields on selected 
Ii foreign Swiss Confederation bonds in three periods o 
Ii 
I: 
I: 
35 0 A reduction in the comparative demand for equity investment 
(per haps as a r esult of diminished inflationary tendencies) 
could well have incr eased the demand fo r all fixed interest 
securitie s during this periodo 
I~ 
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TABLE IX : YIELDS ON SELECTED FOREIGIJ M,D 8WISS 
COHFEDERATION BOIJDS 
GENEVA STOCK EXCHANGE 1955, 1956 AND 196~ 
4% 3t% 3t% 4% 2i% j10 
Period (a) Aust. Austo Sweden France Confederation 
April-December) ~ .l2.ZQ. l2Q2 ili2. ..L2.z.g ) 
1955 ) 3.62 3075 3097 3093 3004 
1956 3074 3081 3 097 4000 3.09 
1962 3 . 40 3.50 3058 3058 3 . 16 
(a) Average of weekly yields for the periods shown
o c-
12.74 
2099 
3 011 
3018 
The difference between the averages of the foreign 
bond yields in the table and the average yields on the SWISS 
Confederation bonds was 0 0 80% in 1955, 0072% in 1956 and 0 034% 
in 19620 Some of this reduction could be accounted for by the 
yields moving together as the loans came closer to maturity 
but this reason is not sufficient to explain the narrowing of 
the margin by about t%. It is reasonable to conclude that 
investors came to regard foreign bonds as a less rIsky 
proposition between 1955 and 196236 • 
This conclusion is in line with a comment made in 
SWiss banking circles, to the effect that 37 : 
I: "If the export of capital in the form of foreign 
I; loans did not develop rapidly, it was because the memory 
I' of mis-adventures induced caution and because th€ 
I political and economic situation of certain ountries 
desirous of borrowing from Switzerland was still 
uncertain. " 
36 0 It is assumed that the Swiss government applied similar 
criteria during the period in determining, in the light of 
economic conditions, the amount of foreign loans it would 
allow to be floatedo 
370Swiss Bank Corporation : Prospects No. 91; Basle, 
April 1963 p.4. 
I 
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On the New York market, in 1955 the Commonwealth's 
1954 issue yielded 136% of United states government bonds with 
a similar maturity o In 1956 the percentage was slightly smaller, 
while the same calculation on the average of yields during the 
first half of 1960 on 20 year bonds of each issuer gave a result 
of 125%0 The decline in the margin is noticeable, but is not 
nearly as significant as it was in Switzerland o Had there 
existed controls on the amount of foreign loans (as in 
Switzerland) the decline may have been more noticeable as in 
a freer market any greater general willingness to invest in 
foreign bonds might be expectect to stimulate an increase in 
foreign bond issues 0 This increase would tend to 11mop up" the 
additional funds becoming available as a result of the greater 
confidence in foreign loans o 
The risk seen by investors would also be taken into 
account by underwriterso New York underwriting firms are 
divorced by laF from investment institutions (hence the 
emphasis on dealers described in the Textual Appendix). 
Unsuccessful loans could be calamitous to underwriters whose 
lack of funds for long term investment would force them to 
dispose of securities soon after an unsuccessful flotation _ 
a situation which contrasts with the London practice of using 
financial institutions as sub-underwriters 0 Underwriters in 
general , but particularly in New York, could therefore regard 
the unde r writing of some loans as being too risky, even with 
a reasonable increase in feeso 
There is some evidence to show that a South 
African loan scheduled for early 1951 in the New York market 
3ra. ivas abandoned at the last minute because the underwriters 
97 
became nervous amidst changing market conditions
o 
Furthermore, 
the International Bank has long propounded the view that its 
borrowing activities help to pave the way for further borrowing 
by less credit-worthy foreign borrowers G Thus there is both 
experience, and an expert view based on experience to support 
the view that the risks of foreign lending can prohibit 
borrowers from floating loans o It is therefore reasonable to 
suggest that the nervousness of underwriters could have been 
an important contributing factor in delaying foreign flotations 
in New York until market conditions became very favourable in 
1954-0 
Between 1954- and 1962, underwriting charges on 
foreign borrowings in New York decreased, more or less parallel-
ling the relative reduction in interest yields already 
discussed o The change in underwriting charges for certain 
borrowers is set out in Table Xo 
TABLE X: UNDERWRITING PREMIUMS IN NEW YORK (a) 
Year Australia Bel~ium Denmark(b) New Zealand Norwal E C.&S.C.(b) 
% % % % % 
1954- 2-5/8 2-5/8 
1955 20566 
1956 2-5/8 
1957 2t 2-5/8 3-1/8 
1958 2t 2t 20533 
1959 2t 2070 
1960 2t 20533 2t 
1961 2t 2t 2t 
1962 2t( c) 2t 2-5/8 2t 2 ~ 533 2t 
(a) "Gross spread " appearing in Registration Statements 
York, lodged with the Securities Exchange Commission New 
expressed as a percentage of the face value of each loan . 
- ,.... 
~ 
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(b) These borrowGrs, and in earliGr years Belgium and Denmark 
as well, also reimbursed underwriter s exp6nses to the 
extent of $25 000 to $50 0000 
(c) Subsequently reduced to 2-3/8%0 
Source : Registration Statements lodged with the Securiti vs 
and Exchange Commission o 
Swiss underwriting charges are not generally 
available, but it is safe to assume that these charges moved 
in the same way as did the charges on the Commonwealth i s loans 
in Switzerland~ While underwriting costs fell for the second 
Commonweal th loan in 1955 '. presumably because of the greater 
interest of investors - they increased for the 1961 loan o38 
The only reason consistent with the circumstances of the 
increasE is the combination of a greater number of acceptable 
borrowers (which is again consistent with a greater interest 
by investors in foreign loans) than the government would permit 
to borrow, combined with the bargaining position of the under-
writing monopoly existing in Switzerland. 39 
The reasons for lnvestors regarding foreign loans 
as being more risky propositions in the early 1950s appears 
to have been summarised in the quotation above from Swiss 
sources ~ The effects, as we have seen, lay not only in the 
higher yields demanded on foreign bonds~ but perhaps much more 
importantly in the reluctance of firms to underwrite foreign 
I, 
I, loans. This reluctance could largely explain the low level 
Ii 
of foreign borrowing in the early 1950s in the New York and 
SWiss markets, which were not structurally affected by the waro 
38 0 See Chapter I ) Appendix VII 
39 0 See the Textual Appendi~ 
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The reluctance of underwriters to arrange flotations when the 
markets were unsteady compounded the risk investors saw in 
foreign flotationso This double-counting of risks _ by 
underwriters and investors might well have accentuated even 
in more r ecent years the effects of cyclical disturbances on 
the amount of foreign borrowing o 
30 Investments from Other Countries 
As well as the funds owned by non-residents which 
tended, directly or indirectly, to augment the general flow 
of funds to the international markets, there were investments 
made by non-residents directly into foreign loans floated in 
some of the markets e The attractiveness of a particular 
currency would, once again, lie in the interest rates available, 
and the relative safety of the currency from devaluatione 
These investors, being non-residents already holding foreign 
currencies, would not usually have the parochial outlook of 
many domestic investors and would therefore find the higher 
Ii interest rates available on loans floated by foreign borrowers 
I: II 
I: relatively attractive o 
Before European currencies became generally 
convertible, the dollar and Swiss franc had particular 
attractions because of their convertibility and apparent 
Ii freedom from the dangers of devaluationo The volume of United 
States trading and foreign investment also led to considerable 
dollars coming into the hands of foreigners or United States 
firms or nationals located in foreign countries . A 
sUbstant ial proportion of subscriptions to foreign loans 
floated in New York is known to have come from foreign sources o 
,~ 
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Robert Gemmell4-0 has related the ebb and flow of 
foreign subs cript ions to forelgn loans with market conditions 
in the United states by using the following table:-
TABLE XI : U.S. PAR TICIPATION IN DOLLAR BOND ISSUES 
U.S . ParticiQat10n Yield on new U.S. 
Per cent CorQorate Issues Quarter Amount of total $m % % 
1957 I 4- 0 20 II 17 4-9 4- 04-8 III 9 30 4- 068 / IV 4-04-4-
1958 I 3 20 3 .74-II) 17) ) 59 3065 III) 25) ) 4-027 IV 6 14- 4- . 4-2 
38 4- . 32 1959 I 15 II 34- 65 4- 072 III 18 82 4-.94-IV 11 22 5011 
1960 I 3 100 4- ,, 86 II 3 25 4- . 74-III 
- 4- 057 IV 8 51 4- 066 
1961 I 14- 93 4-.31 II 23 72 4- 053 III 
- 4- 053 IV 20 54- 4- 032 
1962 I 35 70 4- 04-0 II 89 64- 4- .1 0 
4-0· R. F• Gemmell~New ~Foreign Bond Issues in the U . S~ Market" 
Eederal Reserve '~~~tin, Washington, May 1963, p0586 et seq . 
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From the table it can be seen, as R.F o Gemmell says, 
that yields on domestic issues rose from the second to the 
third quarter of 1957, and the percentage contributed to 
foreign issues by United states residents declined~ In the 
fourth quarter of 1958, percentages subscribed by United states 
residents were lower tha~earlier quarters when the capital 
market conditions were easier o Again, as the market eased 
following the late 1959 and early 1960 stringency, United 
a~nl/I/U£ ~1!dM /t1-(J~ /L~1ilr .i/v<.ka. 
states participation increasedo thoFe eaA ~9 AO Qo~bt~ 7~".d~ 
thepefope, that market conditions in the United states 
affected the amount of foreign (and local) participation 
in foreign loans floated in New York. 
Some other factors not mentioned by R.F. Gemmell 
also appear to have influenced the degree of foreign 
subscriptions o There would be a natural tendency for less 
effort to be used in seeking subscriptions through European 
dealers when United States subscriptions were heavier, and 
this would accentuate the effect of United States' market 
conditions on the level of foreign subscriptions o Another 
factor which would influence the level of foreign subscriptions 
would be the changing position of the dollar, through the 
incr easing convertibility of other currencies, problems 
encounter ed with the United States' balance of payments, as 
well as the r e-open ing of other capital markets and increases 
in interest r ates available on either domestic or foreign 
loans floa t ed in Europe. These last forces could help to 
account for the lower average level of European investments 
in 1961 and 1962, when United States subscriptions to 
1 02 
Australian loans in New York kept above 60% compared with 
about 40% in April 19600 41 
The general effect of foreign investors' interest 
in foreign loans floated in New York was to i ncrease the 
amount of loans that could be floated without commensurate 
increases in cost o Other implications were described by 
Nathaniel Samuels, a representative of the First Boston 
Corporation, in the following terms 42 :_ 
"By taking advantage of this New York 
investment banking mechanism, a foreign government 
or foreign private company is able to raise money 
in the United States and in six or seven European 
countries simultaneouslyo The issue thereby taps 
European markets which may not be open at the 
moment convenient to it, and also thereby raises 
larger sums than would be available to it in any 
one of these European markets o While only one or 
two million dollars may be available in one country 
to an issuer at a given moment, New York has proved 
a more convenient market than any other in which the 
issuer could raise these sums in several countries 
in one operation o" 
4 0 Excursis on The Capacity of the Swiss Market to Absorb 
New Foreign Issues 
The Swiss market had the cheapest rate of interest 
on foreign loans for much of the period 1950 to 1962 ~ Yet 
only the International Bank established a pattern of' 
borrowing there and obtained individual loans of more than 
Swiss francs 60 million (£6 . 1 million) o The capacity of the 
market for the loans of individual borrowers, in a country 
where both the government and the underwriting monopoly may 
exercis e control over new foreign issues, is consequently of 
some interest in the patternof foreign lending between 1950 
and 1962. 
41 °From information suppl ied by the Underwriterso 
42·Nathaniel Samuels "The Investment Banking Background of 
Issuing and Marketing Foreign Securities in the United States", 
lecture delivered at a conference on legal problems of inter-
national financing at the Yale Law School Mar . 1 3, 1962, pp . 3,4. 
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It is habitual for a new issue to be floated at 
a lower price than comparable "mature" loans and for the 
prices of securities regarded as close substitutes to be 
depressed until the supply of additional funds over a period 
brings the yields back to their earlier comparative level
o 
In the London market, new issues are subscribed in instalments 
over a period of three months or more, thus reducing the 
immediate need for funds for a new issue o The New York 
market (and foreign subscriptions to loans in that market) 
relies more on the activities of dealers who secure a much 
greater commission than their London counterparts, but whose 
commission may be lost if the bonds they place are sold too 
soon on the marketo 43 The Swiss procedure does not appear to 
rely on either of these approaches, and the prices of 
securities which are close substitutes for the new issue fall 
markedly and for a long period o 
The ordinary concept of elasticity is not appropriate 
unless defined quantities of specific commodities can be 
employed in the calculation, and price movements are not 
influenced except by changes in the amount purchasedo These 
conditions do not apply to a new issue, when movements can 
occur in many securities and where underwriters may "feed" 
the new securities, like a monopolistic retailer, onto the 
market 0 The use of a time basis to calculate the market's 
capacity offers a satisfactory solutiono 
11-3 e See the Textual Appendix ~ 
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The issues used for the calculation of the ~ime 
taken by the market to absorb a new issue are a Commonwealth 
and an International Bank loan floated in Aprl1 and March, 
respectively, in 19610 To isolate the price of the new issues 
and of another Commonwealth lssue (floated in 1960) from 
general market movements as they affected foreign bonds it 
is necessary to use an index of yields on 'other foreign bonds 44 
This index has been expressed in Table XII as percentages of 
the yields on the Commonwealth and on International Bank bonds
o 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
June 
July 
Aug 
Sept 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1962 
Jan 
Feb 
TABLE XII COMPARISON OF YIELDS ON NEW SECURITIES 
ISSUED IN SWITZERLAND (a) 
Yield on 
Index 
% 
4019 
4017 
4 014 
4024 
4 0 18 
40 20 
4030 
4036 
4037 
4036 
4034 
4034 
Index Yield Expressed as a Percentage of ~J~on' 
(Q)Commonweal th Bonds <.b,)International Bank 
Maturing in- bonds maturing in 
1225: l.92Q l2.Z..'1 
10505 
10307 
101 00 
102 06 
100 05 
10002 
10104 
102 06 
104 00 
10503 
104 08 
10509 
10102 
102 08 
10503 
104 08 
1040 9 
10505 
107 08 
110 09 
11105 
11207 
11303 
11109 
11201 
11109 
(a) Monthly average ,)f weekly prices on the Zurich 
Stock Exchange" " 
, 
44· The index comprises an Austrian loan maturlng in 1980~ 
an Italian (Cas sa) and a Danish loan, both maturing in 19740 
I 
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The table shows interestlng patterns of movements 
in the percentages listed for Australian and International 
Bank bonds e The Australian issue which matured in 19Vf weakened 
in February more than the Y101QS Q& the secur l ties comprislng 
the index and this weakening continued untll July~ when the 
yield started to fall by comparison wlth the indexo Obviously. 
the weakness was caused by the impendlng new 1ssue (which was 
first quoted on the exchanges in August) stimulating sales by 
(bY.d..IM eW.J4) 
people who were to underwrite (or sub-underwrite) the new loan) 
as only these or their confldantes would have been aware ln 
II-Ita.. February of the impendlng iss~eo 
One explanation for the sales could have been the 
desire of underwriters to force the Commonw2alth to offer a 
higher yield on the new issue thus offering a greater capital 
gain for investors (including those underwriters who subscribed) o 
However, the bonds did not rise to their earl ler comparative 
"equilibrium level" until Octob ~r o This delay suggests that 
the market for Australian bonds was very thIn and the early 
sellers did not over-anticipate the short- t er m effect of the 
new issue o Apparently underwri ters sold Commomveal th bonds they 
already held perhaps only to take up the new lssue, and the 
market for the bond s was so "thin" that the price fell - but 
no lower than it was after the flotation of the new issueo 
The International Bank loan maturlng in 1979 was 
issued in March 1961 and was first quoted on the exchanges in 
May of that year o The table shows that the yield on the 
securities issued by the Bank fell gradually until November 
1 0 ~ 
when their prIce reached a peak before de lInIng slifhtly~ 
possibly In antIcipation of another Bank loan which was floated 
in January 1962? 
It would be Interesting to go further and consid,r 
the relative "absorption rates" for rlustralian and Bank bonds? 
The SWISS francs 60 mIllion of Australian bonds Issued in 
April took until October to reach theIr appropriate relative 
price, ioe" about 6 months while the Swiss francs 100 million 
Bank issue took 5 months o As the amount of Australian securities 
outstandIng before April 1961 was only Swiss francs 180 mIllion~ 
while the Bank had SoF.520 mi~lion outstandIng - maklng 
increases of one third and one fifth respectively - it seems 
that the market was prepared to absorb more readily a 
proportionate increase of Australian bonds than of Bank bondso 
However If the earlier. pronounced, weakening of Australian 
bonds is taken Into account, then the market virtually requIred 
nIne months to absorb the new Issue - the additional prelIminary 
period being used by some institutions to adjust their portfolios 
in anticipatIon of the new loano A further complication arises 
when it is seen that the Bank had floated loans tota ling 
SoFo 300 million SInce 1959, compared with S F. 120 million by 
the CommonweEltho In the face of these and other difficulties 
a suitable basis for comparison is not readily availableo 
....... ,... 
~ --. -
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E~ COMPETITION BETWEEN BORROWERS 
10 The absence of free comQgtition 
Free competition to secure funds at the lowest 
available rates would tend to equalise interest rates between 
countries 0 The lack of such competltion is shown by the wlde 
disparity between the interest rates of the countries in 
Appendix 111 0 The control on the amount of foreign loans 
described earlier restricted competition by foreign borrowers 
in all markets but New Yorko In effect~ the market was 
available to foreign borrowers only to provide capital exrn~t5 
surplus to domestic needs that were to be m~t bx~the market, ~u clJ-~~ ~ Cr~aJ-.H-~ ~J.& ~/io and~su~plement~ ~ funds required for direct investment and 
official donations and loans~ 
Governments also used their power to give preferred 
access to certain foreign borrowers o The Internatlonal Bank 
was given preference in most markets, including Switzerland 
(with which It had the "special relations" mentioned in 
Chapter II), and in many countries, such as Italy., Austria and 
Belgium whose markets were not in practice, open to foreign 
borrowers between 1950 and 19620 The amount of loan raisings 
by Belgium in the Netherlands indicates that the former 
country was given preference in the same way, (a not unexpected 
gesture from one Benelux country to another), although not to 
the same extent as members of the British Commonwealth were in 
Londono 
This preferential treatment extended to New York 
where most foreign loans were eligible only for restricted 
I 
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investment by trustees but Canadian loans were given the 
privilege of being trustee investments in the United states 
Discrimination in London was reduced because most if not all 
of the borrowers permitted to approach the market were 
eligible for trustee investments (and only in this last 
market did governmental controls favour under developed 
borrowers) 0 
The flotation process itself also tended to prevent 
competition, in that both officials and underwriters would 
endeavour to prevent clashes between loans o The Bank of 
England managed the "queue" of borrowers on the London market, 
as did the Netherlands Bank for the market in that countryo 
However even where the central bank took no such action, 
it could be expected that underwriters, in order to achieve 
a successful operation, would arrange their flotations to 
avoid periods when the market was being strained by other 
loans e This practice would naturally lead to certain clients 
being given preference by the underwriters < Details of such 
preferential treatment would be hard to obtain but from the 
list of borrowers shown in Appendix IX, it would appear that 
(probably for commercial reasons) the Swiss underwriting 
monopoly gave preference to international corporations during 
the period shown o Less credit-worthy borrowers could generally 
be expected to suffer from the management of flotation dates 
between underwriting firmso 
2. The successful borrowers 
In this section, as in the previous chapter~ 
borrowers are considered in relation to their stage of 
development 0 Borrowing nations are grouped as developed 
~ 
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capital-exportlng, developed capital- importing , or under 
developed o45 
Of the fifty under developed countries that obtained 
loans from I uB.R.D . , the I.D.A. or the market s, only fourt een 
borrowed on the markets Predominantly these borrowed in 
London o The percentages they secured of total foreign loans 
MCl-
in the four markets were: -
Location 
London 
Switzerland 
New York 
Netherlands 
Percent of 
Total Foreign Loans 
% 
30 
7 
The remaining countries secured the percentages of 
foreign loans shown below: -
Location Capital Importers Capital Exporters International 
Bank 
London 63 
New York 63(a) 10 
Switzerland 30 47 
Netherlands 16 69 
(a) Of which Canadian borrowers secured 51% 0 
45 0 The distinction between developed and under-developed 
countries is as previously, based on the classification 
employed by the I.D.A. The countries included as net 
exporters of capital are those so listed by the United 
Nations International Flow of Long-term Capital and 
Official Donations 1959- 1961 0 
7 
26 
16 
15 
-"=- - -
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The under-developed countries did not obtain a 
substantial percentage of loans raised except in Londono Their 
loans in that centre, and elsewhere, were dependent on special 
conditions o London was a "protected" market for members of the 
Br itish Commonwealth and the under-developed colonies had their 
loans guaranteed, and enjoyed freedom there from the competition 
they would have met elsewhere o Loans raised by the Belgian 
Congo - which accounted for virtually all raisings by under-
developed countries in SWitzerland, and about one quarter of 
their New York borrowings - were guaranteed by Belgium and 
therefore were regarded quite highly by investorso Panama, 
which raised half the groups' borrowings in New York, had to 
set aside future Panama Canal rentals payable by the United 
States, for the servicing of her loans o Under-developed 
nations therefore, required favourable conditions in particular 
markets or special conditions attached to their loans for them 
to obtain funds on the capital markets between 1950 and 1962. 
Outside London their competition for loans was more potential 
than realo 
A number of under-developed countries could not 
afford the interest rates that would have been demanded and, 
even if they were prepared to pay, may not have been able 
to secure underwriters for their loans o Most borrowings by 
capital-exporting countries were secured by private organisations 
seeking cheaper interest rates, usually in SWitzerland, than 
prevailed in their own countries at the time; at other times 
these organisations preferred to borrow domestically (The 
international character of some firms also raises problems in 
classifying their borrowings in certain countries as domestic 
or foreign o) 
) 
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The high percentage of loan~ secured by capital 
exporting countries in the Netherlands refJects the favoured 
position of Belgium, a contiguous country with close trade 
and cultural ties However, Switzerland s lending has b~en 
dispersed, fairly widely between capital exporvlng countries 
in recent years, primarily to private organisations or to 
organisations of the European Economlc Community 
The International Bank had a dual role vis a-vis 
other foreign borrowers The Bank borrowed in all the 
international capital markets and in many other countries as 
well between 1950 and 19620 . In many cases the Bank was the 
first foreign borrower to float, at least for many years, and 
appeared to be doing as it claimed - actlng as a "bell wether" 
in encouraging investors to subscribe to foreign loans The 
Bank could hardly be regarded as competing with other foreign 
borrowers in these circumstances ~ vrhen few other foreign 
borrowers would have been able to raise loans However, the 
Bank's loans in the established international markets 
undoubtedly reduced the loans available to other foreign 
borrowers, even in Hew York where no quantltative control on 
forelgn borrowings was exercised and where lnvestors to a 
great extent i regarded the Bank as a domestic borrower
o 
The capital markets in general displayed a lending 
pattern which was more conservative than the International 
Bank's, whose prominent borrowers included India Mexico and 
Pakistan~ Developed countries were the maln borrowers in all 
centres but Londono Capital-exporting countries were prominent 
borrowers indicating that a noticeable amount of foreign loans 
I~ 
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were raised because of the differences prevailing between 
borrowing costs in the markets of these countrles from time 
to time o (These borrowings, naturally did not result in an 
increase of net capital exports by developed countriese) 
Under-developed countries had little choice of raising loans 
unless their loans were guaranteed by developed countriese 
~ 
! 
I 
t 
l 
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r 
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F. THE COMMOl W~1iLTHiS COMPETIT1V~ l)OSITION 
The per cen tages s eCl~r eo oy <1::, ra I a. In ea 1 cen re 
between lj50 and ~')L,; were: Lundon 36%; A vi {ork, 5%; 
Swi tzerland, 5%; ... etherlands., 3%? On::'y.:.n S\Oll tzerlc:.rlG therefore 
did Australia raise less ~r.an all underoeve.(Jped countrIes put 
togethero Competitlon lor loans In wltzerland, However came 
primarily and particularly In recent years~ from capital exportIng 
countrles~ In New York but only if Canadian and InternatIonal 
Bank borrowings are excluded, AustralIa secured as much as all 
other capit·' ImportIng countrIes combIned and naIf as much as 
dId capital exportlng countrleso 
T11<:)se percentages do not necessarlly IndIcate the 
Commonwealth's competItive positiono In the flrst place interest 
rates probably were too hIgh from time to tIme and from place to 
place for the Commonwea:t~ to seek oansa Secondly, capltal 
exporting countrIes ( ucn d~ Belglum) w~uld not nave been as 
consistent borrowers ~s the Commonwualtn eC~U2e their needs 
(Including the need::, of prlvate enterprlse ) could more frequeltly 
be met from the domestic marketo S mIlarly, some developed capltal 
importlng countrles (suCh as .orway and ew Zealand) may also have 
had a less constant demand than the Commonweal tho 
As we have seen" restrictIons on access to the markets 
prevented unlform supply conditIons for all borrowers o In London 
the Commonwealth had three advantages She was amongst the few 
permitted access to the market s 'lnd out of these was on the 
~ as6 
average, the largest holder )f ,{ terling balan' 8S" Furthermore. 
the United Klngdom authorltles were conscious of the net draln on 
1 1 4 
reserves caused by cash loans. and the Commomvea.l th IS rais 1ngs 
'vere wi th two exceptions~ convers' on loans wnich d1d not affect 
the balance of payments o 
The ·,ttitude of investors must therefore be gauged in 
some fashion other than by the amount of loans raised. In New 
York, investment advisers attempt :0 Itgrade" borroViers by giving 
them a credit-rating, but these ratings are too subject1ve and 
crude to be of real use o The most suitable comparison appears 
to be by comparing the Y1elds offering on the securities of 
different borrowers but carrying slmil r maturity dates, and by 
assessing these yields over a period of time long enough to 
remove most short-term factors In th1S way it should be possible 
to gauge the relatIve regard Investors had for the securities of 
the borrowers over the period o 
AppendIx X shows the average YIelds offered on securIties 
of selected borro\vers In the different markets (Including Canada) 
expressed as a percentage of the YIeld offered on Commonwealth 
securIties o In general the Commonwealth's rating is high. In 
~l markets the Commonwealth's securlt1es offered no higher YIeld 
than most developed foreign countries o ~ere others offered a 
lower yield It 1S possible to suggest a fairly obvious reasono 
In London, for example, Commonwealth secur1ties were 
not quite as well thought of as UnIted Kingdom government 
securl tIes but the Y1elds of the two \vere suffic1ently close 
to illustrate the effect of the prov1sions of the ColonIal Stock 
A t ' 46 ct on dom1nlon securi les o New Zealand securIties, also 
See Textual Append1xo It is also possible that the Bank of 
England could have been selling UoK~ government stock at the 
time to increase long term YIelds, thus forcIng yields on 
U oKQ and dominlou stocks temporar ily closer together 0 
1 1 5 
providing an avenue for trustee Investmen , nad a sl_ghtly 
lower Y1eld than Commonwealth securlties~ T'e Commonwealth s 
heavy conversion programme and a ~eries r f unaersubscribed loans 
had no doubt led to a large holding of Commo \'ealth se l ... rI t1es 
by Institutions involved 1n the underwrit"rg 0f loans? Alt.ough 
a New Zealand loan floated in May 1361 was 88% undersuoscrIbed. 
the effect on the market may not have been as great as that of 
the Commonwealth's more frequent approaches to the market at 
times which were largely determ1ned by the dates of the matur1ng 
loans o There 1S also a possibil1ty that Commonwealth slnkIng 
fund purchases were less than New Zealand s over the period when 
the yields were comparedo 
The New York market showed a more distinct preference 
for domestic government securIties. a feature which would be due 
probably to their greater eligibility for lrve~tment by f1nancial 
inst1tutions and taxation benefits as we1~ as to the greater 
marketabill ty of large parcel s of Un1ted StateC' government bonds o 
Canadian and International Bank securl ties offered a much Imver 
Yleld than Commonwealth bonds, due to tne access t1ey had to a 
w1der field of investors as \.,ell as the g'la 'antee possessed by 
Bank secur1ties~ and the close cultural anj f1nanc1Ql tles and 
their geographl al proxImity between Canada and the Uni ed Stateso 
On the other hand. the Commonwealth s more consIstent pattern of 
loan rais1ng resulting in a wlder fIeld of 1nvesto s acquaInted 
with it and its loans and consequent greater marketabilit\ ,47 
seems to have been largely responsible for the Commonwealth's 
47 See Chapter V AppendIx III 
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securi ti es being more highly regarded than Belgl urn s or ! ew 
ZealJnd s, but closer cultural and financial tIes could also 
have been influential 0 
The situation was reversed In '::>Vlitzerland where 
BelgIan securitIes rated slightly higher than the 80mmonVlealth's 
The reason appears to be that In tnat market~ BelgIan loans 
(includIng those of the Congo as a BelgIan territory) had been 
more frequent than the Commonwealth So By way of contrast~ SwedIsh 
and French government loans - both capital exporting countries 
which had secured loans some tIme previously48 - allhough 
apparently more secure as investments offered hIgher interest 
yields, apparently because the securIties were traded infrequently 
and investors regarded them as being less "lIquid" than Belgian 
or Commonwealth securltles o The International Bank's securities 
showed up weakly because the average had LO be taken over a 
period when the market was still affected by a Bank flotation49 • 
In the Netherlands~ similar forces caused Belgian 
and Norwegian loans to carry lower Interest rates than the 
Commonwealth'so Both~ also. are contIguous, and In a market 
where Investors had met few foreIgn loans thIS factor would be 
more important than In the other markets already dlscussed o 
Austria's economic condition would explaIn the lesser regard 
investors had for AUstrian bonds o 
The attitude of Investors to South African securItIes 
was unenthusiastic but not uniformly sOo SWJSS investors 
were more nervous than others of South AfrIca's racial Lroubles 
480 The loans shown in appendix VI as beIng raIsed by France and 
Sweden were not arranged for the governments of thore countrieso 
49 0 See SectIon D 4 of thIS ~ha)tero 
I 
I 
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but United States investors - probably less cloistered in 
their outlook on multi-racial relations - were not much less waryo 
But in London tAe ~pi9Q sf South African bonds were rated 
comparatively higher - perhaps because of the long-standing 
relationship between the United Kingdom and South Africa, perhaps 
because the loans were still trustee investmentso However, the 
comparative yields available on South African securities in all 
markets shows the attitude of investors to issuers who are 
likely to encounter serious political and/or economlC problems, 
and exemplifies the difficulties which continua l ly confronted 
under-developed countries in approaching the international 
capital markets o 
-
I 
I 
I 
( 
I 
1 2 0 
APP.!:, 
DOHBSTIC G(V.l:!;htTl1fIH IOHu-T.t;,Rh BUND IIl!;LDS IlJ 
81LECTED COUNTRIB 97)-1962 
(Annu~l Averages) 
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Net Internatlonal Flow of Long-Term Capita~ and 04ficlal Donations 1951-1961Ca) 
Capital Exporting Countries 
APPENDIX I 
Millions of Dollars 
DONATIONS OFFICIAL AND BANKING (b) PRIVATE TOTAL 
Belgium 4-8 j 766 '(19 Germany (d) 
- 1,4-4-2 
- 3,30, ~10 
- 4-,957 Fi~nd (c) 89 128 102 j 1 5 France (g) 
- 1,195 
- 3,826 1,4-35 
- ~,586 Japan 393 299 4- 688 Netherlands 
. l:-3 775 4-07 325 Sweden (c) 12 181 21 190 Switzerland 386 
- 2,133 
- 2,519 United Kingdom LI-81 
- 1,925 4,906 
- 7,312 United States (f) 
-20 ,84-1 5,633 
-24-,011 
- 50 ~ 4-85 TOTAL 
-24,4-34-
.16,4-63 
-30,099 
-70,996 
(a) Long-term generally refers to loans and investments for periods exceeding one year, but there are 
some mlnor exceptions: in the tables for Belgium; the United Kingdom (in 1951 only); and 
official capital for 1960 and 1961. 
(b) Excludes transactions of central banks and private monetary institutions for 1960 and 1961. 
(c) In 1959, 1960 and 1961 these countries were classified as importers of capital
o 
(d) Excludesrestitution payments to prlvate resldents of forelgn coun~ries. 
(e) For 1961 includes dlrect investment only. 
(f) Excludes military aid for the period 1951 1959. 
(g) Includes official loans and donations of metropolitan France to franc area countries and 
estimates of flows of private long-term capital to the overseas franc area. 
Sources: United Nations: International Flow of Long- Term Capital and Official Donations 
1951-59 (pp2-3) : Ib d ' 1959-61 (pp 6-7) 
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PPt.. JIX I 
DOH1STIC GCV1~Ht HI H lCJlJJ-Tl:'..RL BUND YIELDS IN 
S1LECTED COUNTRI1 19JO-1962 
(Annual Average::;) 
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SECURITY 
and Fixed In~erest Domestic Ca ital Formatio 
G. N • P. (a) G.D.C .F . (b) Net Is sues (c) 
I II III 
Milliards of Na onal Currency Units 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
Germany 
France 
1,567 
80 0 616 
1240 6 
135.08 
978.3 
96985 
265 
Ilt.27 
35.lt 
35.8lt 
260 0 8 
202 It 
3501 
2.1lt 
8 0 61(d) 
3.62 
26 o lt2 
25.63 (e) 
National Account Statistics, (United (a) United Nations, ~Y~e~ar~b~o~o~k~o~f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Gross National Products . 
(b) United Nations 7 Ibid, Gross Domestic Capital Formation. 
Nations , 
III as % 
IV 
13.2 
23. 0 
16 .. 0 
10. 1 
1001 
12.7 
1961t) , 
(c) 
( d ) 
Bank for International Settlements, Thirty-Third Annual Report, (Basle 9 1963) ? p.lt9o 
Includes privately placed issues, and the pe rcentage in column IV has been ad justed 
downwards from 24.3%0 Supplementary information was derived from Bank of England, 
Quarterlv Bulletin, June 1963, ppllO-lllo 
(e) Gross issues, hence the percentage in column IV is overstated. 
of II 
(f) 
(d) 
(f) Issues in the United Kingdom in 1962 exceeded the total of issues in 1960 and 1961 combined. 
As the calculated percentage (of 15%) was not indicative of the capacity of the 
market a revised percentage was calculated. 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
r 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1 2 0 .... . \. ' 
DOHESTIC GC\Tl<.hIll-1bn lC)Hu-Tt.RL BuNlJ IIELDS Il~ 
United 
Stat(.s 
2 32 
2057 
2068 
2.92 
2.52 
2.80 
3.06 
3.4-7 
3043 
4.07 
4.02 
3.90 
3095 
SE1~CIED COUNTRIBS 7~()-1962 
(Annual Average~) 
United 
Kingdorr: 
3,54 
3078 
4.23 
4.08 
3075 
4. 1 '1 
4-.73 
4.98 
4. 98 
4.82 
Switz-
erlani 
2.95 
;>084-
2 0 5) 
2.62 
2.97 
3.12 
3u65 
3017 
3008 
3 13 
Ne t her-
lands 
3.28 
3088 
3> 95 
3.43 
3. j 1 
3026 
3.84-
4-058 
4.32 
401 ? 
4.20 
Ger!Ilanya) 
5.78 
6.38 
5028 
5067 
5.04 
4-.52 
609 
7. 5 
608 
6.4-
5.9 
5.9 
a) Mortgage bond rate used up to and Including 1955, and, 
thereafter, governmental A.uthoritles' bOld-rate. (The 
mortgage rate is decrL';lsed by a governmental subsidy 
on housing loans and taxation benefits, combined with 
this subsidy, have helped tl walntain a high level of 
interest rates). 
Source : International Honetary Fund~ Internation Financial 
Statistics, various dateS. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
DAVIS POLK WA~DWELL SUNDERLAND Be KIENDI. 
Borrower 
Au s t ral ia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Congo 
Cuba 
Denmark 
Copenhagen 
France (Credit 
Foncier) 
Italy (Cas sa) 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Devt. Bank 
Telephones 
Netherlands 
KoLoM. 
Amsterdam 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Oslo 
Panama 
Rhodesia 
South Africa 
E.Co&SoC .. (a) 
SnE .. Pinelines 
TOTAL 
Canada 
Intern'al Bank 
GRAND TOTAL 
.. -' ~-., 18 BROAD 8TftEE T 
1950 1951 
146 248 
150 
146 398 
NEW YORK IS. No Y. 
1 2 1 
Foreign Bond Issues on the New York Market 
$ IDlllion 
1950 to 1962 (First Half) 
1952 1953 195'Lt- 1955 1956 1957 1958 
25 25 20 50 
25 
30 30 
15 
8 
15 
10 
15 29 
6 
25 40 
35 50 
55 48 25 85 240 
170 199 71 84 319 359 325 
110 75 100 275 ltoo 
280 274 226 132 344 717 965 ' 
1959 1960 
25 50 
20 
50 
30 
12 
30 
19 
10 
27 
35 
21~ 95 27 173 
125 
489 393 
'I APPEND1X IV 
19?1 1962 TOTALS 1st 
Half 
25 6(' 280 
25 
25 30 115 
15 
8 
20 40 
15 15 
I 50 
I 30 
12 
30 
20 18 38 
20 18 38 
19 
15 
20 25 g~ 18 
10 20 
27 
6 
~~ 
65 
145 40 
128 261 1,150 
154- 85 2,607 
100 1,335 
282 446 5,092 
(a) European .oal and Steel Community 0 
Sources: ~nte" ~ional Bank , Ann a Re ort for Bank borrowings ), Canadian borrowings -Intern ional Bank, Summary 0_ Foreign Bonds T 'pd in Various Markets, (for 
1950-5'0.1, estlmates based on Bank of Canada .... .;a-~l st cal Summary (for 1960-61-62), 
and prospectuses issued by o~her borrowers o 
--- -,.- -------- " 
--..,------- - - -
I 
1 
Commonwealth 
Other Aust. 
e\-, Zealand 
Rhodesia 
I.B.R.D. 
South Africa 
East Africa 
Jamaica 
orway 
Ceylon 
Barbados 
Guiana 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Other 
TOTAL 
APPENDIX VIII 
DAVIS POLK WA~DWELL SUNDERLAND Be KIENDI. 
....... _- .... . 
1250 1921 
6 5 
6 
5 
12 10 
(a) 
(b) 
( c) 
18 BROAD STftEE T 
NEW YORK IS. H. Y. 
", 22 
l:AJOR FORBIGN LO.hl,':: (CASH }UlD C :VERSIO 
1220-1262 
£Stg. million 
1922 1953 1254 1252 1256 1727 1958 
( 12) (11 ) (7) 31 (b) 
2 
(10) 10 10 5 20 
7 10 10 10 10 
5 11 
3 1 
5 4 3 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
2 
20 34 36 26 26 14 66 
1259 1960 
(20) 26(c) 
10 
10 
(5) 
3 
3 
3 
48 33 
The loans shown in brackets are conversion loans 
Includes £16 million conversion 
Includes £14 million conversion 
1961 
(20) 
20 
40 
Source : Prospectuses ~nd Financial Times, London, various issues. 
-- -- . --_ ... ----,------.... _--- "'~-..,...--:-
LA_ 
1962 
1st 
half Total 
127 
8 11 
10 85 
68 
26 
17 
15 
7 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
2 4 
20 385 
1 5 
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DAVIS POLK WARDWELL SUNDERLAND & KIEND1. 
....... _- ... .. 
18 BROAD 8TftEE T 
NEW YORK S. No Y. 
1 2 ~ 
FOREIG BOND' ISSL6S 01 fHE SWISS 11&RKET 
(Mil~lons of Swiss Francs) 
1950~1962 (first half) 
CounGries and international 
1950 1951 
-:952 1953 1954 1955 ~956 1957 organizations 
.1958 
Argentina 
- -
-
- - - - -
-
AuC"tralia 
- - - 60 
- 60 
- - -
Austria 
- -
-
- -
- 5 40 Belgium 50 
- 50 - ~O I - - - -Canada - - - - 11 
- - -
Congo 60 
- 60 60 
- 60 
- -
Denmark , 
- -
. 
- -
-
- - -
Finland 
- - - - -
- - - -
France 
- - -
- 37 50 
-
- 52 United Kingdom 
- - - - -
- - -
-
Italy 
- -
-, 
- - 160 85 
- -
Netherlands 50 Norway 
- - -
- - 25 40 
- -
Peru 
2 6 7 11a 
-
Portugal 
- -
- - - -
- - -
South Africa 50 85 85 35 - - -Sweden 
- -
- - 110 
- - - -
United States 
- -
- - 75 30 :0 I - 50 Western Germany - - - - - - - 12a E.C.S.C. (e) 
- -
- -
- - 50 
- -
Interfrigo (f) 
- -
- - - -
- -
-LB.R.D. 50 50 100 50 50 
- - -
TOTAL 210 
1959 1960 1961 
- - 32 
- 60 60 
15 
- 95 
50a 50a 100t 
25 60 
-
- - -
65 50 25 
- - 30 
-
- 18 6C) 110 160 
- - 150 
50 
65 50 I 8 
- I -- - 4 
50 
- -
40 
- 40 
50 110c 60 
- 50d 80 
- - -
10 
- -
I 
100 120 100 
50 247 226 397 428 285 I 16 154 530 660 1012 (a) Conversion 
(b) Of which Sfr. 50 millions conversion 
(c) Of which Sfr. 15 millions conversion 
(d) Of which Sfro 35 millions conversion 
(e) European Coal and Steel Community 
(f) A European Corporation with registered offices in Belgium 
Sources : Annex to the Swiss Bank Corporation Bulletin No. 86 of MaYch 1962 and subsequent 
pr ospectuses issued in Switzerland. 
-- _... - - -- ---,.-.-- --- ....... _.,....-.-
1C b2 
1 st- Tct~s 
Half 
- 32 
- 240 
- 155 
- 34C 
1C 106 
- 240 
60 200 
- 30 
- 1""1 
120 -+) ) 
- 39C' 
- 10 
- 188 
- 2 
-
- JOe. 
-
190 
60 485 
50 192 
-
t;L 
- 0 
1vO 720 
I 
40C 4615 
1 >:< 5 
AFPENDIX VIII 
DAVIS POLK W ARDWELL SUNDERLAND Be KIENDl. 
· .. ..,· _-w . 
Borrower 
Belgium 
Petrofina, Brussels 
Antwerp 
Liege 
Wagons - Lits 
Water Distribution 
Belgian Petroleum 
Sabena 
Brussels 
TOTAL BELGIUM 
IoB.R. Do 
Norway 
Ship Credit 
Oslo 
TOTAL NORWAY 
Eurofima, Basle 
French Petroleum 
Naphtachimie 
TOTAL FRANCE 
South Africa 
Investment Bank 
European Coal and Steel 
Community 
SoE. Pipe Lines 
Australia 
Anglo-Rhodesian Devto 
Copenhagen Telephone 
18 BROAD S T ftEET 
NEW Y ORK S . N. Y. 
Forei 
195Y- 1955 
100 100 
10 
6.5 
10 
10 
126 05 110 
ltD ltD 
35 
35 
15 
15 
50 
26 . 6 
166.5 276 06 
1961 1962 First Half 
75 75 
12 . 5 12.5 
50 
10 
22 
30 
169.5 117.5 
50 50 
12.5 
30 
42.5 
30 30 
40 
40 
50 
50 
50 
ltD 
2rJ 
507 237.5 
APPENDIX VII 
TOTAL 
350 
10 
6.5 
10 
3500 
50 
10 
22 
30 
523.5 
180 
35 
1205 
30 
77.5 
60 
40 
15 
55 
50 
50 
50 
50 
40 
2606 
25 
1,187.6 
SOURCE: De Nederlandsche Bank NoVe Annual Reports, and prospectuses lssued Slnce Dec. 1961 
._-- _. --.--- -~- ,--........---~- -- - - - - - - -
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APPENDIX VI II 
DAVIS POLK WA"OWELL SUNDERLAND Be KIENDI. 
...... __ ........ . 
MORGAN STANLEY & Co. 
2 Wall Street 
Xew York 5, New York 
Dear Sirs: 
18 BROAD STftEET 
NEW YORK 8. No Y. 
J anuary ,1962 
In connection (vi th the proposed issue of $30,000,000 principal amount of Twenty Year ........ % Bonds 
Due January 15, 1982 (hereinafter called the Bonds), of the Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter called 
the Commonwealth), we have examined (i) the requirements of the laws of certain states governing 
legal investments for savings banks organized under the laws of such states, (ii) the requirements of the 
laws of certain states governing legal investments for life insurance companies, and for certain insurance 
companies other than life insurance companies, organized[ under the laws of such states and (iii) the 
requirements of the laws of certain states governing legal investments for fiduciaries subject to the laws of 
' suc~ states. We have also obtained an opinion of Canadian counsel with respect to certain requirements 
of Canadian Jaw governing legal investments for life insurance companies. 
The conclusions herein expressea and the accompanying comments are based upon information 
contained in the RegiMration Statement relat ing to the :&Dnds filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, upon the statutory requirements in the particular states as to which we have made the 
examinations referred to above and upon the opinion of Can~dian counsel referred to above. The omission 
of a particular state or a particular class of. investor does not necessarily indiC4lte that the Bonds are 
. not legalEor investment in soch state or for such class of investor. 
J 
I 
'vVe are of the opinion that, upon dlle issuance as contemplated, the Bonds will be legal investmcnts 
for savings banks organized under the laws of Ohio and, if authorized by their articles of incorporatIOn, 
for savings banks organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. 
r- • 
II 
We are further of the opinion that, subject to the various qualifications sct f rth in the notcs to 
the table below, insurance companies may legally purchase the Bonds upon due issuance as co~~templated, 
as follows: . 
Dom(. .• c Life Insurance . 
Companies 
Connecticut 
Delaware (2) . 
Indiana(2) 
Kansas 
Kcntucky(2) 
Massachusetts (2) 
New Jersey (2) 
New York 
Pennsylvania (2) 
Rhode Island (1) 
Vermont(2) 
Wisconsin 
Other Domestic Insurance 
Companies 
Connecticut (1). 
Delaware(2) 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Massa husetts ( 1) 
New Jersey(2) 
New York 
Ohio(2) 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island (1) 
Wisconsin 
(1) In Connecticut investments by domestic jnsurance companies other than life are unre-
stricted by statutory requirements. In Massachusetts the statutory requirements fo r investment 
---- -----,-.---~- .. - ......... ----,-
126 
~ , . 
Al-' I ~tlDl1 'v 11 
oy OUI It:Hic IU3111'QnCe comp nies other ti111n lite apply, 11\ gen~r I, only to c pi tilt. thoot: r.: .• HI 
h. s no st~lutCS govcrning' investmcnts by domestic insurance companies. 
(2 ) I;l\"cstmcilt in the Bonds is pcrmitted under provisions applicable to securities not other-
wise expressly authorizcd, subject to the ioilowing limitations as to the maximum amount of ass 'ts 
",hic 1 may be invested: 
Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio and Pennsylvania-up to five per cent; 
Indiana-the lesser of (a) ten per cent or (b) the aggrega te of the company's capitai, 
surplus and contingency reserves; 
l\Iassachusetts-up to one fourth of reserves; 
i • ew Jersey-up to b .... o per cent; 
Vermr,nt-up to three per cent. 
\Ve are further of the opinion that the Bonds are securities in which companies registered under 
l'ar t III of the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act may, without availing themselves of the 
provisions of subsection (4) of Section 63 of said Act, invest their funds, and are also securities which 
companies registered unoer the Foreign Insurance Companies Act may deposit with the Minister of 
Finance of Canada or may vest in trust for the purposes of said Act without availing themselves of tile 
provisions of paragraph 4 of Schedule I of said Act. 
III 
The statutes governing legal investments for 
fiduciaries subject to the laws of Delaware, Florida, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, Tennessel), 
Virginia and Washington, . 
fiduciaries other than guardians subject to the laws of Kansas, 
trustees, guardians and conservators subject to the laws of Connecticut, 
trustees subject to the laws of Cali' ornia, Illinois and Texas, 
trustees of estates and guardians of minors subject to the laws of New Hampshire, and 
executors, administrators, guardians and trustees subject to the la s of Wisconsin 
provide, in substance, that investments in obligations such as the Bonds shall conform to the prevai ling 
standard of prudent management in the disposition of funds. 
The foregoing is subject to any limitations (i) imposed by statute or regulation as to the amount "'ld 
character of iunds which may be invested in certain types of securities and in the securities of anyone 
obligor, and (ii) resulting from provisions of the charter, by-laws or other instruments under which any 
S<ivings bank, insurance company or fiduciary may act, and (iii) as to the investment of particular fund~, 
such as funds held by guardians of beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration. 
Sou ce : 
Very truly yours, 
Commonweal th of Aus~ralia, bein 
Reg's~ration Stateme~: 1 dged 
Exchar.ge Commission~ 
2 
material artached to 
+he Secirities and 
e 
127 
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SUPPLEME'NTAL INFORMATION AS TO STATUTORY REQUI EM NTS 
IN CERTAIN STATES 
I 
Savings Banks 
California. Any savings bank may invest limited amounts in certain securities, not olilcrwisc 
expressly authorized, "ill which in the informed opinion of the bank it is prudent to invest savings iUllds." 
Connecticut. Investment of limited amounts is permitted in "bonds which, in the 0Illllion of 
the savings bank or of the state bank and trust company making the investment as entered on its records, 
are prudent investments for it to make." 
Maine. Limited amounts may be invested in such "securities as the trustees of a bank may 
consider to be sound prudent investments." 
Maryland. The deposits of savings banks may be "invested or loaned out on good ~ecurity, in 
the discretion of the directors" of such banks. 
New Hampshire. Savings banks may invest limited amounts in securities not otherwise 
authorized "which are prudent investments for such a bank to mal:ce." 
II 
Insurance Companies 
Iowa. Dor.testic life insurance companies are required to invest their legal reser\'(. in ~ fi ~d 
investment lOt including securities such as the Bonds, but are not prohibited from investilll 'her 'unds 
in securities such as the Bonds. 
Michigan. Domestic insurers may invest in such securities 0 a foreign go e rnl1)~11 "s lay 
be first approved by the commissioner" of insurance. 
New Hampshire. Domestic life insurance comp.mies may 'nvc t all amount n t Acceding 
ten per cent of their to~l. admitted assets in investme ts not otherwise permitted, subject t~:\he a;>proval 
of the insurance commIssIoner. 
North Carolina. Domestic life insurance companie~ may invest fu nds in ex ess of their entire 
capital and entire reserves and minimum required surplus in such securities as may be ar~Rroved by the 
commissioner of insurance. 
Ohio. Legal reserve life insurance companies may invest up to five per cent of tQtal admitted 
assets in securities not otherwise expressly authorized. . 
Tennessee. Domestic life insurance companies may invest in "good and solvent securities," 
subject to the approval of the insurance commissioner. 
Texas. Domestic life insurance companies may inves t limi d anlounts in securities approved 
by the State Board of Insurance "as being ubstan i ly 0 e a gr de nd quality" as t ose expressly 
authorized. 
3 
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Vircrinill. Domcstic: Insurers may Invest "excess enpltal Ilnd eU"plua" in such accuritic 5 the 
hoard of directors or a duly constituted investment committee "determines to he for the best interest of 
the insurer." 
Washington. Domestic insurers may invest in securities not otherwise eligible for invest-
ment, subject to the advance approval of the insurance cOlllmi ~siol\er. 
III 
Fiduciaries 
Massachusetts, Missouri and Vermont. These states have no general statutes governing 
invesbnent by fiduciaries. A Missouri statute enumerating certain classes of securities as legal invest-
ments for guardians does not include securities such as the Bonds. 
Rhode Island. Trustees may invest and reinvest in their discret ion "personal property held" 
in trust and, for ·trusts created or becoming effective after May 2, 1957, invest and reinvest in their 
discretion "the trust estate". 
The foregoing is subject to any limitations (i) imvosed by statute or regulation as to the amount 
and character of funds which may be invested in certain types of securities and in the securities of any 
one obligor, (ii) resulting from provisions of the charter, by-laws or other instrument under which any 
savings bank, insurance company or fiduciary may act, and (ii) as to the investment of particular funds, 
such as funds held by guardians of beneficiaries of the Veterans Administration. 
e 
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APPENDIX IX 
Foreign Loans Floated in Switzerland Bet"Yreen January: _1961 
and early March 1963 
Classified according to type of Borrower 
SoF. million 
130 
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COMPARISON OF YIELDS AVAILABLE. OI~ ClJMJ-10NWEALTH A~~D OfHEB 
SECURITIES IN INTERlJATIONAL HARKErs (a) 
Borrower 
LONDor 
United Kingdom 
New Zealand 
Soutnern Rhodesia 
South Africa 
! EW YORK 
United States 
Canada 
International Bank 
Belgium 
New Zealand 
South Africa 
SWITZERLAND 
Swiss Confederation 
Belgium 
Sweden 
France 
International Bank 
South Africa 
NETHERLANDS 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Norway 
Austria 
CANADA 
Canada 
International Bank 
Yields Expressed as a 
Percentage of the Yield 
on Commonwealth Securit~es(a) 
% 
97 
98 
11 )' 
130 
70 
85 
87 
107 
110 
155 
90 
99 
104 
104 
109 
160 
68 
88 
93 
105 
( a ) The figures used are the average of yields taken at 
weekly intervals over perio s of 6 months or more~ 
The averages were taken during periods in 1960, 1961 
or 1962. Diflerent periods had to be selected for 
each market in order to avold as far as possio~e 
factors such as new flotations that could disturb 
the comp'lrison. 
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CHAPTER IV : THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOANS 
A. THE CHANGE IN BORrlOWI NG POLICY AFTER 1949 
Chapter I drew attention to the marked change in 
borrowing activity which occurred after 1949 0 For twenty years 
there had been no cash borrowings except for two small amount s 
secured in London in 1938 and 1939. Between 1940 and 1945, 
oversea debt was reduced by the equivalent of £34 million; 
and in the following years by £60 millionl. Then, in 1950, 
cash borrowings .recommenced . The total secured by cash loans 
over the next twelve years totalled £318 million0 2 
The change of policy occurred after a change of 
government. A Labor government was replaced,late , in 1949, 
by a non-Labor government. The change in bor~owing policy has 
too frequently been suggested as being entirely due to the 
alteration of governments~~ While borrowings overseas may have 
been entirely different if the Labor government had stayed in 
office, other influence8 also helped to shape eventso Then, 
too, the change in policy does not appear to have been as sudden 
as popular opinion would have ito 
The Labor government's poli cy statements, between 
1945 and 1948 were similar to the fOllowing 3 : -
" It has been sugges t ed . • 0 • . that we should 
borrow from America. The Government would 
not do that except as a last resort •• • .• 
We believe that this country should live 
within its means in regard to sterli ng and 
dollar income and expenditureo.o •• " 
1. Commonweal th Treasury, Goyernment Securities-..ru:Llsslle at 
30 June 1962, Table NO o20o 
20 Fr om Chapter I, Appendix III . Net of repayments. (See Table XIII ) 
~a". k N - 3. 11e/4~~V4} .~~ ~.,.,. '~c~vW ~ p-t£.:d4.~~/ j~. 
~ J.B. Chifley CoPoD. (House of RepresentatIves) 7 December 
1948, po 40520 
, 
) 0 
e 
Ie 
A large part of the community remembered the prob1 .IDs 
that had been caus ed or accentuated by the need to service foreign 
debt in the 1930 ' s, and were probably averse to borrowing OVerseas 
no matter what the costo There was, too, an upsurge of 
nationalistic feeling during and after the war which led 3 1 le 
to oppose any reliance on foreign capital. Others felt that 
the needs of post-war Europe or of un er-developed countries 
should receive priority over Australia's. Yet , contradi ctorily, 
£269 million was invested in Australia on behalf of foreign 
residents between 1940 and 19504 0 
At this time Australia was continuing to accrue "soft" 
currency reserves. Because of the needs of the United Kingdom 
and the major European powers following the war, which led to 
the retention of resources in those countries and strenuous 
efforts to divert their exports towards the dollar area, much 
production eqUipment was not purchasable with ~softt currencies. 
Also, there wer e items that were available more economically 
from dollar sources. The accumulation of reserves the ef ore 
was of limited use, and the redemption of London debt as it fell 
due was a logical outcomeo 
For her "hard " currency needs, Australia had to rely 
on the share allocated to her from the Sterling Area's dollar 
poolo Australia normally had a dollar defici t and therefore 
would have been worse off for hard currencies if she had decided 
t o operate in isolation fr om the Sterling area. Dol l ars were 
stri tl ra tioned and there were complaints of the onsequent 
problem s o 
4°dee Appendi x I. 
I. 
e 
Ie 
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The economic effects of the dollar sho r t a ge were 
described in the following way by Mr. Spender, a member of 
the Oppositi on i the House of Representatives 5:-
liThe shortage of dollars is affecting not only our 
petrol supplies but also capital equipment urgently 
needed to increase production in Australia 0 •• 
We are limited in every way by the dollar shortag~ 0 00 
We not only hamper export industries which depend 
on these imports and other industries ne cessary for 
the development of the ~ountry, but we are al : o 
for ced to develop mushroom industr ie s, which m st 
mean excess costs to the community and a subtract ion 
from the man-power pool to operate them .0.0 There 
is 0 reason why the Government should not obtai n a 
gove nment to government dollar loan. Tak i ng t he 
long-range view it is time the Government ceased 
talking about putting this country into pawn and 
adopted a more realistic policy." 
Amongst the advice put forward was a plan by 
Professor Copland, who suggested that:-
(a) Australia should ease restrictions on 
essential imports from the dollar areas such 
as cotton, petrol, rubber, newsprint, tlnplate 
(b) AUs t ralia should borrow up to the amount of 
her dollar deficiency in the balance of 
payments plus 50 per cent. 
(c) The surplus of 50 per cent sh uld be placed 
at the disposal of the United Kingdom and an 
equivalent amount of Australian sterling debt 
would be liquidated. 
(d) Australia would payoff further ster ing deb t. 
of an amount equal to the balance of t he dollar 
10an6• 
5.Spender P.C C.PeD . (House of Represe t 
7 December 1948, p o 4046 
f nlJl extrac t s a ai l abltl i C.QWW.QDwealth 
:tal .Qa Qe rom an addres s to the Economic Soc i ety of 
-1,.bJ.s:.:=ot.o.r "'><a""'l """'l;':'a and Nevr ?:(~~ l a nd on 2 5 June 1948 A r e f erence t o the 
addrc.::> a f-b 1 _ 1 c· , , cd ourne , ?8 JUDe 1948, . , . 
Th P op s al 19nores the fact that no ster ling debt was 
redeemable at t hat timeo 
e 
One exter nal difficulty Professor Copland saw in 
mplementing this plan was the possibility that the Unlted 
Kingdom would have been loath to have the Commonwealth borrow 
in New York, as it would i mply an acceptance of England 's 'ed~ced 
economic stature7• Another factor , apparently overlooked, n" 
that any borrowings by Australia from the United States may have 
diverted some of the capital then being provided to the United 
Kingdom. Australia's nor mal dollar deficit , and the United 
Kingdom' virtual control of the dollar pool made Australia 
dependent on the United Kingdom for funds to service any 
dollar loan. 
There was no continuing source of loans available to 
counterbalance this r estriction, and indeed the Commonwealth 
would have found it difficult to obtain any hard currency loans 
at all o The United States' government was a reluctant lender 
and had, in fact, made only one loan (to the United Kingdo ) . 
The New York market had supplied refinancing loans in 19~6 and 
1947, for hieh a significan a 0 t of the mat 'ing sec~rities 
a held by re idents of the United Kingdom who had the 
alternatives of subscribing to these loans or of repatriating 
their money. Ther e wa s only a slight chance , at that time, that 
the New York market woul d have supplied cash loans as well as the 
refinancing loans. However it was not even a possible source 
in 1949, because of the increa~ing international tension, the 
poor result of the Australian refinancing loan in New York 
7. i> 'ofessor Copland commented. 0 0 nIt is onl natural that, 
finding er strength attenuated in every directlo by the 
impact of war, Britain should be unwilling to retreat too 
r ead i ly to a new international position cons sent wi h her 
• ... rt ne c :. Inl.... p 01i e L • 
. .s. 
e 
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in June 1947, and the strained position of the sterling ar e. 
wi t h which Australia was naturally identified . In fact, t wo 
s emi-governmental loans maturing in 1950 (one for the Sydney 
Water Board and one for the Brisbane City Council) had t o be 
re paid despite prolonged negotiations for conversion loan f 
The Swiss market was prejudiced against foreign loans, 
particularly to the weakened sterling area o The main r emainlng 
source , the International Bank, was then only commencing to 
adopt a freer attitude towar~lending and was as conscious of 
the sterling area's difficulties as any other lender o (The 
Liberal government, which assumed office in late 1949 d i d not 
obtain a dollar loan until August 1950; and did not draw on 
the loan until Decembero) 
It was in these circumstances that the sterling area, 
including Australia, had to accept a further reduction (25%) 
in dollar imports o The added strain strengthened the hands of 
t .ilOs e desiring a dollar loan , and reduced the power of the 
United Kingdom to prevent independent action by Austr alia 8. 
~he additional strain of the 25% cut in do l lar imports 
apparently made the Labor government prepared to seek a l ong term 
dollar loan o The cut could not be ful l y achieve in 1949-50 
because of outsvand ing import licences, and the Treasurer s aid9 : -
"The Government is examining the possibility of 
borrowing as a means to provide additional dollar s 
Generally, it has been averse to increasing the 
l ong- term commitments of Australia. n 
80 lt coul d be considered that the devaluation of ~terl ing lat e 
in 1949 was a partial recognition by the United ingdom of 
her re uced economic statureo 
9°Chifley J.B., C. PoDo 7 September 1949, pp 22 , 23. 
e 
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This statement plainly indicated a willingness to accept a 
long-te m dollar loan to help ease the effect of the reduction 
in dollars supplied by the sterling area poolo However, there 
was no change in supply conditionso 
In the event, the Commonweal th obtained fund s 1:..b"Clugn 
a short-term loan from the International Monetary Fund
o 
At 
the time the Labor government reiterated its earlier stand 
against long-term borrowing overseas o No doubt, the governmerl t 
sought to make a virtue out of necessity, and, rather than 
alienate supporters by confessing to its failure in raiS ing 
a long-term dollar loan, preferred to cling, in pUblic, to 
its earlier policyo 
The International Bank's gradually softening approach 
on lending provided Australia with an opportUnity to borrow in 
1950 0 Not only did the Bank provide a loan of $100 mil ion, 
but it offered to provide further finance oVer a five year 
period, thus effectively deferring the problem of finding 
dolJars with which to service the loano 
It is of interest to note that the Treasurer s 
speech in introdUcing the Loan (Inte national Bank for 
ReconstrY~n and Deyelopment) Bill 1950 emphasised the 
need for dollars lO 
"The Government decided to raise a dollar loan 
to remove one of the greatest obstacles standing jn the path of industrial expansion and of the 
general development of Austral iao Th t obs t a Ie 
as the shortage of certain types of cap i ' al 
equlpment and plant which are indispensable to 
the furtherance of development in this countr 
and hich can be obtaine d only in the United States 
and Can da~ The Government therefore ex lored the 
possibilities of borrOwing dollars t aIle iate 
the po ition 0000: 
) 
. · 
In most years we (Australia) have to draw on 
the sterling area dollar pool 0000 As a counter-
part to this arrangement we have followed a common 
policy with the other members of the sterling a rea 
in economising on dollar expenditure 00000 
This situation meant, as I have said, that 
requirements in Australia for types of equipment 
and plant which have the utmost importance for 
industrial progress and security here were not 
being adequately met and it was that crucial fact 
which led the Goyernment to seek a do]] ar ] Qan~1 11 
Nevertheless there was one sentence in the speech 
which indicated that the Treasurer might have been viewing 
foreign borrowing in a wider context. That sentence was: 
"In any case we do well under present conditl0ns to borrow 
abroad for develop~ental purposes because in doing so we 
supplement our own resources, make possible a further expan sion 
of our local output, and help to reduce inflationary pressure" . 
This sentence was the prelude to the more substant.~~. change in 
. ~~~-'-
policy which was to operate in the following years and which 
contrasted completely with the statements of the Labor 
government before 19500 
The compl ete change in governmental policy had be come 
obvious by 1953, when the Commonwealth raised its first loan in 
Switzerlando The Treasurer's Second Reading Speech on the 
Loan (Swiss Francs) Bill 1954 included the sta t ement12 ~ 
"0 000 I should like to state the reasons why the 
Government decided to raise the loan, which i3 
designed to assist Australia's industrial 
developmento There is immense scope for 
development in Australia and the greater part 
of it is being financed from our own capital 
resources - from private savings and business 
profitso But overseas capital, too, has an 
important part to playo Overseas capital 
supplements our own savings and enables development 
to proceed faster and more effectively than it 
would if we had to rely solely on our own resources 
The Swiss loan is of special value 00000, because the 
Swiss fr nc is strong currency 0000" 
110 My i t al i c s 
12 0Fa 1gen AoWo ~o 6 pril 1951./-, p051 J N~1i.~l~ 
~~ ~~~art-~ ~~r:k(7A/ 7 ~ ~ ,. ~ I~/J:G:-' d~ . 
.oS. 
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The international scene saw corresponding ch g~ 
the amounts provided for foreign loans and in the vOlume 01 
capital goods available for export. The United Kingdom, 
although still careful in its direct i on of foreign loans , ha d 
overcome delivery lags by 1950. Reflecting changes in th p. 
international economic and political situation, SWiss int erest 
rates fell in the early 1950 s and her l ending expande 0 The 
ew Yo k market "re-openedu in late 1954 with loans t o 
Austr alia a nd Bel gium. The Net erland s am othe coun t ries 
made loans from time to time o Thus foreign loans, whi ch were 
virtually unob t ai nable excep t for refinanc i ng oper ations between 
1945 and 194~, became more .easily obtainable, although , a s we 
have seen, still not plentifUl, over the next decade
o 
Copland's plan envisaged no increase in t he 
Commonwealth's debt overseas o Instead,sterling debt wo uld have 
been decreased by an amount equivalent to any increase in ollar 
debt. Australia would have benefl t ed only by the greater 
convertibility of the funds a t her disposal, and oUld not ha ve 
been living beyond her earnings130 
The Commonwealth ' s borrowing policy between 1950 and 
1962 extended beyond Copland's plan, as the Treasur er clearly 
indicated when introducing the Loan (Swiss Francs) Bill
o 
Hard 
currency borrowings were seen not only as increasi~g Aus tralia's 
capacity to purchase in the dollar area, but also as adding to 
the total amount of resources otherwise avail a leo No a t tempt 
was made to keep the amount of debt stable and, even though 
some sterl i ng debt was redeemed from time to t i 
cash l oans 
were floated in London and in other co nt ri es we 1 after t he 
doll r shor t a e a pas t o 
13., Ex 'p' f)r t M l' t a t e capi t al inf ow ,,1 eady me t i oned. 
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Eo THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 
The inflow of direct investment into Australia between 
1950 and 1962 (which is discussed in the final chapter) was 
indicative of investment opportunities existing in Australia 
over and above what could be exploited with the availaule quantity 
of domestic capital o While some of these investment opportunities 
were dependent on the tariff wall, others arose from the 
existing scope for development and exploitationo 
In this sense Aust ralia was, during the period, a 
country which would attract capital importso In addition to 
this general propensity to attract or seek foreign capital, 
there were important inte~nal and external reasons for the 
governments represented on the Loan Council to seek additional 
resources o 
At 30 June 1950 the Commonwealth government, as agent 
for the Loan Council, faced debt of £Stg 106 million 
(£132 million) maturing in the United Kingdom, and of $153 
million (£68 million) maturing in the United States, over the 
next twelve years o Nearly half of the dollar debt and about 
one fifth of the sterling debt was owed by the Commonwealth 
and the remainder by the stateso If this debt was not 
converted, the governments had to find sufficient funds in 
other ways for redemption of the maturing securitie 0 If 
conversion was effected by raising loans in Australi a - in 
addition to approximately £2,000 million of internal debt 
maturing in the period - the Commonwealth was still confronted 
with the proble~ of finding the equivalent of £200 million in 
foreign exchangeo 
) 0 
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In addition, the Commonwealth was unable, despite a 
high level of private capital inflow, to find sufficient 
convertible currency to permit the purchase of imports from 
the United States to the extent it thought necessary before 
sterling became converti ble in 1958 0 Considerable relie' 
apparently came from the International Bank loans, as 
described by the Treasurer in 195014:_ 
"When the Government took office, supplies from 
the dollar area were still narrowly restricted 
and producers in this country did not have access 
to many types of plant, equipment and machinery 
which can be obtained only from North America, but 
which are absolutely essential to the efficient 
running of our basic indUstries and the progress 
of our developmental plans 0000 Accordingly, the 
Prime Minister made i4 one of the chief objects 
of his visit abroad in the middle of this year to 
explore the Possibilities of raiSing a dollar loan. 
As you know, he was sUccessful in negotiating a 
loan of $100 million from the International Bank 
for immediate Use in purchasing vital equipment ••• 
Furthermore, by arrangement with the International 
Bank, a mission will visit Australia early next year 
to study our developmental reqUirements for dollars 
over a period of fiVe years." 
Governmental and private investment requirements 
were high for particular reasons in 1950-51 and the following 
years o In the first place there was a backlog of investment 
needs from the war. Then, too, 1,460,000 migrants arrived in 
the twelve year period adding to "demands for hOUSing, 
transport, schools, hospitals, and all other facilities of 
community life ". The increasing population also stimulated 
investment in the priVate sector which in turn increased the 
demand for investment in power and other aspects of the 
economic infrastructureo In the first half of the 1950's 
the Commonwealth also devoted larger sums than in the early 
pos t-war per iod to "the immedia te over-riding demands of defensive 
" 15 preparedness . 
14· AoW• Fadden, Bugget Speecll 19<)0-51 (Commonweal.th Budget papers) p.3. See also Note 10. 
15~A.W. Fadden, Ibid, p.50 2. 
These needs and the abscrption of capital by the 
private sector, which had its own investment requirements, ~elt 
domestic governmental loan raisings inadequate. Consequently 
the States, with only a restricted field of taxati on left to 
them, relied on the Commonwealth after June 1951 to subsidi 
the Loan Council borrowing programme from its resources and from 
the Australian currency equivalent of foreign loans. The 
Commonwealth's aid to the programmes between 1951-52 and 1961-62 
loa.-
inclusive totalled about £800 milliono 
As well as coping with these specific problems, all 
post war governments had two general commitments. The community 
demanded that full emplqyment be maintained and was not ave rse 
to demons tra ting its attitude towards unemployment at the polls . 
Secondly, there was a closely related need for Australia's 
secondary industry to grow and become more diversified so that 
Australia 's balance of payments would become insulated agai~st 
adverse price movements of wheat and wool . 
In meeting these problems and commitments u tralia 
was by no means entirely dependent on Commonweal th borrowing 
lS'b 
overseas . Domestic saving ran at 20-25% of Gross National Product, 
and there was a heavy inflow of private investment. Commonwealth 
borrowing overseas did, however, supplement the resources 
otherwise available to Australia during the twelve yearso 
l [tt. /C/t,afvtu--J) ./ fl~ 1. 
/5 6 £rnvm,,~uzlttgafU~) /~w~ /ll ~ /!l0~ 
1r;4~-4r:to IY/I1-tJ/ JaiJvlf1,Cff. 
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C. SHORT TERM EFFECT OF THE BORROWINGS 
1. Definition of Amount Borrowed 
Anyone ou t of a number of different sums could be 
selected as the amount borrowed by the Commonwealth between 
1950 and 1962. The choice between the different sums 'ill 
depend on the rate of borrowing with which it is desired to 
compare the period 1950-19620 The thr ee sums that could be 
expected to have most interes t are related to each other in 
the following table. 
TABLE XIII: AMOUNT BORROWED OVERSEAS 
£ million 
.LQanS rai~H~Q. LoaD§ ra~ 
.befQre 1950 af ter 1950 J'...Q..t ;U. 
Loans raised 1950-1962 483 483 
Les ~ Refinanced 165 
- 165 483 
Less Other r epayments 68 57 
Net increase - 233 426 (b) 
(a) Amount secured by cash loans between 1950 and 1962. 
(b) Loans raised during 1950-1962, net of repayments . 
(c) Net change in debt 1950-1962. 
165 
318 (a) 
12'1 
193(c) 
Source: Commonwealth Treasury,Budget Papers Public Debt, 
Government Securities on Issue at 30 June 1962 ). 
The amount of cash loans raised purports to show what 
was borrowed as a resu lt of the initiative of the Commonwealth 
at the time , and to exclude loans which resulted from the 
"momentum lt of maturing debt . The dis ti nction is~ however , 
pr marily legal . Market cond ' t ' o s could lead to the floati ng 
of new money loans, wh ich had the effect of refinancing maturing 
e 
;.§. 
30 
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debt, either before or after the maturity date of tt~ 01d 1, 
Again, some markets, such as New York, and the International Ban~ 
and financial institutions customarily offer loans which are 
fully amortised by payments commencing soon after each loan is 
floated. Consequently they can be refinanced only by lalsing 
further cash loans. Again, in London, "conversion" loans always 
included substantial subscriptions from new lenders, the proceeds 
of which were used to payoff those who did not convert. The 
figure representing cash loans is therefore somewhat unreal. 
In one - perhaps the most obvious - sens e, the amou~t 
borrowed was £426 million. This figure was the amount secured 
in cash and conversion loans throughout the twelve years, net 
of repayments made on these loans. If the Commonwealth had not 
entered oversea markets nor borrowed elsewhere overseas between 
1950 and 1962, it would have had to find the foreign currencies 
to repay debt amounting to £233 million, and to have made some 
adjustment to compensate for the £193 million by which net debt 
was increased. On the other hand the use of £426 million in any 
analysis of the Australian economy implies a .ggmp.dii 11 i tl9 a 
situation quite foreign to Australian history - a situation in 
which not even refinancing loans were floated f or more than a 
decade16 . 
From the number of alternative amounts that could be 
selected, the one that seems most appropriate is the amount by 
which net debt was increased over the period. The selection of 
£193 million implies a comparison with a situation in which 
foreign debt was kept at a steady level. This standard is 
quite feasible ; it is much the same as what happened in the 
160 8ee Appen ix I. 
14 5 
decade ending 1939/ 400 £193 million is the net change to t!~ 
amount of foreign r esour ces made available , after meeting debt 
commitments between 1950 and 1962. It is a measure of the 
r esults of the Commonwealth ' s borrowing activities in the 
environment in which the Aust r alian economy found itself 
between 1950 and 1962 - an environment that contained the 
pr oblems and difficulties of maturing oversea debt, a dollar 
shortage , ~restricted borrowing prospects ~o17 
Consequently, in the following analysis, attention 
will be concentrated on £193 million as the amount borr owed 
References will also be made from time to time to the "total 
borrowing " figure of £426 million to indicate the differences 
that might have existed had the Commonwealth allowed oversea 
debt to run down o Since only general references will be made 
to the £426 million , Appendix II has been included to provide a 
year by year comparison by sources between the "total borrowings" 
and "net debt " figures for those who wish to pursue the analysis 
using £426 nillion as the amount borrowed. 
l 7 0 A case could also be put forward for using the net debt 
figur e on the grounds that existing debt is represented by. assets 
which should meet the costs of servicing the debt. Extendlng 
this argument to cover war as well as other debt, however, makes 
it quite contentious o 
20 Effect oD-1be BaJance of Payments 
The following table pla ces the movement in debt 
within the context of the balance of payments between the 
years 1950-51 and 1961-62. 
TABLE XlVi MAIN ITEMS IN AUSTffiLIA'S BAL CE OF PAYMENTS 
£ million 
Current Investment C 'wealth Other 
Year Balance in Borrowing Inflow 
Companies 
Monet rv Movements 
Actual Without 
debt change 
--.--~------~------~-
1950-51 + 126 
1951-52 544 
1952-53 + 195 
1953-54 3 
1954-55 239 
1955-56 224 
1956-57 + 107 
1957- 58 155 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961- 62 
192 
229 
369 
1 
-1,528 
69 
86 
26 
69 
105 
117 
105 
104 
124 
194 
235 
149 
- 16 
23 
15 
11 
22 
27 
6 
16 
36 
35 
12 
6 
193 
1 
35 
- 54 
- 58 
- 19 
6 
9 
6 
38 
7 
8 
- 66 
- 44 
180 
-400 
182 
19 
-131 
- 74 
209 
- 4-1 
6 
7 
- 41 
88 
4 
196 
-4-23 
167 
8 
~153 
-101 
20j 
- 57 
- 30 
28 
- 53 
82 
-189 
Sourcei Commonwealth Statistician, Balanc~ of PaY~t5 
First Half 1966 - 67~ pp.26 & 27 ; and Appendix II. 
At 30 June 1950 international reserves were £630 million and at 
June 1962, £54-8 million18 ( i.e. 4-2% of current debits for 1961-62)e 
18oSource as for Table XI , but the effects of an LH vF. drawing 
has been included in the 1950 figure. Net monetary movemen ts 
(other than in r e C 8_c \"es ) account for £87 million, which reconciles 
monetary movemen ts in the Table above with the reserves figure 
shown. 
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The lowest level r eached wa s £322 million in Apri l 195619 0 
Without the ne t inflow of £193 million, and if the demand for 
imports had remained the same, international reserves at June 
1962 would have been only 27% of current debits for 1961-6Zo 
(A reduction by the alternative amount of £426 million would 
have left reserves negative v) Australia could therefore have 
obtained additional fo r eign resources to the value of £193 
million without borrowing if the Commonwealth government had 
been prepared to let reserves fluctuate around zero o 
However, the Commonweal th' s reacti. on when re se r ves 
were falling sharply or were at low levels during the period 
indicates that the reserves figure at 30 June 1962, net of 
debt movement , would have been too low for the Commonwealth's 
liking20 0 It is also possible that running reserves at a 
lower figure might have discouraged pri vate . nvestment inflo'tl 
and further weakened international reserveso Before reser ves 
had fallen to 27% of current debits , action would have been 
taken to correct the external situation by damping down domesti c 
demand o The borrowings \aJ'ould therefore have permi tted the 
Commonwealth to defer, or ameliorate , action that would 
otherwise have been regarded as necessary to protect Australia 's 
reserveso 
1900ther "lows " were £327 million in April 1961 and £337 million 
in September 1952 0 
200 A "hard core " of reserves remained permanently invested in 
s ecur ties of hvo countries which lent to Aust alia (UoK o and 
U~S.A o ) - a process of relending with Australia benefiting 
from additional liquidity , and reducing the net cost of or 
borrowings by the amount r eceived from the investment of 
reserves . The "hard core" might have been useful ha the 
balance of payments crises been a little worse than they were and 
were not as expensiv e to hold as it mig ht appear at first glanc e o 
9, 
1 
The amount secured through debt movements, while 
significant, only contributed 13% of the deficit on currelt 
account during the period. Foreign investment in companies 
was much more significant in Australia's balance of payments. 
Historically, net borrowings during the period VT 
r elatively unimportant. Appendix I shows net inflow from 
governmental borrmvings, and on private account since 1861. 
Apart from two post-depression decades (1900-1910 and 1930-1)40) 
and the period 1940-1950, governmental borrowings overseas were 
a smaller percentage of current Gross National Product than in 
any other period . 
The amount secured during the dollar shortage by means 
of hard currency loans was much more significant in Australia's 
balance of payments with the dollar area. 
TABLE XV : DOLLAR BALANCES AND NET HARD CURRENCY 
BORROWI GS 
£ million 
C1Jr reni Pr i~Hl . .:!& etC' 3&:ea1 tb. Otber Nei Movement ln 
x.e.ru: BaJaD ~e QaRi1al BorrQ3&:jng lnilfJJJl. DQJlar 
Int.:lQ3&: Re~ oJJr~e.a 
1950-51 + 59 20 3 - 36 + 46 
1951-52 86 30 24 18 50 
1952-53 56 2 16 28 10 
1953-54 73 17 13 - 11 54 
1954- 55 - 110 39 26 7 38 
1955-56 - 110 33 27 5 45 
1956 57 99 27 7 10 55 
TOTALS 
- 475 168 116 - 15 - 206 
---
Sources : Commonwealth Stati s tician : ~~Jstraljan Balance Qf Payments 1950 - 51 to 1954-55, p.10 (for 1950-51); 
IQid 1951-52 to 1955-56 , p.14 (for 1951-52 to 
1954-55) ; ~ 1954-55 to 1958-59 pp.9 and 10 
(for 10~ ~ 56 and 1956-57 - item 9 omitted); and 
Appelld..l.X-ll . 
As can be seen from Table XV, the loans brought 
in the equiv~lent of almost 25% of the dollar deficit on 
~ 
current account and ~ not far below identified private 
capital inflow. Except in 1950-51 (when there was a current 
account surplus ) and 1956-57 , the contribution from increases 
in net debt was substantial in each year. The borrowings 
quite evidently made a substantial contribution to AUstralia's 
dollar resources . 
To summarise, the Commonwealth ' s oversea borrowings 
were not important historically, and were small by comparison 
with foreign investment in AUstralian companies during the 
period. Nevertheless they contributed 13% of the deficit on 
current account , and permitted the Commonwealth to defer or 
ameliorate action that would otherwise have been regarded as 
necessary to protect Australia's reserves. Hard currency 
borrowings made a substantial contribution to AUstralia's 
dollar resources up to 1956-57. 
3. Effects on the Domestic Economy21 
The effects of the borrowings on the domestic 
economy depended on the course the Commonwealth would have 
taken if there had been no net borrowings overseas. Broadly, 
the alternatives open to the Commonwealth were : -
21-
(a) To allow reserves to run down by the amount 
of the borrowings, in order to leave the 
domestic economy unaffected. 
In the absence of s tudies on import propensity covering 
this period I wish to express my appreciation of discussions 
on the subject with many people including Mr. B. D. Haig and 
Mr. F.G.H. Pool ey . The line of argument nevertheless remains 
my own. My conclusions are , however , put forwar d quite 
tentatively and with co nsiderable reservations as I c onsider 
the subject in this section offers scope fo r a compl ete thesis. 
150. 
(b) To endeavour21a to maintain all long-
term policies , while achieving a saving 
of £170 million in external balances by _ 
(c) 
(i) longer or more stringent 
deflationary periods; or 
(ii) more stringent (and probably 
longer-lasting) import 
licensing or commensura te 
increases in tariffs. 
To make deliberate changes 
in the pattern of expenditure21b by -
(i) the reduction of governmental 
expenditure; or 
(ii) the reduction of priva te 
investment or consumption 
(in many or in selected 
fields). 
(d) To introduce compensatnry policies, such 
as national planning, encouragement of 
private foreign investment, add itional 
export incentives. 
(e) Any combi nation of t he preceding alternatives. 
Some of these alternat ives can be put aside for 
the time being~1c The first - which involved allowing 
reserves to f all to lower levels - could be discounted for 
reasons given already~1d The alternative of conserving 
further foreign currency by more stringent import licensing 
21a. 
The word "endeavour" is used to indicate the apparent 
difficulty of achieving this aim. While £16 million less in 
each year appears slight, we are here considering the cumulative 
effect which could well have had indirect effects on the 
practicability of some long-term policies such as immigration. See Chapter VI. 
21 b. 
See Note 7, p20~ , where the Prime Minister indicated in 
1958 t ha t the Snowy Scheme would have been much less advanced 
if dollar loans had not been secured . 
21c. 
Most are raised again, in more detail, in Chapter VI . 
21d . 
See p.1~7 and Chapter VI ppo198 and 199. 
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(or tariffs ) (b(ii ) above) implies that the domestic 
economy would have been largely isolated - an assumption 
which can be challenged since the Commonwealth found 
deflationary measures necessary from time to time 
(particularly in 1955- 56 and 1956-57) to protect external 
balances while general import licensing was operating~1e 
This leaves as the most practicable alternatives the 
introduction of compensatory policies, or the alteration 
of the level and/ or pattern of expenditure by deflationary 
measures as the need arose or by deliberate changes in 
governmental policies. The comparative discussion on 
these alternatives has been included in Chapter VI, so this 
section is concerned only with the general question of the 
extent to which domestic expenditure would have had to fall 
in order to reduce the demand for imports by £190 million~1f 
Before examining this question, it is desirable to 
review the circumstances tha t existed in Australia between 
1950 and 1962. The twelve year period commenced with high 
spending on imports , which made good many deficiencies in 
capital equipment , and increased imported stocks~1g This 
spending was terminated by, among other things, the introduction 
21e. More stringent restrictions would have caused additional 
demand for domestic production , affecting price levels except 
to the extent that idle capacity was called into use . There 
would have been some storing up of demand for imported goods, 
and increased demand for exportables . Some effect on price 
levels , and hence on the real value of national expenditure (with a longer period of external imbalance) would seem to have 
been unavoidable . See also Chapter VI , p . 199 . 
21f . Since this amount is expressed in money te r ms , the subsequent 
discussion is also i n money te r ms . The a r guments , however , remain 
applicable to values at constant prices . 
21g. 
See Note 23d . 
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of general import licensing (and, temporarily, capital 
issues control) . 22 After a sharp fall, imports rose again 
in 1953~54 and 1954-55, and exports were reduced, before 
governmental action brought about another fall ~n imports. 
Import restrictions were eased from 1958 and almost totally 
abandoned in 1960. Economic pressures then led to the "Cred~t 
Squeeze"~ which caused imports to fall In 196~ .... 62. 
Internally there was by no means continuous "total" 
~ 
use of resources, even though ~ apart from the recession 
periods employment remained at consistently high levels. 
Undoubtedly the large increase in imports at the beginning 
of the period was important in overcoming bottlenecks of the 
kind mentioned earlier~2a Not only was there excess capacity 
in fields where some would normally be expected such as 
transport, entertainment, warehouse and factory space, but 
also idle capacity in certain secondary industries~3 (There 
is still, indeed, no general application of sh!ft work) . 
There was a limited degree of flexibl1ity in the work force? 
22. 
See Sir Douglas Copland "Problems of the Sterling Area"~ 
Essavs in International Finance ~ Princeton University? 
September 1953, p21, and A.W. Fadden, "Budget Speech", 
Commonwealth Budget Paper§. 195.~'52, p4, and "Budget Speech" 
Commonweal th Budget Papers .: 9 53~ 54, p3 . 
22a. 
See 1:!± 5, p135. 
23. 
See, for example R. Mathews "The Australian Economy 
November 1958" in The Economic Record December 195[\ p300. 
Lundberg and Hil19 The Economic Recorg, May 1956, P319 were 
also able to say that "in 1953/540 the domestic economy was 
in reasonable balanceo • • This relative stability of prices 
and wages accompanied a high level of employment~ the number 
of persons on unemployment beneflt falling during the year 
from 26,000 to 6 9 000. " Such a situation suggests not only 
that excess capacity was available in appropriate industries, 
but also that imports were not harshly restricted . In view 
of later discussion, it is of interest that the increase ~n 
imports over the previous years level represented 28 . 6% of 
the increase in National Expenditure . 
e 
stemming from the relatively large immigration programme, 
the variable degree of participation in the work force of 
juniors and married women23a, and variation of overtime. 
The pattern of Gross National Expenditure, imports 
and the relation between changes in the two are set out in 
the following table:-
194-9-50 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953- ,5lt 
1954--55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958~59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
Source: 
23ao 
TABLE XVA~ IMPORTS AND NATIONAL EXPENDITURE 
1949-10 TO 1961~62 
Im12ort~ of 
Goog,s sUld 
Services 
I 
£m. 
630 
862 
1,219 
654-
800 
987 
974-
864-
Increase 
over 
Previous 
Year 
II 
£m. 
232 
357 
- 565 
14-6 
187 
13 
Gross Incr~as~ National over ExQ~ngitur~ Preyiou§ 
III 
Year 
Dr 
£me 
'mo 
2,656 
3,4-08 752 
4-,323 915 
3 9 906 
- 4-17 
4-,4-16 510 
5,007 591 
59 392 385 
~ o of 
lY 
30085 
39.02 
135.4-9 
28 0 63 
31064-
(~ 3037) 
957 
- "1 0 
93 
15 
160 
158 
- 200 
5,501 109 (.,.100.92) 
972 
1,132 
1,290 
1,090 
5,829 328 28 0 35 
6,272 4-4-3 3039 
6,959 687 23029 
7,4-75 516 30.62 
7,266 
- 209 95.69 
Commonwealth Statistician, AUstralian National Account~ 194-8-4-9 to 1963-64-, Table 2. 
See R. T. Appleyard, "Population and Work Force" in The Economic Recorg, March 1966, p50. 
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It is interesting to note from the table that 
imports were reduced from time to time without corresponding 
reductions in domestic expenditure. This raises the question 
whether domestic expenditure needed to be reduced by any more 
than the equivalent of £190 million , a worthwhile question 
since economic theory pos ulates that there may be a large 
percentage spill~over into imports from increases in expenditure 
in an intensely employed economy. However, the nature of 
transactions in the Australian economy suggests that a reduction 
in domestic expenditure greater than £190 million would have 
been necessary. For example, retail expenditure on imported 
consumer goods would be about 200%-300% of landed cost23b and 
even heavily capitalised goods have handling charges, possibly 
customs and sales tax, and - most importantly - complementary 
domestic investment on factory space and servicing and ancilliary 
facilities~3c So an initial round of expenditure centred on 
imported goods would give rise to expenditure greater than the 
value of the imports involved, and a similar relationship 
could be expected in subsequent rounds of expenditure o 
Some comments in a more general vein can also be 
made on the proposition that there may have been a high 
percentage spill-over into imports in Australia between 
23b. 
A conclusion reached after discussion with retailers and 
importers. However the validity of the argument is not 
dependent on the strict accuracy of the percentage. 
23co 
Overlooking these, and other factors which provided 
flexibility within the Au stralian economy appears to have 
been the reason for Erik Lundberg and Malcolm Hill, 00 Cit, 
p30 selecting a marginal propensity to import of 50% in 
1956 in postulating pessimistic balance of payments forecasts , 
which were disproved by subsequent eventso 
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1950 and 1962. In the first place, we are considering 
a reduction below the level of expenditure that actually 
took place when, as we have seen a bove, the economy had 
some slack periods and excess capacity in different 
fields. Perhaps more importantly, the theoretical 
statement appears more suited to economies with less 
flexible characteristics than the Australian economy, 
e.g. with a greater percentage of raw materials imported, 
and less domestic transporta tion requirements. When large 
increases in imports did occur, and were followed by sharp 
reductions in imports ,without corresponding reductions in 
national expenditure, the explana tion lies primarily in the 
" speculative" accumulation of imported stocks, which were 
allowed to run down in the following low-import years~3d 
It seems most practicable , therefore, to estimate 
the necessary reduction in expenditure (to achieve a saving 
of £190 million in imports) by reference to the relationships 
in Table XVA. By arranging the percent ages in the right 
hand column in order, and selecting the mid-point, it is 
possible to remove the influence of increases and reductions 
of stocks~3e The mid-point of the range24 is between 29% 
23do 
T. Swan, "Australia After the Import Cuts" in The Banker 
Volume XCVIII, April 1952, p210, said that the accumulation 
of stocks entered negatively into the balance of payment 
accounts of the following yearo A similar r e ference is 
made by D.B. Copland "Economic Expansion and Control in 
Australia" ? India Quarterlv, July - September 1954, p256. 
(Of further interest is the fact that capital goods that 
entered into production during the high import years would 
tend to provide excess capacity.) 
23e. 
Which even left a couple of negative results. 
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and 30%, and is within a group of five percentages which 
vary from 28.35% to 31.64%, three of which were in the 
first six years and two from the second half of the period. 
The figure of 29% - 30% appears therefore to offer a 
suitable ratio to calculate the increase in national 
expendi ture permitted through £190 million of import capacity 
being available as a result of oversea borrowings . 
(A few specific qualifications on this percentage 
24a might be stated. The figure 29%-30% does not take account 
of additional exportables that might have been consumed 
domestically when expenditure was allowed to increase to 
take up the additional import capacity , a id this fact 
suggests that the percentage may be slightly increased for 
our purpose. Secondly, marginal theory is based on minute 
additions (a factor customarily put aside as has been done 
above) to unchanged functional relationships. As the 
government may have made deliberate changes to the pattern 
of expenditure if it had not borrowed overseas, these 
functional relationships could have been changed, and to 
this extent - which would be minor because of the relatively 
small amounts involved - an estimate derived from marginal 
changes would be invalid.) 
The selection of a figure of about 30% is supported 
by the results of an independent, unpublished, study designed 
to provide a means of forecasting movements in imports~5 
24a. 
See also ~ 21. 
25. I appreciate the assistance of Mr. G. Taylor, Department 
of Trade , who supplied me with the results of his study. The 
comment at the end of Note 23 is also significant. 
I , 
e 
1e 
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This study related deviations of Gross National Expenditure 
and Merchandise Imports from fitted trend lines. The 
devia tion of imports from trend over the years 1960-61 
to 1964-65 were 35% of expenditure deviat ions, with a 
correla tion of + 0.99. This rela tion between imports and 
expenditure, if adjusted downwards to allow for the 
restra ini ng influence of import licensing up to 196025a, 
comes quite close to the estimate above. (Unfortunately 
the reservations previously expressed on the estimate must 
still stand, because when the trend lines and deviations 
are extended to cover up to 1966-67, both the ratio and 
the degree of correla tion fall.) 
One further refinement can be made by drawing a 
distinction between the amounts by which Gross National 
Expenditure would have had to be reduced if particular 
sectors had to bear the burden of reduced availability of 
imports. Here, work accomplished by B.D. Haig 26 in respect 
of the average propensity to import of different sectors is 
of use (although not specifically applicable to marginal 
movements and relating only to t he year 1958-59). He 
postulated tha t a ratio of 12% of final government expenditure 
and consumption, and about 22% of priva te investment was 
directed toward imports. Applying this difference in import 
propensities ena bles us to estimate tha t had consumption or 
25a. 
It is accepted tha t import licensing would tend to divert 
~ expenditure towards surplus domestic capacity. 
26. 
B. D. Haig, " Input-Output Relationships 1958-59" , 
The Economic Recorg, March 1965, p123. 
15'4d. 
government expenditure been reduced in order to lessen 
the demand for imports by £190 million, domestic expenditure 
would have been about £800 mil l ion lower (about 1%), whereas 
the corresponding reduction for private investment would have 
been about £500 million~7 These amounts represent marginal 
propensities to import of 24% and 38% respectively. 
As indicated earlier, these estimates give only a 
broad picture of t he likely effect on the domestic economy 
if steps had to be taken to reduce imports by £190 million. 
It is f easible that the level of domestic expenditure could 
have remained the sam~, but with lessened money values leading 
t o a concealed reduction in the standar d of living, (perhaps 
shown in more restricted output of particular items like 
motor cars). Again the Snowy Mountains Scheme, or immigration, 
may have been deferred or restricted. Alternatively, the 
government could have adopted compensatory poliCies, such as 
the introduction of national planning . It is by evaluating 
these alternatives tha t the full implications of oversea borrowing I, 
on t he domestic economy can be apprecia ted and this evaluat i on 
is the subject of Chapter VI. 
27. 
Because of the reservations expressed earlier the amounts 
have been rounded. me 
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D. LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE BORROWINGS 
1. Servicin€, Costs /~~ 9ift:t;; 
The interest liability On total/foreign debt rose 
from £18.1 million at 30 June 1950 to £30.6 million at 
30 June 19620 Over the same period foreign debt rose from 
£519 million to £712 million. Interest liability rose 76% 
while debt - representing need for conversion loans or 
commitments for repayment - rose 37%. 
The interest liability on the outstanding amount 
of loans secured overseas between 1950 and 1962 (i.e. 
£426 million) totalled £21.5 million at 30 June 196228. 
Repayments due on this debt in 1962-63 amounted to £33 million 
and further repayments becom2 due in each subsequent year until 
1981-82, with a maximum of £36 million due for payment in 
1971-72. Interest and repayments to be met on this debt 
in 1962-63 amounted to 005% of Gross National Product or 307% 
of exports in 1962-63. 
' An interesting, but minor, reduction in servicing 
costs arose from the devaluation of the Canadian dollar in May 
19620 Before that time Canada had a flUctuating exchange rate 
either around or above parity with the United States dollar. 
The devaluation led to a reduction of about £150, 000 in 1962-63 
in the costs of servicing loans raised in Canada and in the 
Canadian dollar component of Int ernational Bank loans.) 
Payments due on the Commonwealth's borrowings do 
not appear to be large enough to represent a significant 
percentage of even greatly reduced export earnings. Table XVI 
sets out the relationship between interest liability and export 
earnings in 1925-26, 1928-29, 1938-39, 1949-50 and 1961-62. 
28·Calculated from oyernment Securities on Issue at 30 June 1962. 
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TABLE XV I : OVERSEA INTEREST LIABILITY AND 
CURRENT CREDITS IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Oversea Interest Liability Balance of 
at June 30 - Amount 
Payments I as % of T1 
Current 
Credits 
I II 
£m . £m. % 
1926 24 0 0 154.2 (25/26) 15.6 
1929 27.5 147.8 (28/29) 18.6 (a) 
1939 25.8 165.3 (38/39) 15.6 
1950 18 01 1 678 (49/50 ) 2.7 1962 30. 6 1306 (61/62 ) 2.3 
( a) At 30 June 1931 oversea interest liability approximated 
40% of export earnings. 
Sources : 
Interest Liability _ Commonwealth Treasury, Budget Papers 
1938-39, po124 
Current credits -
_ Commonwealth Treasury, Budget Papers 
1963-6~022 1 II 1')~JJv.~""'" ~~.\O ..LC...ALiqbJ 
N.G. Butlin, Australian Domes tic Product, 
Investment and Foreign Borrowin a 1861-1938/39, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1962) Table 2560 
_ Commonwealth Statistician, The illlstralian 
Balance of Payments 1928-29 to 1951-52, po61. 
_ Commonwealth Statistician, Ba1ance of Payments 
1960-61 , 1961-62 and first half 1962-63, po18. 
_ Commonwealth Statistician, Ba1ance of Payment~ 
1961-62 to 19b5-66, p.5. 
The tahle shows that there was a marked reduction in 
the percentages after the world war. By comparison with even the 
mid 1920s (before Australia's terms of trade had noticeably 
deteriorated), oversea interest liability at both June 1950 and 
June 1962 was extremely slighto Although interest liability came 
1 57 
close to doubling between 1950 and 1962, current earnings more 
than doubled. The level of interest liability could not, in 
these circumstances , be considered dangerous in any foreseeable 
cir cums tances 0 
The burden of servicing the loans should, however, 
reflect, as well as export expansion, import-replacement 
activities (and , for that matter, any other economic or social 
development that would make the costs of repayment more 
acceptable to the community). Table XVII relates interest 
liability to Gross ational Pr oduct at the commencement and 
end of the twelve year period, and provides comparative figures 
for 1928-29, 19:8-39, and for 1925-260 
At June 30 - Oversea 
Interest G.NoPo I as ~ of II 
Liability 
I II 
£mo £mo % 
1926 2400 803 (25/26) 300 
1929 2705 816 (28/29) 304 
1939 2508 877 (38/39) 209 
1950 1801 2677 (49/50 ) 007 
1962 30 06 7392 (61/62) 004 
Sources: Interest liability - as for Table XVI 
Gross National Product - NoG. Butlin, Op.Cito, Table 10 
Commonwealth Statistician, 
Australian National Accoun~ 
1948-49 to 1963- 64, Table 20 
1 0 B 
The proportion of the Gross National Product devoted to 
interest paymen t s ove r seas fell appreciably between 1949-50 
and 1961-62, and in the latter year was only one - fifth of t he 
percentage in 1928-29. 
The ratios sho~n in Tables ~VI and XVII do not 
reflect merely the costs and benefits that flowed from the 
additional funds made available by government borrowing over seas . 
The influence of other considera tions, which far outweighed the 
amount of foreign borrowing, is r eflected in Gross National 
Produc t rising almo s t three time s the 1949/50 level, while 
current credits in the balance of payments doubled. Movements 
in prices in Australia and overseas (which reduced the real 
burden of the debt) increased productive capacity resulting 
from domestic saving and direct investment, and increases in 
interest rates overseas have also affected the final percen t a ge . 
Although the percentages do not isolate the effects of overs ea 
borr owing, they show the slight significance of interest 
liabi l ityo 
However, interest li ability is not the only 
burdensome aspect of foreign debto In 1930, for example, a 
substantial part of the strain on the Australian balance of 
A~~w 
payments was due to the difficulty of convertingAdebt ma turing 
overseas. 
In June 1950, the Australian governments had 
oVersea debt (in London and New York only) of £156 million to 
repay in the following ten yea r so At June 1962 , there was over 
£400 million in oversea debt to redeem (through amortisation, 
final maturity payments or refinancing loans) in the following 
ten years. Avera e eD~yments per year on this amount at June 
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1950 were 0 06 per cent of G. NoP. in 1949-50 and 203% of cur~ n< 
credits, while the average repayments per year at June 1962 
were 005% of 1961- 62 G .• Po and 302% of that year1s current 
credits. Consequently while foreign debt rose only 37%, its 
average life had obviously been markedly reduced, thus 
increas~the prospective burden on annual export earnings 
should conversion be impracticablea 
Combining interest liability ar.d principal payments, 
the re was an increase of about 10% from 1950 to 1962 in the 
potential burden on Australia1s balance of payments earningso 
However, this percentage tends to give undue influence to the 
increase because neither the percentage payable from June 1950 
nor from June 1962 rep~esented an onerous burden. The most 
likely difficulty that will confront the Commonwealth will 
not be in servicing the loans, but in being able to borrow 
sufficient to maintain a net inflow in the next 10 years that 
will approximate even the rather low rate of inflow between 
1950 and 1962, without at the same time paying much higher 
rates of interest and thereby increasing the problems to be 
met in the following decadeo 
20 Other eff~ 
The amount of additional domestic expenditure 
permitted as a result of oversea borrowing was estimated 
(in C. above) at between £500-800 million. It would be most 
useful to be able to say whether this expenditure resulted in a 
gain to the Australian economy after meeting the costs of 
servicing the loanso 
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The additional expenditure could have been made 
available to any sector of the economy; one can only 
hypothecate on the actions that would have been taken in the 
absence of oversea loanso Even if certain specifi c projects 
could be selected as those most likely to have been put aside 
if the additional funds had not been available, it would be 
difficult indeed to trace the effects of the initial 
expenditures which, like waves or ripples, would permeate 
through the economy , affecting this or that economic decisiono 
The problems can be illustrated by reference to 
the aircraft loans , if it is assumed that the re-equipment of 
the ajrlines would not have gone ahead without the loanso The 
airlines made a profit after servicing the loans (up to 
June 1962 and afterwards) but it is not possible to deta i l 
what imports were replaced by the cash portion of the purchase 
price, nor how this replacement affected other economic activit Yo 
The advantages of airport extensions compared with what would 
have happened without these extensions, and the effect of 
expenditure by contractors, sub-contractors and their employees, 
as well as the effect if these organisations and people had 
worked on other contracts (if the loans had not been secured), 
would be among the iniiigl points to be covered in any 
investigation of the detailed ramifications of expenditure 
associated with the borrowings for aircrafto 
Nevertheless, of the dollar and other hard currency 
bor rowings in the early 1950s it could be said, in general 
terms, that Australian industry must have been made ~ 
more efficient, and Australian exports more price-competitive, 
than if ~ustralia had gone without the loanso The loans should, 
~~ 
overall , have helped Australian resources to be directed more 
towards goods that could be more economically produced in 
Australia, rather than used in "mushroom industries" producing 
goods that other countries could produce with much less efforto 
The most useful means of evaluating the remaining 
long-term effects of the bor rowings , apart from servicing 
costs, appears to be by analysing the alternatives open to 
Australia in the absence of the borrowingso The main 
alternatives are discussed in the final chapter, after the 
examination of the Commonwealth 's demand pattern , which is 
the subject of Chapter Vo 
.. -
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA 1861-1961/~ 
(a) Public Authority Private Inve stment 
Calendar Years Debt Overseas (d) 
Amount Per Cent Amount Per Cent 
£m. of G.N.P. £m. of G. N.P . 
1861-1870 (b) 16 2.2 4 0.6 
1871-1880 ~~ 301 13 1. 1 1881-1890 5.4 72 4.1 
1891-1900 41 2.5 29 1 0 8 
Financial Years 
1901-1909/10 15 0.6 "'30 
-(a) (c) 
1910/11-1919/20 167 3.8 -60 -
1920/21-1929/30 250 303 41 005 
1930/31 1939/40 -15 - 79 1 . 0 
1940/41-1949/50 -124 
-
269 1. 6 
1950/51-1961/62 184 0.3 364 2.1 
(a) Exc l udes immigrants funds, where these are i dentifiabl e . 
(b) Incomplete 
(c) Includes years 1903 and 1903-04. 
(d) Excludes short-term debt in London, where thi s 
is identifiable, and foreign holdings of securities 
domiciled in Australia. 
Sources: Fore i gn investment -
1861-1900 N.G. Butlin, Australian Domestic Product , 
Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1938, 
Cambridge University Press, 1962, p~24. 
1901-1903 R. Wilson, Capital Imports and the Terms 
of Trade, Melbourne University Press and 
McMillan & Co., 1931, pl08. 
1903-04 to) 6 1929-30 ) R. Wilson, Ibid, p3 • 
1930-31 to) 
1936-37 ) 
1937-38 to) 
1945-46) 
Commonwealth Statistician, The Australian 
Balance of Payments 1928-21 to 1937-38, 
Table B (Items 57(a) & (C ) t 60 & 61.) 
(Conversions at £Stgl00 = ~A125)0 
Commonwealth Statistician, Ibid , 1928 -29 
to 1948-49(1), Table XXVII,(Items a, c ,& e) 
Sources: 
- . ~.-
APPENDIX I (Cont' d) 
1946-47 to) Commonwealth Statistician, Ibid, 
1961-62 ) 1960-61, 1961-62 and first half 
1962-63, Appendix I. (Government 
securities domiciled overseas, 
and total companies)o 
Gross National Products 
1861-1938/39 N. G. Butlin, Op,Cit., Table 10 
1939/40-1947/48 No G. Butlin, Op.Cit., Table 271. 
1948/49-1961/62 Commonwealth Statistician, 
Australian National Accounts 
1948-49 to 1963-64, Table 2 
(Gross National Product). 
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AMOUNTS BORROWED BY THE COMMONWEALTH OVERSEAS 
1950-51 to 1961-62 
£ million 
A. TOTAL BORROWINGS (Less repayments on loans floated) 
I.B.RoDo London New York Switz. Commercial Canada Nethnds Total 
1950-51 40 1 401 
19'51-52 2409 2409 
1952-53 16 0 8 1408 31 06 
1953-54 20 G9 13 .. 5 6., 1 40 05 
1954-55 2403 - 001 11 . 2 6 .. 1 4105 
1<j55-56 18 .. 0 11 .. 2 6.8 36 00 
1956-57 306 8 e 7 8 .5 3.5 24.3 
1957-58 13.0 20 .0 10 . 5 - 005 43.0 
1958~59 203 43 .8 10.6 2.6 - 0.1 59.2 
1959-60 - 7.7 14 09 20 G6 6G 1 8.1 - 0.4 41.6 
1960-61 - 8G2 42G4 9.7 6.1 - 1.7 8 G3 56.6 
1961-62 
-
8~7 - 0,.7 2L8 7 11 J - 0 .. 2 £t .. 2 2221 
Total , 103 ~3 157 .3 104.1 24 .4 19 G8 13.2 4.9 426 .1 ..
B. DEBT MOVEMENTS 
1950-51 4G 1 - 18 .,7 - 1.0 - 15 06 
1951-52 2409 - 006 - 0.9 23.4 
1952-53 16.8 - 0.8 - 1.0 15 0 
1953-54 20 09 - 108 - 13.8 6.1 1104 
1<;54-55 2403 - 309 - 405 601 22 00 
19)5-56 18 00 ~ 0.4 2.2 6.8 26 06 
1956-57 306 - 1.0 L .1 3.5 602 
1957-58 13 00 - 605 907 - 005 15.7 
1958~59 203 1609 1401 206 - 0.1 35.8 
1959~60 
- 707 13.8 1409 6.1 801 - 0.4 34.8 
1960~61 
- 802 - 1.1 8.6 601 - 1.7 8.3 12.0 
1961-62 - 8 2 7 - 0.2 208 7d ~ 022 £t02 222 
Total 10303 - 500 32.2 2404 19 08 1302 4.9 19208 
Source: Commonwealth Treasury , Budget Papers, (rublic Debt and Government 
Securities on Issue), various yearso 
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CHAPTER V: THE COMMONWEALTH'S BORROWING PATTERN 
A. THE DURATION AND LOCATION OF THE LOANS 
With supply conditions being as restricted as they 
were between 1950 and 1962, it is difficult to be conclusive 
about the Commonwealth ' s1 willingness to borrowo In most 
years there was a noticeable gap between the cheapest and 
dearest loans secured, indicative of the foreign exchange 
controls already discussed. Would the Commonwealth have been 
prepared to pay even a little higher for a slightly higher 
amount than it secured in each year, or if borrowing costs 
had been higher, would it have borrowed as much? 
It seems possible to come at least to some tentative 
conclusions. As a first step, the loans secured by the 
Commonwealth have been grouped into fina ncial years, and their 
interest cost to the Commonwealth is shown in Appendix 10 The 
highest cost loans in each year are indicated in the Appendix, 
and the interest cost (on the most expensive loan in each year) 
rose from 4.25% in 1950-51 to 6015% in 1961-62, with a peak 
of 6.41% in 1960-61. 
In most demand-supply situations, this cost 
classification could be an immediate starting point and woulft 
explain why the Commonwealth borrowed where it did and when 
it dido However , befor e turning to an analysis of demand 
prices , a few pre liminaries seem necessaryo The first is to 
see whether all l oans - subject to their costs being equal -
10 In this s e ction, "the Commonwealth " is used usually as being 
synonymous with the Aust r alian Loan Council o In Section B, it 
will be ne cessar y to distinguish between the States and the 
Commonwealth. 
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appeared the same to the Commonwealth o In particular, did the 
Commonwealth (like most borrowers ) prefer loans of a longer 
duration, and were there any factors - apart from cost and 
availability that might have influenced the location of the 
Commonwealth's borrowings? An examination of these aspects -
which were to be the most important aspects apart from 
borrowing costs - will clear the way for an examination of 
demand priceso 
1. The duration of loans 
The duration of a loan customarily affects its price, 
2 
with shorter-term loans costing less than longer-term loanso 
The relationship between yields on loans of different duration 
is usually not unlike that shown in the following tableo 
2· In times of financial stringency, with high interest rates, 
this relationship is frequently reversed a s borrowers refuse 
to commit themselves to a long-term loan at the prices asked 
by lenders. 
On occasions a longer term loan could, even when it gives 
the lender a higher interest yield , cost the borrower less 
than a somewhat shorter term loan o This type of contradictory 
sltuation arises when there is little difference between the 
interest yield on the two loans, and the flotation costs 
being spread over a longer period in one case reduces the annual 
interest cost per year to less than is paid on a shorter term 
loan o 
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TABLE XVIII: COMMONWEALTH BOND YIELDS 
on 21 Decemb~l2Q4 at Sydney Stock Exchan~ 
11ilutl1.z Date Yl~l d 
£ So do 
April 1965 3012, 1 
May 1966 40 50 1 
May 1967 40 80 3 
February 1968 4 010 0 5 
August 1970 4011 0 7 
Fe bruary 1972 40120 7 
February 1975 4-0140 9 
February 1981 4.18 0 9 
Sert~mber 1985 4.190 8 
The yields shown in the table increase noticeably with ea~~ 
additional year of life of the loan for the flrst five yea~~ 
and then the difference lessens to t% between loans of 10 and 
20 years duration. 
The average life of each loan secured overseas by t he 
Commonwealth is shown in Appendix 11 0 Most of the loans had an 
average life of over nine years o Shorter term loans of flve 
or less years duration, were obtained from commercla1 SOJr es for 
aircraft purchases, and interest and principal payments were the 
responsibility of ToA. Ao and ~antaso These loans had shorter 
lives, evidently because the Commonwealth was prepared to arcept 
them as loans for specific projects, to be amortised over the l~fe, 
and by the earnings , of the equipment purchased 30 The cost. of tho, 
loans were also lower than those of contemporaneous longer - term 
loans in the New York marketo 
3/Second Reading Speeches to Bills providing for borrJwing on 
behalf of Qantas and T.A oA. customarily s tated that tl~ 
Commonwealth only acted as an intermediarY Q uSlng its cr~u 
standing to reduce borrowing costs for the airlineso Spe, 
for example, Harold Holt, CoP oDo , 21 August 1962 p.729 
The classification of the Commonwealth 1 s l oan, 
Appendix II shows that half of the loans lith an average L: p 
of 9-10 years, and about the same proportion of those w~th q 
life of 16 years and over, carried the highest co s t to the 
borrower in a financial year o So far as the number of loar. 
is concerned four had a duration of 9 ~ 10 years, 23 had a dUldtlon 
of 11-15 years (averaging a little over four ~or each year ) ~ whiLe 
nine loans had a life of sixteen years or more o However, these 
statistics are greatly influenced by the fact that most New York 
loans had a life of about 11 years o It could be concluded only 
that the Commonwealth sought loans with a life of nine years or 
more, except when loam could be set off against the revenue from 
the investment of loan proceeds, and that the Commonwealth wa 
probably prepared to pay as much for one loan as another so IJrp 
as each had a life of 9 or more yearso 
30 The Geographjcal DjslributioD of the LoaDS 
The sparsity of loans from the InternatIonal Bank af e 
1956 has been explained in Chapter II and so has the pr eponcierm:ce 
of Bank loans up to that time o Similarly the dIff i cul ty of 
securing permis sion to float can explaIn the intermittent r"a t re 
of the Commonwealth's borrowings in Switzerland, the Ne herlc1nd. 
and, for that matter, in Canada; although it is still of ir.~erest 
to ponder on the Commonwealth's motives for raising loans for 
such small amounts (£6 million and £5 million) as it did I n these 
countries. A different explanation from the availability of 
loans is also required to explain the pattern of borrowi ng in 
the New York and London markets, and from commercial sour ces in 
the United States o 
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New York : As has been mentioned earli Jr; the Commonwealthis 
borrowings in New York followed a fairly consistent pattern? 
Commencing in 1958, two $25 million loans were raised 
within each twelve monthly period, i . e o there was not as 
much as twelve months between succeSSlve borrowingso 
However, this rate of borrowing increased with the 
flotation of the $30 mililon January 1962 refinancing 
loan; and in June 1962, a further $30 million was secured o 
Two points are noteworthy about this pattern of 
borrowing 0 The first is that conditions varied 
considerably in the' New York market between 1958 (when 
$240 million was obtained by borrowers from outside 
North America ) and 1960 (when these borrowers secured 
only $95 million), yet the Commonwealth maintained a 
fairly even tempo of borrowingo The second noteworthy 
pOlnt is that this tempo increased with a refinanclng 
loan of $30 million (in January 1962), when some 
additional subscriptions might be expected from holders 
of maturing securities o 
The Commonwealth apparently tried to maintain a 
fairly steady rate of borrowing in New York; it did not 
venture for loans larger than $25 million, nor try to 
increase the tempo of borrowing by approaching the 
market more frequentl y, until a favourable opportunity 
arose for test ing the market with a $30 million refinancing 
operationo I t was pr epar ed, also, to contlnue in 
Septem ber 1959 with a borrowing for which preliminary 
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arrangements had been made just before a sharp rise 
in interest rates4 0 All of these actions indicate a 
desire to develop the New York market as a steady (rather 
than an 'ad hoc l ) source of loans~ Such an attitude on 
the part of the Commonwealth would be consistent with 
a borrower desiring to maintain a steady capital inflow 
on acceptable terms over a period of years o 
The New York market was the only source from WhICh 
a fairly constant flow of funds at acceptable costs could 
be hoped for, because it was not subject to the same 
governmental controls as other marketso The underwriters 
would also tend to favour the attItude ascrIbed to the 
Commonwealth and may well have been responsible for 
emphasising the advantages of such a policy to the 
Commonweal tho Certainly a "safe" flotat~on policy favoured 
underwriters who had restricted fInancial support? and 
who would view with favour the fact that all Commonwealth 
loans in New York except the 1959 loan were quickly 
oversubscribedo 
Consequently, the Commonwealth's desire to maIntaIn 
its standing in the New York market can be considered as 
affecting the rate of its borrowing there. and~ to a 
lesser extent , the costs it paldc 
4/By contrast with preceding oversea loans, the whole 
of this loan was allocated to the Commonwealth. WhICh 
supports the conclusion that the cost was considered 
quite higho See also the text in Appendlx 1110 
5/See the Textual-Append~o 
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1..o.ans for small amounts : This explanation seems largely 
to fit the circumstances in New York and COUld, perhaps, 
be extended to the Commonwealth 's interest in securing 
loans for relatively small amounts in Canada 1 SW1tzerland 
and the Netherlandso Wi th access to markets being so 
restricted, the Commonwealth could well regard any 
possibility of gaining entrance to another market, even 
though the amount of the first loan \as small, as 
improving its future prospects for loans o The 
Commonwealth, for example, rright have viewed 1tS first 
loans in the Netheriands and Switzerland as paving the 
way either for a series of small loans Wh1Ch would 
aggregate to a respectable amount, or even for a series 
of larger loans o In addition1 as 1ts need for loans 
extended into future years, the more markets potentially 
available to the Commonwealth, the more it would be 
insulated from the closure of, or high lnterest rates 
in, other markets from time to time o 
1QndQn: The London market provided five of the highest 
cost loans during the twelve yearso One of these, in 
1958 ~ 59, was a cash loan and had a significantly lower 
cost than loans of the preceding and succeeding years, 
which suggests that easier supply conditions may have led 
to the Commonwealth ' s demand being satisfied at lower prices 
in that particular year o The remaining four loans were to 
refinanc e maturing debt as were the two loans floated 1n 
New York that carried th e highest costs of 1955-56 and 1961~62o 
It can be readily understood that maturing debt 
exerts pressure on the willingnEs; of the borrower to 
meet the market's price, because a decision to float 
cannot be long deferred in the hope of better market 
conditionso In addition a refinancing loan - because 
it merely maintains the status quo - is not (it would 
seem) so open to criticismo A further, and particularly 
important, point about the Commonwealth's refinancing loans 
in London, was that the United Kingdom authorlties did 
not restrict refinancing operations by other countries 
to the same extent as they restricted cash operations, 
because conversion loans caused no net outflow of fundso 
Fairly obviously, therefore, the frequency of the 
Commonwealth's borrowings in London (and, to a more 
limited extent, the prices at which the loans were floated) 
was influenced by the amotnt of maturing debt6 
Commercial Loan~ : Another somewhat slmilar j situation 
can be seen as helping to determine the source of 
commercial loans all of which were obtained ln the 
United Stateso These loans were secured (and m' de) for 
refinancing the purchase of aircraft and related equipment 
in the United States for Qantas and ToAoAo It is doubtful 
if banks in other countries \.,rould have been prepared to 
supply loans for this purpose and, if they had been prepared 
(and permitted) to do so , whether loans would have been made 
at or near the same costso 
6/The access gained by the Commonwealth for two cash loans 
could also have been influenced by the amount it had 
redeemed si nce 1945, and by its position as the largest 
holder of sterling balances o 
1 7~ 
Both Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (the 
Commonwealth's fiscal agent in New York) and the 
Chase Manhattan Bank (which holds the Commonwealth's 
account in New York) , with both of whom the Reserve 
Bank of Australia held time deposits from time to time, 
were prominent among the lenders o Both banks would have 
felt somewhat under an obligation to assist the 
Commonwealth 0 In addition, these banks probably held 
accounts on behalf of the exporters o If the funds had 
not been available from United States banks the 
Commonwealth either may not have purchEsed the equipment 
or what is much more likely would have purchased the 
quipment at the expense of other imports, because it 
would have considered that similar, short-term loans 
would not have been Rvailable on acceptable terms outside 
the United States to purchase United States exports o7 
Some worthwhile conclusions can therefore be drawn 
on factors, other than price and availability which affected 
the geographical distribution of the Commonwealth's loans o The 
source of commercial loans was largely predetermlned by declsions 
to purchase aircraft in the United States and also ill part, by 
the pre existing relationship between the Commonwealth and two 
large New York bankso The timing and the number of London loans 
7/The prospects of securing bank loans in other countries to 
finance exports has not been covered in this thesis~ 
Nevertheless it would seem most improbable that the 
Commonwealth could have secured reasonable terms el~ewhere 
to finance United States exportse When sufficient funds were 
not available in the United States for a antas financing in 
1956, the Commonwealth secured a loan from the International 
Bank to supplement the commercial loans, but a repetition of 
this between 1956 and 1962 would have been unlikely, to say the 
leasto 
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were influenced by the existence of maturing debto The 
Commonwealth's borrowing pattern in New York was apparently 
influenced by the Commonwealth's and the underwriter's desire 
to develop that market as a steady source of loans o 
~~ Costs and Demand Prices 
The time has now come to see what relation can be 
established between the highest costs the Commonwealth did pay 
from time to time, and what it would have been prepared to pay if 
more loans had been available at a continuum of increasing 
prices. As has been mentioned, supply conditions were such that 
demand considerations appeared to be quite subordinated o 
£evertheless some price must have been just below, and another 
just above, the point where the Commonwealth (bearing in mind 
the considerations discussed in the preceding sections) would 
have cried, "high enough " 0 
It seems clear that the Commonwealth had no inbuilt 
national prejudice against any international capital market8~ 
The German market was providing loans for Japan at an interest 
cost of about 7% from 1958, and was o pen for borrowers from other 
countries9 o From this it may be taken that this price was more 
10 than the Commonwealth was prepared to pay o 
8/See the report delivered in 1959 by the Treasurer after he 
had canvassed the capi tal markets. (See Note 15 ~ 'T'rYVh'~l 
Apnennix ? ) 
9/See Chapter II I concerning foreign exchange controlso 
10/The Commonwealth's credit standing (see Chapter III) would 
have approximated that of Japano 
, 
, 
A little more precise determination might be obtained 
through examining the loans with the highest costs shown in 
Appendix I for each financial year . (This grouping in itself blurs 
a precise determination , but is justified - superficially at least _ 
by the custom of the Commonwealth and States to budget on a 
financial year basis ) o From what has been said concerning 
refinancing loans , there is a possibility that in those years 
when a conversion loan was the most expensive, the Commonwealth 
mi ght have been "nudg ed " close to its pri ce limi to These loans 
were the most expensive in 1952-53 and 1955 56 to 1961-62 (except 
for 1959-60 when the New York loan raised in September 1959 was 
the most expensive)o 
During different years the Commonwealth also dld not 
refinance the whole of a maturing loan, and from time to time it 
repurchased SUbstantial amounts on the marketo These occurrences 
might, under most circumstances, be taken to indicate that yields 
had gone too high for the Commonwealth as a borrowero ll However, 
the management of a considerable volume of debt on the London 
market - which was not at all a steady market - could be the 
reason for much of the repurchaseso The failure to refinance the 
full amount of a maturing loan may not have been the Commonwealth's 
decision, but may have been due to advice from the Bank of England 
(in the London market ) or the underwriters (in New York) that 
attempting to refinance the full amount would prejudice the market12 • 
ll/That is , that the Commonwealth was prepared (in the case 
of repurchases ) to lend at these prices, and not to borrowo 
12/As a loan matures , the securities are normally sold by long-
term investors and purchased by shorter-term holders (eogo 
those in the money market)o Consequently a good proportion 
of those holding maturing securities could not be expected to 
convert into a long-term loano 
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Consequently the only definite conclusion on demand 
prices is that 7% was regarded as too high between 1958 and 19620 
However in the absence of any available alternative, it will be 
necessary to assume for the discussion of factors affecting demand 
prices in the following section that the Commonw2alth paid as much 
as it was prepared to pay in each financial year, and to reeard 
any resultant conclusions as being tentativeo Pr obably this 
assumption is not too far out but it must be quite suspect for 
the years up to 1955-56, when the Commonwealth was assured of a 
flow of funds from the International Bank130 
13/It will be recalled that the loans late in 1956 from the 
Bank were additional to the finance promlsed in earlier years o 
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B. FACTORS AFFECTING THE COMMONWEALTH'S DEMAND PRICES 
Although conclusions formed on the basis of the 
costs shown in Appendix I must be fairly tentative, it is worth-
while to attempt, at least, to say what factors appeared to 
influence directly the prices the Commonwealth, as agent f or 
the Loan Council, was prepared to pay from time to time for 
its oversea loans o Since the purpose of oversea loans is to 
provide additional resources for the economy or for particular 
sectors, three matters stand out among those which could 
influence the demand price for the loans o These are 
government borrowing costs in Australia, the state of the 
balance of payments, and the degree of assistance the 
Commonwealth had to provide from year to year for the States' 
Loan programme s o 
The following table provides the statist ics for the 
discussion of these three factors o 
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TABLE XIX : BORROWING COSTS, INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND 
COMMONWEALTH ASSISTANCE TO STATE LOAN PROGRAMMES 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956 57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
Borrowing Costs 
Overseas Internal I as % 
of II 
% 
4.25 
4092 
4 075 
4.62 
5 000 
5087 
6016 
5 08 1 
6 023 
6041 
6 . 15 
(a) 
% % 
136 
4 050 106 
4050 103 
5000 (c) 100 
5000 117 
5'000 123 
5.00 116 
') 000 124 
5037(d) 119 
5037(e) 114 
Inter-
national 
Reserves (b) 
£m. 
621 
795 
359 
534 
553 
422 
347 
558 
517 
506 
501 
539 
Common-
wealth 
Assistance 
153 
132 
74 
49 
88 
92 
83 
3 
30 
88 
7 
(a) 
(b) 
Long-term bond rate o 
(c) 
Cd) 
(e) 
At commencement of financial years o Net of I.M oFo drawings 
and adjusted for statistical discrepancy advised by Bureau 
of Census and Statistics o 
Increased from 4t% in May 1956 
Increased from 5% in February ~d was 5.09% for one loan 
only. 
Reduced to 5% in February 1962 . 
Sources: Appendix I for oversea loans. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Prospectuses, for public 
loans in Australia, various dates o 
Commonwealth Statistician Balance of Payments 
1961-62 to 1965-66, Appendix VIII (p o34) for 
international reserves from 1951 (adjusted); 
Commonwealth of Australia, pros5ectus for New York loan of 1954, p 012, for June 19 0 reserves o 
Appendix X of Chapter I for Commonwealth Assistance 
to State loan programmes. 
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1. Internal Borrowing Costs 
14 Buchanan has put forward the view that -
"The community should be indifferent between the 
two loan forms (internal and foreign) if the external 
borrowing rate is equivalent to the internal borrowing 
rate o" 
To operate in this fashion, a government would have to 
regard its borrowings in the same way as a private busine s s, 
quite unrelated to its responsibility for the general economic 
tenor of the whole economy o There is a marked difference 
between the effects on the economy of governmental borrowing 
overseas and borrowing internally . One important distinction 
is that foreign currencies permit the economy (either the 
public or private sector) to secure goods that can be 
purchased more cheaply overseas, and these goods can act as 
a leavening agent for the use of further factors of production 
/~ 
economically available locally o Consequently a foreign loan 
can help to bring into play more factors than those purchased 
with the proceedso 
There is no indication that the Commonwealth 
endeavoured to equalise its oversea costs with either the cost 
of its domestic long-term loans (as shown in Table XIX) or 
the cost of its short or medium term bond rates between the 
years shown in Table XX belowo (The difference between the 
costs would be sligqtly more marked if the amount of interest 
returned t o the Commonwealth, by way of taxes from resident 
holders of Commonwealth bonds, was deducted from the cost 
shown for borrowing in Australia o) Furthermore, 
oversea costs obviously fluctuated l ifferently from internal costs o 
14 ' 
·J.M. Buchanan, Public Principles of Public Debt, Irwin, 
1958, po 790 
IN.-a kf'149<i1AlPft. 
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TABLE XX: YIELD TO INVESTORS ON~SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM 
COMMONWEALTH SECURITIES 19_4-25 TO 1961 -62 
Year Short Term Medium Term % % 
1954-55 3G50, 3055, 3040 (a) 
1955-56 3.25, 3025, 4. 16 (a) 
1956- 57 4000, 4035, 4000 5 05 , 5 0 00~ 5 00 
1957 58 4- 0 45 ~ 4042, 4040 5000, 5000, 4089 
1958- 59 4016 4022, 4018 4 86, 4084 4082 
1959-60 4000, 4012, 4024 4078 4080, 4 85 
1960~ 61 4025, 505O, 5046 4 82, 5042, 5042 
1961~62 4. 75, 4042, 4 ,, 43 5025 9 4080, 4- 080 
(a) During these year6, medium term securities were either 
issued at the same interest rate as long- term, or only 
two securities (short and long) were available to 
subscribers o 
Source: Prospectuses o 
Some might nevertheless contend that the Commonwealth 
borrowed more economically by securing marginal amounts overseas 
in preference to increasing domestic interest rates on its cash 
and its conversion loans in Australlao The result of a 
calculation of this nature would depend on the assumed 
elasticity of demand for Commonwealth bonds at any point of 
time However, it seems unlikely, to say the least, that the 
Commonwealth undertook any calculations of this nature in 
arriving at the prices it was prepared to pay overseas o 
At the same time, the percentages in column III of 
Table XIX pOint to a shifting, but nevertheless noticeable 
relationship between internal and oversea costs Oversea costs 
in 1950-51 were 136% of domestic costs, a height never reached 
again in the period o At this time Australia was feeling more 
keenly than in later years the need for dollar goods o 
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The broad relationship indicated by the percentages 
would have been brought about, in all probability, by 
subjective evaluations 0 It is natural when purchasing anything 
(including money) to relate the cost to other known costs o 
In this way it would be fairly automatic for those undertaking 
a borrowing overseas to relate its cost to the costs they were 
accustomed to pay for loans in Australiao As oversea costs 
rose in relation to costs in Australia it could be expected 
that there would be a growing feeling that "costs were getting 
too high overseas".15 
The extent to which this feeling affected borrowing 
decisions would be determined by the pressures existing at the 
time for additional resources to be available o One such 
pressure - the dollar shortage - and its possible effect in 
making relatively higher oversea borrowing cost acceptable in 
1950~51 has already been mentionedo Others are discussed in 
the following sections o 
15 ~ It is possible that, if an unsophisticated reaction to a 
large gap between the costs of domestic and oversea borrowing 
was taken into consideration~ the interest rate rather than the ' 
interest cost would be the criterion o It is perhaps significant 
that conversion loans, which occasion less reaction because they 
do not add to the level of debt, were the only loans that carried 
an interest rate of 6% (i o e~ a coupon of 6%, with interest cost 
being higher) during the twelve years o But this could have been, 
as well, a result of supply differences (flotation cost 
differences particularly) between markets o 
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20 The Balance of Payments 
The Commonwealth was the government responsible 
for the general economic welfare of Australia o It was 
concerned both with the condition of the country's balance 
of payments and with thr level of employmento The 
Commonwealth could naturally be expected t r become 
more energetic in seeking foreign loans when internal 
economic conditions required additional resources of foreign 
currency to maintain full employment or an early return to 
full employment c 
The Commonwealth took the proceeds of all new money 
loans until 1956-5716~ and its willingness to pay high prices 
for these loans from time to time would consequently not have 
aroused strenuous objections from state representatives on the 
Loan Council, who did not have to meet the interest costs of 
these loans. When the States were affected - ecg o in 
refinancing operations on the London market - they would have 
had difficulty in presenting effective opposi tion to any 
refinancing operation proposed by the Commonwealth 17 
16 0The proceeds were subscribed to State loan programmes at 
domestic rates of interest o From Table XXI it can be seen that 
a small cash portion of a New York refinancing and cash loan in 
1955-56 was allocated to the States, but this is small enough 
to be discounted o 
17 0 The alternative open to the States was to find money to 
redeem the loano Sufficient funds would not have been available 
from their sinking funds, and the local market was inadequate 
for the cash loan programme o 
Also, where a maturing loan was divided between all the 
States none would have a large quantity; where one or two 
States held all the maturing debt the others would give them 
little supporte 
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The first evidence of the Commonwealth's borro 1ngs 
being dlrectly linked to balance of payments difficult1es was the 
first loan from the International Bank in 1950 0 When this loan 
was arranged, Australia was suffering acutely from a shortage of 
dollar goods. This shortage was an important factor in the ~l ~ction 
policy of the government in the 1949 elections It 1S therefore 
understandable that the Commonwealth was prepared to pay a high 
relative cost, by comparison with contemporaneous internal costs, 
for this loano 
Following the initial approach to the International Bank~ 
the Commonwealth was assured of signiflcant dollar assistance over 
the immediately following years. The government's attention was 
consequently directed more to the country's overall need for 
foreign exchange, and this reorientation was made evident in the 
speech, already quoted in part, on the l&an (S\viss francs) Bill 
19540 (See Section A of ~ chapter Over these years then 
the Commonwealth s concern could be expected to be directed mQre 
to the adequacy of Australia's general reserve position 
-i4-
thanAthe dollar positiono 
A comparison of Australia's international rfserves and 
annual oversea borrowing costs in Table XIX supports this view, 
In each year up to and including 1956-57 oversea borrowing costs 
rose when reserves fell and vice versa o 
The degree of the rise and fall in the two sets of 
statistics do not, however correspond very closelyo There is 
no sign that when the level of reserves fell dramatically the 
Commonwealth felt an urgent need to secure loans overseas at 
any priceo In part the comparatively minor movements in oversea 
costs would reflect the availability of funds from the International 
1 05 
Bank (which did not vary its charges in relation to amount s ~ 
Two other factors were also important -
ao Long term loans could not provide substantial 
funds quickly to meet a crisis18 , but the 
International Monetary Fund could, and at 
cheaper rateso 
b o Anticipatory borrowings could blur the relationsnip 
between balance of payments crises and the cost 
of oversea loans. The Treasury Bill and bank 
rates in London~ where most of Australia's 
reserves were invested, were sufficiently high 
during most of the period to reduce the net 
cost of borrowIng and of holding loan proceeds 
in reserves (or of borrowing to prevent the 
reduction of reserves) to less than one per cento 
Thus there was no great cost to discourage 
anticipatory borrowlng19 o 
To summarIse there is statistical evidence to support 
the view that the state of Australia's oalance of payments up t o 
1956-57 had a direct influe lce on the costs the Commonwealth was 
l8/Both I~B o RoD . and commercial loans are usually drawn nver 
periods of some time while goods were beIng purchasEd The 
time entailed in negotiating public loans and the amounts 
obtained q prevented the markets providing substantial funds 
quicklyo 
19/Until reserves were again de pleted, the Commonwealth 
would have made a profit from on the one hand, the retill'n 
on the investment of foreign currencies and~ on the other 
hand , the relending of local currency proceeds to the States 
at internal bond rates o 
I , 
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prepared to pay for its oversea loans20~ In prirt:('1Jlcl.r~ the 
high relative cost of the first Internati~l ql Bank loan was 
directly influenced by the dollar shortage~ HoV/ever, the costs 
did not a t any time ri se to cor respond wi th balance of payments 
crises becaufe tle sources of long-term loa~s were not as 
adequate as the International Monetary Fund to m Jt these crises o 
30 Commu~ea1th_Assistance to Stat~LQ~L~~ 
The State~ loan programmes could be very much affected 
at times of falling or low reserves, In the boom periods. which 
have led to falling reserves the private sector has tended to 
attract investible funds away from Commonwealth loans o The loss 
of reserves, in itself, 'means a reduction In domestic liquidity~ 
with consequent reductions in domestic borrowIngs and/or higher 
interest rates in Australia unless there is a compensatIng 
relaxation of restrictions on the level of lending by the banking 
systemo Such a relaxation would not be likc:y when the 
Commonwealth was endeavouring to protect the balance of payments e 
Similarly, the Commonwealth could not be expected to use central 
bank finance when reserves were already low and might for this 
and other reasons be reluctant to guarantee as hIgh a loan programme 
20/This conclusion is of course subject to the reservations already 
expressed about accepting the highest cost of loans in each year 
as reflecting the Commonwealth's demand priceso In addition it 
should be noted that -
(a ) There is no significant degree of negative correlation 
between oversea costs and Australia's reserves during 
the twelve year period ; and 
(b ) The level of reserves shown In Table XIX is as at the 
beginning of each financial year The use of these 
statistics seems justifiable on the basis of the 
Commonwealth's budget being prepared at about the same 
timeo Nevertheless~ different results are obtained from 
USIng, for example, the lowest level of reserves in each 
year o 
1 8 f 
for the States as it might when there were no balance of payments 
problems. The States ' need for Commonwealth assistance for the 
loan programmes would consequently be linked with but would not 
necessarily occur at the same time as, the Commonwealth's deepest 
concern ov er the balance of payments o 
The States began taking a share of the proceeds of 
foreign cash loans in 1957-58. From this time, with some exceptions 
they bore part of the higher cost involved in borrowings overseas. 
The effect of this change in policy on the allocation of loan 
proceeds can be seen in the following table o 
TABLE XXI : CHANGES IN NET COMMONWEALTH A D STATE DEBT 
OVERSEAS 
£ million 
Commonwealth States Total 
1950-51 201 - 1707 - 1506 
1951-52 2404 100 2304 
1952-53 16 02 102 1500 
1953-54 1706 6 02 1104 
1954-55 2506 306 22 00 
1955-56 2502 + 104(a) 2606 
1956-57 7 00 0 08 602 
1957-58 1305 + 2.2 1507 
1958-59 1307 + 2201 35 0 8 
1959-60 28 0 8 + 6 0 0 34 0 8 
1960-61 - 7.4 + 1904 12 00 
1961-62 - 1.7 + 702 2: 2 
TOTAL 16500 27 08 19208 
(a) Result of a portion of a combined cash and refinanc ing loan 
in New York. 
Source : Derived from Commonwealth Treasury, B1Jdget Papers, (Commonwealth Debt and Government Secur ities on Issue) 
various yearso 
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From 1957-58 , the States could be expected to jOln forC2 5 
in oppos ing int ere s t c osts on ove r s ea loans that were slgnl f l cantly 
higher t han the rates on inter nal loans . Yet, while the 
Commo nweal t h wa s heavily subsidi sing the State programmes, t heir 
opposition could hardly be effe cti v eo ( The Commonwealth had only 
to point t o the lack of funds f or inter nal loans, and the need for 
1/ , t 
ove r sea l oans to generate additional expendlture ln Australia o 
The Commonwealth would not be so aver se as the State s to borrowing 
at t he higher rates because of its obvi ous desire to supplement 
Australia's long-term capacity to impor t o) 
The States' opposition t o accepting the high interest 
cost of oversea loans was voiced publicly by at least one 
It is also noticeabl e that statistics of Commonwealth 
ass istance to State loan programme s, in Table XIX, rnoved in the 
same direct i on as did oversea l oan cost s in each year from 1957-58 
to 1961 62. Indeed, the degree of correspondence between the two 
sets of fi gures is somewhat sur prising~ conslderlng the peculiar 
character istic s of the supply positiono 
It is of some interest that the States could, apparently 
make t heir pres sure felt on the Loan Council when conditions were 
favourable to them, and that there i s ev i dence that their need for 
loan f und s, rather than the desir e f or f or eign currency had a 
dir ect influence on the willingness of the Commonw ~alth to accept 
highe r costs in its oversea borr owi ng s f rom 1957-58 0 
21/Premier Playford made a trenchant crit i clsm ln May 1960 
which is quoted, in part, in the fi nal chap ter, Fur the r 
evidence of the restraining infl u ence of the State s appears 
in (i) the Commonwealth ac cepting the full amount of the 
September 1959 loan in New York; and (ii ) an arrangement 
made in 1966 for State loans maturing over seas to he convert ed 
i n Australia and for the Commonweal t h to take tIe f ull 
pr oceeds of oversea loans (which t hereafter climbed to 
an intere s t cost of 7%)0 
I 
, 
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APPENDIX II 
AV2RAGE LIFE OF COMMONWEALTH LOANS OBTAINED OVERSEAS 
11920-1962) 
- Year :: -
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. _ _ _ .i ~,-, 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961"",62 
AP ~ IX I 
INTEREST COST OF COMMONWEALTH LOANS OBTAIl'JED OVERSEAS 1950-51 to 1961-62 
Io.3 oRo D~ 
( a) 
% 
4 025(b) 
4075 
4075(b) 
4 0 62 (b) 
New York 
% 
4 ,.17(c) 
5000(b)(c) 
5034(c) 
5,. 18 
5.67 
6,.23(b)/5090 
5084/6 .. 23 
6.15(b)/6,.07(c) 
London 
Cash Conversion 
5087 (b) 
6016 (b) 
5 .. 81tb) 5074/5069 
5.71 
Switzo 
% 
(2) Two loans were secured at this price,. 
% 
6.15 
Nether- Commer-
lands cial-
% % 
4675 
4.67-4075 
4 .. 75 
(a) 
(b) 
(c , 
(d) 
Commitment fee adds slightly to the costs shown o 
Loans with highest cost in each year are indicatedo 
Includes refinancing operation .. 
In the same re financing operation, investors could select 
other securities costing 6032%0 An earlier loan cost 6 .. 29%0 
Source: Chapter I, C. & D. 
hig est 
Co t of 
Year (b) 
-y:-
4-Q25 
5. 00 
50 87 
6.16 
5081 
6.23 
6041 
6.15 
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APPENDIX II 
AVERAGE LIFE OF COMMONWEALTH LOANS OBTAINED OVERSEAS 
(19t)0~1962 ) 
Sourcst 
o ~ 
I.B.RoD. 
London 
New York 
Swi zerland 
Canada 
Netherlands 
Commercial 
No. of highest 
cost loans in 
individual year s 
3 lr ~ 5 
3 2 
3 2 
- Year : 
-
6 - 8 9 - 10 11 - 1.5 16 -
3(a) 2 2 
1 3 7 
11 
4 
2 
1 
4 23 9 
2 5 l~ 
(a) Includes one loan for Qantas, and another which had 
part of its proceeds devoted to the purchase of 
aircraft o 
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CHAPTER V - APPENDIX III 
ISSUE TERMS AND MARKET CAPACITY 
.There are two market reactions which have a long-
term influence on the comparative price at which a borrower 
~an issue securities at any given timeo Since the effects 
~of these reactions arise by implication in the discussion 
of market reactions, it seems advisable to state briefly 
their effect on the yield (and price) of bondso 
(1) ~rket reaction to frequent issues: The general attitude 
of bond market dealers was that the New York market was not 
very price-elastic for foreign borrowers' bonds. Consequently, 
the raising of $30 million instead of $25 million would require 
a noticeable increase in yield offered by the borrower over the 
full amount of the loan, leading to a much higher again marginal 
cost (for the extra $5 million). 
Over a given period there might be "X" amount of 
f unds becoming available for investment in the securitles 
offered by borrower"A" at a yield of, say, 5% (in certain 
market conditions and with a given dur ation etc.). (The 
practice of insurance companies spreading their investments 
over specific groups of investments in pre- determined 
proportions illustrates the attitude which - it is suggested -
is applicable to the market as a whole). If a borrower 
decides to pay 5 + a% in order to secure more than $X over 
the period, this price could be expected initially to attract 
those prepared to invest in A1 s securit i es at 5 + a%7 but not 
at 5%. 
Subject to there being no change in general economic 
conditions, funds will continually become available to inves t ors 
for investment or re~investment in the period following the issue. 
Some of these funds will be under the control of those prepared 
to invest in A's securities a t 5%. They will tend to purchase, 
while investors desiring of holding A' s bonds only at higher 
yields will sell these securities as the yield falls below 
5 + a%. Thus, in the absence of changes in market conditions, 
and if there is no further issue by A in the meantime, A' s 
securities will again come to approximate 5%. 
However, if before the flow of funds has brought the 
yield back to 5%, A makes another issue, the yield will again 
lncrease. Constant issues at the new price will tend to make 
the yield on A's issues settle at a new equilibrium level higher 
than 5%, particularly when those who had earlier held or secured 
the bonds at a yield of 5% find themselves suffering a loss. 
(2) The Liquiditv and Price of Bon~~ Running apparently 
counter to the example given, is a factor which will tend to 
reduce yields on bonds which are traded in considerable 
numbers. The willingness of some investors to buy "A's " bonds 
at a given price will be influenced by the relative difficulty 
in realising on the bonds before maturity. (Again, the process 
can be illustrated by reference to insurance company practiceo 
1 9 2 
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APPENDIX III 
(Cont'd) 
Insurance companies usually invest long-term, and when 
maturity approaches-and the relative yield falls and 
the price rises - realise on the bonds, thus obtaining 
a margin above the current price of long-term bondso) 
The prospect of loss in a sale on the market, 
due to the sale price having to be lowered for a 
substantial quantity to be sold will reduce the quantity 
of bonds these investors are willing to buy in the firs t 
place o 
Conversely, when "A" has a sufficient quantity 
of bonds on issue for trading to be undertaken in large 
batches 7 the demand for his bonds will tend to increase, 
and the yield he has. to offer will decrease . 
I 
" 
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CHAPTER VI : ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
INTRODUCTORY 
In Chapter IV the main commitments facing the 
Australian governments, and particularly the Commonwealth 
government , were suggested as -
a. Overcoming the dollar shortage; 
b. Increasing governmental and private 
investment -
(i) So that the economy would recover 
from the wartime rundown of 
equipment, and 
(ii) To provide employment and products 
for a quickly growing population; 
c. A high level of "defensive preparedness" in the 
early 1950's; and 
d. The diversification of Australia's export trade. 
To assist it in meeting these requirements, the Commonwealth 
borrowed overseas, increasing net foreign debt by about 
£190 million . 
The general effects of the borrowings have already 
been discussed in Chapter IV. However, an evaluation of the 
government 's policy of borrowing overseas requires a comparison 
with alternative courses that were available to the government. 
This chapter undertakes this comparison. 
195. 
Consideration of some of the alternatives 
requires comparison of amounts of money flows within 
the economy. In these cases, the discussion would be 
nebulous unless amounts were used to indicate the 
effect of the borrowings. As discussed in Chapter IV 
the use of £190 million in discussion of the effect on 
domestic money flows could not be justified. The 
appropriate amounts to use were estimated in that 
chapter as £500 million (for the required reduction in 
private investment) "and £800 million (for the reduction 
required in consumption or governmental expenditure). 
These amounts can, however, be described only 
as the amounts that appear most appropriate in the 
circumstances. Where the figures are used in this 
chapter they must accordingly be read with the reservations 
that have already been expressed on the validity of the 
estimates·~ These reservations still apply even though 
!t «-I v-W the estimates are rounded to the nearestAmillion. 
• See Chapter IV, ~ 21 and others. 
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A. THE EFFECT OF A REDUCTION IN EXPENDITURE 
1. Loans for Aircraft Purchases 
There are two points of interest peculiar to the 
loans raised for aircraft purchases from commercial sources. 
The first is whether it would have been profitable for the 
Commonwealth to have made funds available itself for the short 
period required by T.A.A. and Qantas: The second is the likely 
effect if the Commonwealth had not permitted the airlines to 
re-equip. 
The loans a~ranged for T.A.A. and Qantas from 
commercial sources were, by comparison with the Commonwealth' s 
other borrowings, short-term. (Their average duration, from 
Chapter I Appendix IX, was between 2 years 9 months and 4 
years 11 months.) Had the Commonwealth itself advanced the 
funds, instead of borrowing elsewhere, Australia's international 
reserves would have been depleted by the outstanding amount 
2 of the loans 0 The consequent net gain or net loss of earnings 
from the investment of resources can be estimated from the 
1· This is a common proposi t ion put forward in Parliament. 
See, for example, F. Crean, C.P.D., 19 May 1967, p.2458. 
2·As suming that no other action was taken by the Commonwealth 
in relat ion to the leve l of domestic expenditure and imports. 
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TABLE XXII INTEREST RATES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ON THE 
COMMONWEALTH'S AIRCRAFT LOANS 
Aircraft UNITED KINGDOM RATES ~a2 Date Loans Bank Treasury Short - Term (b) Rate Bills Bond Average 
Nov. 1956 
% 
4.75 5.50 4.93 4.67 5.04 
June 1958 4.6-4.75 5.00 4.92 4.69 4.87 
Sept. 1958 4075 4.50 3087 4.51 4.29 
Aug. 1960 5.75 6 .. 00 5.56 6.10 5.88 
Dec. 1960 5 .. 75 5.00 4085 5.82 5.12 
1961 6,000 5.13 5.74 5.62 
(a) Source: International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Stat istics, various issues, United 
Kingdom Bank, Treasury Bill and Short-term Bond 
Rate at end of quarter following, except for 
1956 and 1961 where an annual figure has been 
used. 
(b) Unweighted.PrlP'~ f¥ft.ddJw :~Iuu.t~, 
On two of the air craft loans (in September 1958 and 
December 1960) the Airlines accepted a higher rate of interest 
on their loans than the Commonwealth's estimated earnings from 
its International reserves at about the same time. With these 
two loans, interest rates in the United Kingdom would have 
risen above their interest cost before they were fully repaid. 
No clear case can therefore be made on a financial basis for 
the Commonwealth to have provided the finance for the airlines, 
with the resultant diminution of reserves for 2-5 years. 
Some of the possible consequences of the Commonwealth 
not re equipping the airlines are particularly relevant not 
-1 9? 
only to airline financing but also to the subsequent examination 
in this chapter of the alternative of reducing domestic 
expenditure instead of borrowing overseas. If Qantas had not 
been maintained as an Australian airline (a necessary result 
of not re-equipping), its earnings, which more than sufficed for 
servicing the loans, would have accrued to foreign-owned 
airlines, and Australia's current account in the balance of 
payments would have been so much worse. If T.A.A. had not 
been maintained, the most probable alternatives would have 
been -
(a) Both T.A.A. and Ansett-A.N.A. could have used 
antiquated aircraft, with a resultant inferior 
and slower transport service; 
(b) Ansett-A.N.A. could have been permitted to expand 
and modernise with finance being provided by -
(i) Commonwealth government-guaranteed loans 
from abroad costing as much, at least, as 
the ones secured for T. A.A.; 
(ii) Loans secured privately either in Australia 
(thus detracting for the time beingf~funds 
available for other investment 3) or abroad 
(which would have cost more than T.A.A's 
loans); or 
(iii) Equit investment from abroad, which could 
only be expected if profit prospects were 
greater than on fixed-in erest loans (and 
3·Unless reserves were a llowed to run down as mentioned above. 
I 
) 
, 
I 
which would therefore have been as onerous 
on Australia's balance of payments as (ii) 
above). 
Other results would include -
(i) The Commonwealth would have had to find from 
taxation the revenue otherwise accruing from 
T.A.A.; and 
(ii) Air transport charges could have increased through, 
among other things, less public surveillance of 
airline activities. 
None of these alternatives give the appearance of being as 
economically or socially desirable as the course actually 
followed in financing aircraft purchases. 
20 Credit Expansion 
The Commonwealth could have maintained the level 
of domestic expenditure in Australia and either allowed 
reserves to run down to the equivalent of the net increase 
in foreign debt, or restricted imports to maintain the same 
level of reserves. 
The alternative of allowing reserves to run down 
over a long period raises two questions that were not dealt 
with in connection with the aircraft loans. In the first 
place, foreign investors could have been frightened off by 
prospe cts of foreign exchange restrictions resulting from the 
lower level of reserves, leading to some diminution of private 
capital inflowo The second point ·s that Australia's reserves 
need to be managed to ac t as a buffer against potentially far 
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worse balance of payments problems than occurred between 1950 
and 1962, since no formula had been found to prevent an 
international financial crisis4. Because there remained a 
potential danger of crises worse than actually occurred in 
the twelve years it is difficult to put forward a case for 
having reserves run at a lower average level than was 
maintained over the period. 5 
The second alternative of maintaining domestic 
expenditure but reducing imports has even less to recommend it. 
It became obvious during the dollar shortage that high cost 
import-replacement activities wasted resources. Attempting 
to maintain the same level of domestic expenditure would 
have required more stringent import restrictions, with higher 
domestic prices. These, in turn, would have increased mis-
direction of resources and, possibly, led to increased 
export subsidies and a somewhat lower standard of livingo 
On the other hand, the government might have chosen to maintain 
the same level of import restrictions, and adopted for slightly 
longer periods the deflationary measures it employed when the 
balance of payments was threatened between 1950 and 1962, with 
4° In 1967 I.MoF. and other groups were still studying 
international liquidity problemso 
5· As was shown unde r the previous heading, the cost of holding 
reserves is not as high as it may appear to be. 
2QO 
resultant greater reductions in production and employment. 
Neither course would have assisted the Australian governments 
to fulfil the ambitions and commitments of the period in t he 
way that oversea borrowing dido 
A satisfactory alternative could obviously not be 
found by monetary measureso Since the borrowings provided 
additional resources, the only practicable alternatives must 
have lain in the reduction or reallocation of real resources. 
3. Reduction in Public Expenditure 
A reduction of imports valued at £190 million could 
have been achieved (according to the estimate in Chapter IV) 
by reducing public sector expenditure by about £800 million. 
Among the current expenditures of the Commonwealth 
and the States, the only item which appears capable of 
encompass ng a reduct on of this amount was defence expenditure , 
which totalled £2,100 million during the twelve years. It 
rose from £54 million in 1948-49 to £203 million in 1952-53, 
after which it tailed off until 1958-590 In retrospect, this 
level of expenditure was a response to a threat which did not 
materialiseo However, as was indicated in Chapter IV B, a 
high level of defence preparedness was one of the government's 
criteria, and it would not have been the area to suffer first 
from reductions in government spendingo The case nevertheless 
i llustra tes the implications of an iEeAF~ pol itical decision. 
Commonwealth fixed capital expenditure barely 
exceeded £1 , 000 million and t hat of the States, £5,000 million o 
A reduction of the ne ces sary extent (13%) in this expenditure 
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would seem to be almost catastrophic o As it was, gross fixed 
capital expenditure per head at average prices hardly 
maintained the level established at the commencement of the 
period. The figures are shown in the following table. 
TABLE XXII I : GROSS FIXED PUBLIC CAP ITAL EXPENDITURE 1950-51 
TO 1961-62 
1950-51 
1951 -52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
At Average 
Prices ~a~ 
£ million 
465 
545 
480 
474 
487 
49 5 
505 
51 0 
553 
576 
580 
614 
Per Ca}2i tal" ~b ~ 
£ re i J J i i '11 
56 
64 
55 
53 
54 
53 
53 
52 
56 
57 
56 
58 
Sources: Commonwealt~ Statistician, Australian National 
Accounts 1948-49 - 1963-64, Tables 10 (adjusted) 
and 11; Commonwealth Treasury, Budget Papers 
1962-63, Table 50 (po157) - (mean population) 0 
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For a country with an expanding population, and with 
the requirements for expenditure on social needs and on the 
economic infrastructure that Australia had, the ~ during 
the period in per capita public expenditure is diffi cult to 
understand. Long waiting lists for houses, inadequate 
education facilities, water and power shortages, poor roads 
and ill-equipped railways, hospitals that even in 1967 were 
classed as outmoded structures, indicated a substantial 
unfilled need for public expenditure 0 
The fall from time to time in expenditure on publi c 
works was largely a result of the Commonwealth dampening down 
expenditure to protect Australia's balance of payments 6. 
Further reductions, to the order of 13% would in the 
circumstances appear to have made it impossible for the 
Australian governments to achieve the tasks they were set by 
the backlog of war needs and the immigration programmeo 
Undoubtedly , such a reduction would have aggravated the 
problems faced by an expanding private sector, thereby 
increasing costs and reducing productiono 
The only area in which a reduction could have been 
made without fairly early repercussions was in some of the more 
"roundabout " projects that required heavy investment before 
they were brought into productiono An outstanding example 
6· The reasons given for reductions in government expenditure 
from time to time (see, for example, Budget Speech 1950-51, 
Po4; 1955-56, po6; 1960-61, p . 5) were the pressure on 
Australia's international reserves and the need to reduce 
internal demand 0 
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was the Snowy Mountains Scheme, of which the Prime Minister 
said in 19587 -
'·' It is the simple truth that the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme would not be half as far advanced as it is today 
if we had not borrowed money in dollars overseas. " 
Reductions of "roundabout" projects seem quite feasible in 
an emergency, in that some immediate saving is achieved at 
the expense of an increase in running costs. Over a long 
term - perhaps somewhat longer than the period now under 
study - the aggregate costs rise. Hence, doing away with 
projects of this natur~ was not a real alternative8 • 
4. Reduction in Private Sector Expenditure 
A reduction in private fixed capital investment of 
about £500 million, or about £800 million in personal consumpt ion 
has been estimated as necessary to reduce imports by the amount 
borrowed overseas. 
Private fixed investment (excluding dwellings) was 
the area which showed the most notable increase in expenditure 
during the period. It rose from £609 per head in 1950-51 to 
£779 in 1961-62 at ~a:o prices, representing an increase of 
28%9. Although there would seem to be scope for a reduction 
of £500 million , or 5%, of the total expenditure in this area, 
there is no reason to suppose that the ~ socially, 
economicall~ or even financiallY,least desirable investments 
7· R. G• Menzies, Telecast over National Stations, 12 November 1958. 
8° The Snowy Scheme also provided interim employment for a 
quantity of unskilled migrant labour . 
9·Commonwealth Statistician, Australian National Accounts 
1948-49 to 1963-64 , Tab'e s 10 and 11 (expenditure has been 
adjusted to 1959- 6 p~ ces)o Mean population statistics are 
from Commonwealth Treasury, Budget Papers 1962-63, Table No.50 
(p .157L 
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would have been the ones left short of funds . Consequently, 
production must have been affected, leading to a reduction of 
about 5% in goods that would otherwis e have been available 
Ji);Yle"o>itc use 
for eonsYmptioR or export o 
Personal consumption, on the other hand, rose only 
by a little more than 1% per head per annum in average price s 
over the period10 , and could have stood a reduction less wel l 
than private investment. The reduction of 2% necessary in 
consumption would have involved an increase of 12% in either 
direct or indirect taxqtion (or 6% in both) over the period . 
Such an increase could have been politically acceptable, when 
viewed against the 5% income tax increases and reductions from 
time to time during the period and the subsequent increases in 
State taxation, none of which caused a government to fall 
although the moves were unpopular at the time. 11 
There a ppears to have been considerable scope also 
for taxation to have been increased in a way that would make 
the tax structure more equitable. Amongst opportunities for 
increasing taxation were, for example -
(a) Tightening of tax loopholes, including a capital 
gains tax12 ; 
(b) Increase of tax on higher income brackets (the 
maximum rate of tax of about 70% was comparatively 
low) ; 
10· C 56 ommonwealth Statistician, Ibid, Table 0 
11 • Sin e in orne tax ates . ncreas e automat ically during a period of 
ris g prices (as people move into higher income bracket s) , an 
increas e in taxation did not necessarily require the much-less-
palatable increase~ n ax rate s o 
12 · S T orne of the loopholes wer e covered in the Income ax 
Amendment Act of 1964. 
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(c) Taxes designed to hit those savings which 
(d) 
financed hire purchase ar rangements and were 
accordingly diverted towards consumption ; 
Reduced depreciation allowances (since these, 
as was suggested in Chapter III, do not 
constitute freely available capital) . 
The se avenues would appear to be acceptable on an equity 
basis, but they would have reduced private investment • 
Even though there was more scope for reduction 
in the private than in.the public sector, the Australian 
governments would not have been helped in achieving their 
objectives if private sector expenditure had been reducedo 
In particular, and to the limited extent indicated by the 
percentages provided above, a reduction in private sector 
expenditure would have led to some of the following 
difficulties:-
ao A decrease in private investment would have 
lowered production, leading to lessened economic 
capacity to sustain an increasing population 
with a rising standard of living; 
bo Increases in taxation directed at those who could 
most easily have borne the burden, would also 
have hit private investment; 
Co Profit opportunities left open through a reduction 
of private investment would have been taken in 
part by foreign capital, whi h seems more 
expensive to serviceo (See the subsequent 
discus -ion on direct investment o ) 
\ 
, 
I 
1 
, 
, 
i 
I 
I 
I 
, 
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d. A reduction in consumption during the period 
would, in most circumstances, have been caused 
by a more inequitable taxation system, and 
could have reduced the number of migrants 
available, particularly from Western Europe. 
20f 
B. COMPARISON OF THE COSTS OF DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GOVERNMENTAL 
BORROWI G 
1. General 
Capital inflow into Australia between 1950 and 1962 
was predominantly in the form of private capital inflow -
mainly direct investment, while Commonwealth borrowings 
played a minor role. It is not proposed here to conduct a 
complete analysis, but to ex~mine briefly the costs of both 
to the Australian economy. A comparison of costs is worthwhile, 
not only because the amount of inflow differed so much, but 
because it was noticed'earlier that an alternative to re-
equipping T.A.A. was to secure foreign equity inve s tment in 
Australian airlines. 
Two political opponents of Commonwealth borrowing 
overseas have come out strongly in favour of direct investment. 
The leader of the Federal Opposition has said13 :-
"When money comes into this country by way of 
investment and not by way of loans ther e flows 
with it that indefinable quality which is so 
valuable - the quality of know- how ." 
At the same time as he criticised governmental bor rowing 
overseas, Premier Playford was reported14 to "have made it 
clear that his criticism did not apply to all forms of 
overseas borro\lring. Overseas investment in industr ial 
undertakings was undoubtedly good and wel come .' 
13· A . A. Calwell : C. P.D . 3 April 1957, p.467 . 
14· Si r Thomas Playfo d's as 
reported' the ~A~d~e~l~a~i~d~e~~~~~~~ 
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The evaluation of the net cost of direct investment 
has been the source of some confusion, mainly because 
protagonists contend that -
(a) direct investment brings with it an important 
but a rather nebulous quality called "know-how"; 
and that 
(b) the disadvantages that can accompany infusions 
of direct investment are capable of legislative 
control. 
Consequently they say that "know-how" should be considered 
as a benefit arising from direct investment, but that 
attendant disadvantages should not be taken into accounte 
The~ validity of this view depends on whether know-
how can be obtained without direct investment as easily as 
legislation can be introduced to control the disadvantages of 
direct investment o In modern times, know-how can increas ingly 
be obtained separately from equity capita115. The size of 
firms overseas is such that decision-making is to a large 
extent carried out below the ownership level, which indicates 
that managerial capacity can be hired. Technical skills can 
be obtained from planned migration, and professional skills 
are available on a consultant basis 16 • Research capacity can 
15· A distinction needs to be made with risk capital, but this 
seems rarely to be available from international organisations. 
16° For example, the Commonwealth employed a French firm to 
conduct an oil survey in the Northern Territory, and the 
International Bank frequently has consultants examine projects 
of many different types. 
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-
either be engaged, or the fruits of research can be obtained 
by licensing arrangements o Skills not available in these ways 
would seldom become available to local producers as a result 
of direct investment17 0 
By exercising initiative the government can ensure 
that managerial, professional and technical know-how is 
available to the Australian community 0 It would be no more 
easy for the Australian government (judging by United States 
anti-trust legislation) to control the disadvantages of dire ct 
investment, than it would be to ensure a continuous flow of 
know-how int o Australiao Consequently, in assessing the net 
benefit of the qualitative characteristics of direct 
investment it is necessary to count both advantageous and 
disadvantageous qualitieso Some of the disadvantages that can 
accompany direct investment are -
(a) Foreign subsidiaries are acknowledged as being 
accomplished in monopolistic practises, and their 
advent could be expected to heighten the degree 
of monopolistic trading and impede the advent 
of new firms and products into Australian 
industrieso (Advertising is one practice 
referred to18 o Another of common knowledge in 
Australia was the development of one brand 
petrol stations). 
17 0 A case in point is the cultured pearl industry in Torres 
Strait, where Japanese operators strictly guard the secret 
of planting the seed for the pearlo 
18 oH• Martyn International Business : Princioles and Problems (Glencoe Press), 196~, page 183 states : "Firms that are very 
successful internationally have been among the leaders in the 
development and use of advertisingo In many countries, 
foreign subsidiaries are the largest and shrewdest users of 
advertisingo" 
-. 
\ 
i 
I 
, 
I 
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(b) The policies of international firms could also 
conflict with the policies of the Australian 
governments, e.g. -
(i) Restriction of outlets available to 
Australian subsidiaries, so that the export 
field is left open to a subsidiary in 
another country; 
(ii) Direct political interference by the 
country in which the head office is 
situated - an example is given in the 
following passages19 :-
"A new American doctrine of extra-
territoriality has appeared o A small 
example is the dying Eisenhower 
Administration's order on Friday, January 
13, 1961, that any American controlled 
company that held gold in any other 
country must sell it regardless of the 
laws of that country 0 The American 
government had previously extended its 
regulations against trading in specified 
goods with nations it regarded as 
unfriendly to foreign subsidiaries. There 
is also a long list of interventions by 
the Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust 
Division, and the Maritime Commission out-
side American borders. " 
(iii) Credit restrictions designed to reduce or 
prevent investment generally or in particular 
industries can leave foreign subsidiaries 
untouched because funds are available from 
19·Martyn Op.Cit., p.71o 
their parent companies20 • Apart from 
defeating governmental policy, this 
independence could fac il itate the 
growth of foreign firms at the expense of 
local firms~1 
These examples indicate tha t the advantages and 
disadvantages of direct investment may lead either to a 
net benefit or a net disadvantage. The net effect would 
depend on the circumstances in each particular case . 
2. Comparison of Costs 
An estima te of net profit ac~~uing from overseas 
to American investors (about the end of the period under 
study, based on oversea earnings and book values of 
investments and apparently ne t of tax) by Martyn22 is 
14.4%; this could exc eed expect ations of Amer~can investors 
in Australia where there is less risk than in less stable 
20. 
A case study of American electrical companies operations 
in Brazil states:-
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" In periods when t he Brazilian Government ' s 
inflation control policy restricts commercial 
bank facilities , the flow of credit has to be 
reduced and sales decline. At such times the 
(foreign owned) manufacturers generally try 
to offset in part these restrictive effects 
by lengthening their credit terms to 
distributors and dealers" . H. Martyn 
International Business: Principles and 
Problem~ as quqted by The Economi~ 
October 17, 1964 9 p.272. 
The result of the "Credit Squeeze" on different firms 
in the motor car industry illustrates this point . 
22. 
Martyn : Op.Cit. 1964, p. 117. 
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countries~3 The Commonwealth Treasury has estimated 
earnings on direct investment (from the United Kingdom 
as \-Tell as the United States and other countries) at a 
24 
much lesser percentage : the earnings are estimated 
to have been about 10% in 1950-51, 11% in 1953-54 and 
diminishing to 6% in 1961-62. This estimate, which is 
calculated by taking income payable overseas by companies 
as a percentage of the estimated cumulative amount of 
direct investment up to the end of the previous financial 
year, could understate the position for the following 
reasons:-
23. 
(a) Capital appreciation should be added to 
the earnings and also to the initial and 
subsequent investment. The effects of 
these additions would be to increase the 
percentage earnings on the one hand~ and 
to decrease the percentage as the value 
of capital investment was raised. The 
result (in the short-term) would have been 
a net increase in the percentage earning 
rate between 1950 and 1962, 
(b) Heavily capitalised industries (and industries 
in which there is a need to develop a market) 
become profitable only after a time lag. A 
recalculation of the Treasury figures with an 
Recent negotiations for a U.S. investment in a fertiliser 
plant in India broke down because the investors were unable 
to secure a guarantee that the cost would be recouped within 
five years. 
24. 
Commonwealth Treasury: Supplement to the Treasurv InformatiQll 
BU1~etin, May 1965: "Private Overseas Investment in Australia" , 
p.1 • 
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additional 2 year lag adds between 2% and 3%, 
while a 3 year lag gives a maximum percentage 
of 14% in 1956-57 and a minimum of 8% in 1961-620 
(c) Some foreign investment has been made in oil 
exploration, which is potentially very profitable, 
but which has so far made little return on the 
investment 0 
(d) The establishment of subsidiary manufacturing 
firms could involve the importation of machinery 
at values abQve its market priceo 
(e) Some expenditure is designed to conserve or obtain 
markets for raw materials (crude oil, for example), 
and the profits accrue outside Australiao 
It seems therefore that, while MartJn's estimate may be too 
high for earnings of direct investment from all sources, the 
other estimate is too low, with the real figure lying between 
the two and being at least a few per cent higher than the cost 
of foreign loans between 1950 and 19620 
The burden of servicing the two forms of investment 
will, however, vary with phases of the trade cycleo Direct 
investment could be expected to earn more during a period of 
rising prices, when the cost of fixed interest loans remains 
steadyo On the other hand direct investment catering for a 
depress ed market will suffer a reduction in earni ngs while 
the real cost of oversea loans would rise. 
At times, direct investment could have an effect 
on the balance of payments quite different from that of 
foreign borrowing by the Commonwealth. This difference 
would occur when an infusion of direct investment was 
directly linked with the importation of particular foreign 
capital equipment25 e.g. when a factory was to be established, 
and the funds were to be used entirely for machinery which 
came from overseas. If some supplementary capital expendit~re 
was still required in Australia, this expenditure ~ if financed 
from within Australia, e.g. by internal loans ~ could lead to 
some further imports and so to a net drain on Australia 1 s 
reserves. In these cases the direct investment would be of 
no immediate assistance to the Australian balance of payments. 
It is difficult to compare it in these circumstances with 
governmental borrowing which made foreign currency proceeds 
available to the general run of importers. 
The retained earnings of foreign~owned companies 
reduce the outflow on investments in most years However, 
these earnings are retained and reinvested, or alternatively 
repatriated, on the decision of the foreign investor {unless 
exchange control prevents repatriation) and 9 if reinvested, 
increase future potential outflow. It seems best therefore 
to regard retained earnings as if they had been repatriated, 
and then reinvested (which is the approach adopted by the 
Commonwealth Statistician). 
25. 
This has been held to be a not uncommon feature of direct 
investment. 
215. 
It has also been sugges ed by some that direct 
investment differs from borrowing in that the former has 
not to be repaid. However, in some past periods Australia 
has experienced a net private capital outflow~5a A portion 
of private capital inflow, including direct investment, has 
been attracted by boom conditions, and departed when the 
booms collapse. Nevertheless ~ during the past war period , 
the world accepted for some time foreign exchange controls 
on the repatriation of both earnings and capital, and 
similar controls could be used to prevent an outflow in 
the future. 
To summarise, it may be said that direct investment 
was more expensive to the Australian economy between 1950 and 
1962 than foreign borrowings~6 In some cases direct 
investment provided no immediate assistance to the balance 
of payments, but could instead have cause a net reduct ion 
in international reserves. The value of such infusions of 
direct investment must be evalua ed by the worthwhileness 
of the particular industry to the community, rather than by 
comparison with governmental borrowing overseaso Direct 
investment has, however, one significant advantage : a 
country can prevent repatriation of earnings, and of the 
capital itself, with less repercussions than if it defaults 
on a foreign loan floated by its government. 
25ao 
See Chapter IV, Appendi.x 10 
26. 
This holds true even with the Treasury figureso 
C. NATIONAL PLANNING 
Planning may be viewed as comprising the 
institutional f r amework (or the planning system) , the 
methodology of forecasting built around input - output analysis, 
and lastly, the selection of the strategy of development. 
The more complex an organisation, the more need 
there is for establishing a method of co-ordinating its 
activities, and in particular for ensuring that information 
is disseminated on related activities to those making 
decisions in each spher~. If the economy is accepted to 
consist of a group of interdependent activities then there is -
IIlultql/,II.(,I"T .(,t 'l'I't~t P 
by analogy with /practice - / natibnal planning~ Yuill goes much 
further when, in talking of the desirability of planning in 
individual organisations, he says27 -
"For an enterprise to remain in existence, its 
management ha s to constantly plan t o meet competi t' on ) 
to weather economic storms, to expand and to make use 
of technological progresso Much of the success which 
an enterprise has can be attributed to effective 
planning. " 
The attitude taken by the government between 1950 
and 1962 was that planning of the dir ection of private 
investment was undesirable. In his 1955 Budget Speech the 
Commonwealth Treasurer said28 -
"Some, however , would go much farther and say that 
the Government should intervene to cont r ol the e conomy 
and its workings both directly and indirectly , through 
whatever powers and devices it may possess. My 
colleagues and I do not share this view ••• We believe 
that, on all past experience , controls ar e , at the best, 
largely futile .•••• " 
27·Yuill : Supervision Pr inciples and TeChni~UeS, West 
Publi shing Corporatio Pty . Ltd . (Sydney) 19 4, p.190. 
28· A•W• Fadden : C.P. D. 24 August 1955, po32. 
The misdirections of investment during the period 
1950-1962 were eventually corrected - at times by the operation 
of free economic forces, and at other times by governmental 
action. For, despite the tenor of the statement quoted above, 
the Commonwealth exercised both general and specific controls 
(to a limited extent) on Australian economic activity between 
1950 and 19620 Monetary and fiscal measures were used to 
control the general level of activity and to reduce activity 
in certain industrieso Controls on dollar imports were 
extended to cover all imports from 1952 until 1958, when the 
restrictions were gradually removedo 
controlled for about the same period o 
Capital issues were 
The direction of 
investment of savings bank funds, and later of pension and 
insurance funds, was greatly influenced by Commonwealth 
legislationo Consumption was deliberately directed by indirect 
taxation towards or away from specific industries. Tariff 
policy influenced investment decisions and, after 1960, 
taxation incentives encouraged investment in industrial plant 
and in the export trade. There was even price control of a few 
commodities. 
At the same time, the reluctance of the government 
to establish tnrgets in different industries, and to maintain 
controls on imports and capital issues after sterling 
convertibility was indicative of its view that, in general, 
private investment should be free of restriction. This 
philosophical detachment from the concept of planning prevented 
the establishment of adequate forecasting and planning 
machinery, and show ea ltself in a reluctance to take specific 
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action until the need became urgento As a result the 
government's interventions were general rather than specific, 
curative rather than preventative, and lacked the informat i on 
and experience necessary for fine judgement of the degree of 
intervention necessary. 
The three maj~ crises of the period, in 1951, 
1956 and 1960, with their associated reductions in economic 
activity, were all caused largely, but in different degrees, 
by domestic factors and therefore theoretically open to 
earlier preventative action29 • If earlier action had been 
taken it seems realistic to assume that the necessary measures 
would have led to less re-adjustment in the economy . Idle 
factors of production represent wasted resources, and hgavy 
aanaGa deflationary measures led to three periods when both 
men and machines were idle in substantial quantit ies30 • This 
loss of production diminished the resources available for 
investment and consumption by the Australian community 0 
290 Sir Arthur Fadden C.P.D. 26 September 1951 po51 (Budget 
Speech 1951-52) : "It would be a mistake, however, to assume 
that all or even the main part of inflation in Australia is 
due to external causes o Preponderantly it is of local origin". 
C.P. D. 24 August 1955 p.30 (Budget Speech 1955-56 : "It had 
been obvious for some time past that something of a boom was 
getting under way, a boom chiefly in consumer spending and in 
private investment " . 
H. Holt C. P.D. 16 August 1960 p.37 (Budget Speech 1960-61) 
"We do, however, have some control over the demands we 
ourselve make upon external resources and it is there 
particularly that the situation needs a steadying hand". 
30 .t1'~/~b 
°The Federal Opposition claimedAthat loss of production 
as a result of the "Credit Squeeze" amounted to £700 million. 
During the twelve years the government appeared 
willing to allow imports to rise while the balance of payments 
permitted ito Consequently, over three periods there was a 
considerable current balance of payments deficit, which was 
followed on each occasion by a deflationery period in order to 
reduce the demand for importso The following table shows the 
uneven way in which the Australian economy made use of the 
additional foreign resources that became available over the 
period 1950-51 to 1961 -62e 
TABLE XXIV: AUSTRALIA'S BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
Year ended June ' 51 ' 52 ' 53 
£m. l 2~0 .+126 - - - +195- '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 , 59 
- - +l.o7 - -
o 
200 
400 
600 
-:3 _ -239_ -22~ _ _-155_ -192.. -229- -J69- .... 1 
Sources: Commonwealth Statistician, The Australian Balance of 
Payments, 1949-50 , 1950-51, and 1st half 1951-52, 
Table II; remainder as for Table XIV. 
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Although current debits rose £150 million during 
the year, the wool boom of 1950-51 helped to bring a surplus 
on current account , and the Commonwealth gov ernment allowed a 
further " splurge" on imports in the following year which helped 
to bring about a deficit of £544 million in conjunction with a 
fall of £300 million in exports . Then the government imposed 
general import restrictions and achieved a surplus of about 
£200 million on current account in 1952-53, when debits fell 
to 57% of the previous years level. A less severe sequence of 
relatively high spending on imports~Oa followed by deflationary 
action to restrict importing, occurred twice more before June 1962. 
Such a " spendthrift" approach must have led to goods 
being imported which were at the time unnecessary to the 
economy . It brought periods when domestic resources were 
thrown idle because imports were not available. Rarely did 
t he economy run near a deficit of £130 million, which was 
the average deficit on current account over the period. It 
is reasonable to conclude that if imported goods had been 
made available at a fairly steady rate over the period, there 
would have been much less surplus capacity from time to time 
in Australia , and an overall improvement in productive 
capacity by 1962~1 
The additional resources that became available from 
the net increase in oversea debt amounting to £1 ~0 million 
in foreign currencies , which permitted an estimated increase 
30a . Exports also fell (about £50 million) in 1954-55 and 1957-58 . 
310 See reference to restrictions on public expenditure in 
Note 7. 
of £500-800 million in domestic expenditure, appears small 
indeed beside the deficits of the period. It is sobering to 
realise that the net increase in oversea debt in the twelve 
years was only 35% of the amount of the current account 
deficit of 1951-52, 42% of the combined deficit of 1954-55 
and 1955-56, and 3~% of the deficits of 1959-60 and 1960-61. 
The increase in domestic expenditure permitted by the increas e 
in debt would appear correspondingly small, it seems, beside 
the loss to consumption or public or private investment that 
was occasioned by the three periods of harsh deflationary 
measures. 
Adequate forecasting machinery, and a less reluctant 
attitude on the part of the government to make early 
adjustments to the general level of activity would have 
prevented these wide fluctuations in domestic activity and 
in imports. It is not unrealistic to suggest that the 
government in this way could have secured as large an increase 
in productive capa city as was achieved, without any net 
increase in oversea debt (except to the extent necessary to 
relieve the dollar shortage). 
Additional resources could have been conserved if 
the Commonwealth had been prepared to take its planning further . 
With the expansion Australian industry underwent , there was 
scope for planning a strategy of development for industry, 
with a view to preventing misdirection of private investmento 
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As it was, the direction of private investment led to 
maldistribution of finance and over-investment, and was an 
important cause of the crisis periods. 32 
There was heavy investment (e.Go before the "Credit 
;/ 
Squeeze in commercial buildings, petrol distribution, 
electrical equipment, motor car production) conducted in an 
uncoordinated fashion, leading to short production lines, 
company failures and bankruptcies and idle capacity. The 
motor vehicles industry was allowed to grow, then was the 
subject of measures which threw much investment idle; later 
there was a relaxation of these measures and tariff changes to 
encourage further investment, particularly Japanese, into 
the industry. 
The growth of hire purchase increased the compe tition 
for the available capital, with the more lucrative uses - such 
as hire purchase - being able to pay higher prices. Further-
more, the extension of hire purchase increased demand for 
automobiles and electrical goods and led to over-investment 
in these industries. 
32 •See - A.W. Fadden , C.P.D., 24 August 1955, p.31 
(Budget Speech) -
"Competition ••• with resources going to those enterprises 
which have least need to trouble about costs." 
- H. Holt, CoP.D., 16 August 1960, p.35 (Budget Speech) -
"Speculation in shares and other securities and in land is 
disturbingly active and prevalent." 
In view of the government's own shortcomings in 
arranging matters under its own control, it would have 
encountered difficulties no doubt if it had endeavoured openly 
to force industrial development into a set pattern. 33 
Understandably, private industry could have feared that the 
planners would make more mistakes than the people in private 
industry . There might also have been some doubt of the 
government's sincerity. These barriers might have prevented 
full scale planning and direction of the economy. They did 
not prevent the government from improving the statistical 
data available, preparing forecasts of development and, for 
that matter, offering incentives to some industries and 
refusing aid to others o 
These steps towards national planning appear to 
have been quite feasible between 1950 and 1962. More even 
usage throughout the period of the additional resources that 
became available would have assisted in ensuring that foreign 
exchange was used more effectively, and should also have 
33oRonald Brech, Plannin~ Prosperity, Danton, Longman and 
Todd Ltd., (London) 7 196, says (p 0113) "It •• 0 requires the 
government to make everybody realise that its policies and 
actions will be determined by the simple criteria of the 
common good over time, rather than by political expediency." 
(It is possibly relevant that the Federal elections of June 1951, 
December 1955 and November 1958 occurred during boom periods. 
The last two also coincided with periods of substantial current 
account deficits o ). 
Jan Tinbergen, Central Planning, Yale University Press, 1964 
says (p . 71) "the possibilities (of planning) depend on: 
(1) the technical competence and integrity of the 
administration; 
(2) the level of litera cy and the civil spirit of the 
business community at large; and 
(3) the availability of data." 
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reduced the extent of deflationary measures with their 
accompanying losses of productiono This measure by itself 
might have allowed the economy to expand as much as it did, 
without an increase in oversea debto Further savings of 
resources, or increases in production or consumption could 
have been achieved if the government had been prepared to go 
further and adopt a sufficient degree of planning to prevent 
much of the misdirection of private investment that took 
place over the twelve yearso 
It is approp~iate to add at this stage that the 
hard currency loans of the early 1950s helped to prevent a 
greater misdirection of local and other resources. Even 
during the later years, the availability of loans probably 
permitted Australian industry to avoid investment in some 
uneconomical import-replacement industries o Oversea 
borrowing can, in this way, be seen as a useful assistance to 
national planning in an expanding economyo On the other hand, 
national planning should be seen as a prerequisite to borrowing 
overseaso It is farcical for a country (as it is for an 
individual) to borrow, while not ensuring that its own 
resources are used to the best advantageo 
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Do CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The discussion earlier in this chapter has not 
suggested that oversea borrowing should have been avoided. 
There have been implications that the government's policies 
were open to improvement (e.g o in defence and planning) but, 
within the given framework, oversea borrowing was essential 
for Australia to go as close as it did towar~achieving the 
objectives and commitments set out in Chapter IV B. Even 
if national planning had been introduced, oversea borrowing 
would still have been desirable. 
None of the conclusions have produced a formula 
for determining how much borrowing and what interest costs 
would be acceptable for a nation at Australia's stage of 
development 0 It is doubtful if a universal formula exists o 
What might have been appropriate in the 1880s or 1920s for 
Australia, or appropriate for India today, may not be suitable 
for Australia todayo 
One lesson can be learnt from experience. Nations 
which have secured additional resources in the past have so 
frequently used resources wastefully~3~ that each capital-
3~oSome fantastic stories can be found in Cleona Lewis: 
America's Stake in International Investments 
Australia's own history of capital-importing periods 
is certainly not clear of speculat j ve investment, and of public 
investments that were sometimes usel ess and at other times made 
years before they were economically justifiableo See, for 
example, A.GoL. Shaw, The Economic Develo ment of Australia 
(Longman Green and Company , 19 ), or Bo Fitzpatrick, 
The British Empire in Australia (Melbourne University Press, 
1941)0 The danger of inves~ ing t oo large a proportion of fund s 
in long-term public ,yorks i n Austr ali a in the 1920 ' s was the 
theme of EoOoG o Sharu, The Boom of 1890 - and Now, Sydney, 
Corns talk Publish 19 ~ompany, 19270 
importing country should recognise the need to establish 
an effective watchdog on public and private spendinge Fc''''' 
this reason alone, the emphasis given in this chapter to 
the need for national planning is well justified. 
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TEXTUAL APPENDIX: THE MECHANICS OF THE COMMONWEALTH'S 
BORROWING OVERSEAS 
A. THE LEGISLATIVE BASIS 
1. The Authority for Borrowing 
The Australian Constitution originally conferred 
power on the Commonwealth Parliament (by Section 51(iv» to 
make laws with respect to borrowing money on the public credit 
of the Commonwealth. The amendment of the Constitution by the 
insertion of Section 105A early in 1929, and the approval of 
the Financial Agreement by the Australian governments required 
the Commonwealth\ subject to Loan Council decisions, to borrow 
money on behalf of the States. 
The Financial Agreement also made the Commonwealth' s 
borrowings subject to Loan Council approval of -
(a) The amount of the loan (which must be covered 
by a programme approved by the Loan Council); and 
(b) The terms and conditions of each loan. 
This approval applied to all loans raised by the Commonwealth, 
except for defence borrowings (which are specifically 
exempted from the operation of the financial agreement) and 
temporary borrowings (which have been interpreted as meaning 
loans repaid within the financial year). 
1°It was made difficult for the States to undertake 
borrowings or to issue State securities. See also 
Chapter I A. 
The Commonwealth's borrowing procedures in addition 
remain subject to the original provisions in the Constitution, 
and to Commonwealth legislation concerning borrowing and 
paying money out of the Commonwealth's accounte This 
legislation delineates the Commonwealth's procedures within 
and subject to the approvals required under the Financial 
Agreement 0 For it must be emphasised that, except with the 
two types of borrowings outlined above, all the procedures 
and legislation described below operate only when the Loan 
Council's approval to the programme and terms have been (or 
at certain stages, will be) obtainedo 
Section 83 of the Constitution provides that 
statutory authority in the form of an appropriation is required 
before money, including money borrowed, may be drawn from the 
Commonwealth Treasuryo However, the Financial Agreement Acts 
and the Financial Agreement Validation Act 1~t~ authorise the 
payment to the States of money raised on their behalf by the 
Commonweal tho The money raised by the Commonwealth for its 
own purposes cannot be spent without the authority of an Act 
of Parliament (in addition to the Loan Council approvals 
specified above) 0 
It has been the Commonwealth's custom to obtain 
legislative authority for borrowings arranged on its own behalf. 
The procedure for most oversea borrowings for the purchase of 
aircraft has differed in that the loan agreements had been 
signed before they were submitted to Parliament for approvalo 
For example, the Loan (Qantas Empire Airways Limited) Act 1958 
annexes as its schedule the text of the loan agreement 
previously signed in New Yorko In such circumstances, the 
borrowing is considered to be validly made in the exercise 
of the power of the Executive of the Commonwealth. 
Nevertheless, legislative authority is required 
for the expenditure of the proceedso When an Act ha s been 
passed to deal specifically with the proceeds of a particular 
loan (eogo loans for Qantas and T.A.A., the first two Swiss 
loans and the first Canadian loan), the Act has contained, 
as a matter~courtesy not necessity, approval of the borrowing 
(when the loan agreement has already been signed) or 
authorisation for the borrowing (when the agreement has not 
been signed before the legislation passes through Parliamento) 
The Acts which authorised the payment of loan proceeds out of 
the Commonwealth's account between 1950 and 1962 are as 
follows:-
(a) the Loans Redemption and Conversion Act 1921-1950, 
which authorised the raising of loans and the use 
of loan proceeds to redeem existing debto 
~b) the Loan (Housin~Acts, which authorised the 
raising and the lending of money secured by means 
of loans to the States for housingo 
(c) Acts which related to specific loans - Loan 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) Acts of 1950, 1952, 1954, 1955, 1957 
and 19620 The first five acts specified that the 
proceeds would be paid to the National Debt 
Sinking Fund, and the last, to the Snowy 
Mountains Authorityo 
I 
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Loan (Qantas Empire Airways) Acts of 1957, 1958 , 
1960 and 1962, which authorised the relending of 
loan proceeds to Qantas Empire Airways Limited. 
Loan (Australian National Airlines Commission) 
Acts of 1958 and 1960 which permitted money 
borrowed by the Commonwealth to be relent to TAA. 
Loan (Swiss Francs) Acts of 1954 and 1955 and the 
Loan (Canadian Dollars) Act of 1955, which 
authorised the proceeds of three loans to be paid 
into special trust fundso 
2. The Loans Securities Act 
Among other things, the Loans Securities Act 1919-1959 
appropriates the Commonwealth's Consolidated Revenue Fund for 
the payment of interest on and the repayment of the principal 
of m~ney borrowed in accordance with the provisions of the Acto 
Because of this provision - entailing as it does the payment of 
money out of the Commonwealth's account - the Loans Securities 
Act contains a provision that it can only cover loans, the 
raising of which has been authorised by an Acto Consequently 
the Loans Securities Act cannot be employed when the borrowing 
arrangements have been made under the authority of the 
Exe cutive of the Commonwealth, and the agreement has been 
signed before legislation is introduced to deal with the 
spending of the proceedso 2 
2· The legislation passed for spending the proceeds must there-
fore in these cases provide for the necessary appropriations 
for servicing the loano 
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The Act states that the amount of the loan may be 
determined by the Governor-General, who may also determine the 
terms of the loan and the form of securities to be issued or 
who may empower the Treasurer to determine these mattersc 
Through an amendment pas sed in 1959, the Act allows 
bondholders who are not residents of Australia, Papua and New 
Guinea to be exempted from taxes, and empowers the Governor-
General to establish Registries of Inscribed stock - although 
the only Registry that has been established overseas is in 
London, which is the one centre where stock has been issued c 
Section 6 of t~e Act states that the Treasurer 
shall pay sums required to meet judgements of United Kingdom 
courtso This provision was designed to permit Commonwealth 
l oans to be registered under the Colonial Stock Acts of the 
United KingdoIDo 
30 Legislation for Debt Redemption3 
The National Debt Sinking Fund Act 1923 established 
a fund for the redemption of Commonwealth debt held in Australia 
and overseaso By virtue of the Financial Agreement, the sinking 
funds of the states were absorbed into this Fund, which is 
administered by the National Debt Commission0 4 
3· This description is taken from Commonwealth of Australia, 
Prospectus, 27 June 1961, for a New York loano 
4°The Commission comprises the Treasurer, the Secretary to the 
Treasury, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, the Chief Justice 
of the High Court, the Secretary of the Attorney- General's 
Department, and a representative of the Stateso 
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The income of the Sinking Fund includes , in respect 
of Commonwealth debt, contributions from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of the Commonwealth of t% per annum of the net 
debt outstanding at 30 June 1923 (payable for a period of 50 
years from 30 June 1923), plus t% per annum of the net debt 
created in any subsequent year not subject to special 
amortisation arrangements (payable for a period of 50 years 
following the year in which the debt was created)o However, 
in respect of net debt incurred for postal, telegraphic and 
telephonic purposes, the corresponding contributions are 1t% 
per annum for periods of 30 yearso 
These contributions are supplemented by annual 
contributions from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of 5% of the 
amount of debt redeemed by the Sinking Fund prior to 1 July 
1930, and of 5% of the receipts of the Sinking Fund from that 
date to the end of the year preceding that in which the 
contribution is madeo The aggregate amount of these 
contributions is reduced by amounts paid into the Sinking 
Fund in respect of interest on its investments, other than 
interest received on the investment of a special payment of 
£98 0 5 million made into the Sinking Fund by the Commonwealth 
Government in 1951-520 other receipts include repayments of 
advances from the Loan Fund, repayments of loans for War 
Service Homes, and receipts in respect of loans from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Under Section 17 of the National Debt Sinking Fund 
Act 1923-1959, the National Debt Commission was authorised to 
- ) 
I 
I 
I 
23 4 
apply the National Debt Sinking Fund in repurchasing or 
redeeming Commonwealth securities o Any securities so 
repurchased or redeemed cannot be re-issued but must be 
cancelled , and the amount of the debt is reduced accordingly o 
Contributions to the National Debt Sinking Fund 
in respect of the debts taken over by the Commonwealth under 
the Financial Agreement and of any loans raised subsequently 
by a State or by the Commonwealth for and on behalf of a 
State are as follows: 
(a) On the Public Debt of the States at 30 June 1927 
and on loans i~sued for the conversion, renewal 
or redemption of such debt 3/8% per annum of which 
the Commonwealth pays 1/8% and the States t%o 
Contributions are to be continued for a per iod 
of 58 years commencing 1 July 1927 except in the 
case of the State of New South Wales whose 
contributions commenced on 1 July 19280 Where 
there was an obligation under law or contract to 
provide a sinking fund in excess of the rate of 
3/8% per annum the excess is provided out of the 
National Debt Sinking Fundo 
(b) On loans raised by a state or by the Commonwealth 
on behalf of a State after 30 June 1927 , t% per 
annum of which the Commonwealth pays t% and the 
State t%o Contributions are to continue f or 53 
years commencing from the date of the raising of 
the loano 
(N.B . These condition s applied under the legislation up to 1966 
when amendments to the Act radi ally changed the method and 
amount of contributiono) 
I 
J 
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Sinking fund contributions made under the 
Agreement, and sinking funds transferred to the National 
Debt Commission, could not accumulate but were to be applied 
to the redemption of the public debts of the States or to 
the purchase of securities issued in respect thereof; but, 
if deemed inexpedient at any time by the National Debt 
Commission to apply sinking funds in this way, the 
Commission could temporarily invest those funds in 
authorised securitieso 
When a security issued in respect of a public 
debt of a State or of a loan raised by the Commonwealth for 
a State is repurchased or redeemed by the National Debt 
Commission it is cancelledo From the date of cancellation 
and for the full period during which sinking fund 
contributions are payable, the State on whose account the 
security was issued must make a further sinking fund 
contribution at the rate of 4t% per annum on the face value 
of the cancelled securityo 
Sinking fund contributions on loans raised after 
30 June 1927 by a State, or by the Commonwealth for a State, 
to meet revenue deficits are at a rate of not less than 4% 
pe r annum . However, by an amendment of the Financial 
Agreement in 1944, special arrangements were made to repay 
loans raised during the depression of the thirties to meet 
revenue deficits o 
~ I 
, 
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The Commonwealth has made special arrangements fo r 
the repayment of some oversea loans o The counterpart funds 
of most loans from the International Bank were paid directly 
into the Sinking Fund, which invested the amounts in 
Commonwealth securities in Australiao The repayment of the 
Novembe r 1956 and January 1962 loans from the Bank, and of 
the loans raised in the United States for Qantas and T.A.A., 
is provided from the Consolidated Revenue Fundo 5 The 
legislation approving the first Canadian loan and the Swiss 
loans of 1953 and 1955 required the proceeds to be paid into 
a special trust account, from which the loans would be repaid. 
Other debt has been redeemed from the Loan 
Consolidation and Investment Reserve, into which the 
Commonwealth paid revenue surpluses 0 The Reserve has been smce 1955 
a substantial subscriber to the Commonwealth's internal loans, 
thus providing a channel by which the Commonwealth's surpluses 
became loans to the Stateso 
40 The Legal Procedure 
Once the Loan Council has approved the cash and 
conversion loan programmes for the Commonwealth and the States, 
the Commonwealth is to endeavour to raise loans towards the 
programme 0 
As a matter of courtesy, the Commonwealth advises 
Premiers when negotiations have progressed sufficiently to 
indicate that a loan is fairly certain to eventuateo The legal 
5·Qantas and T.A.A. were required to make compensating payments 
to the Consolidated Revenue Fundo 
consultation with the Premiers on the terms of the loan occurs 
normally only a few days before the Commonwealth commits 
itself to the raising of the loano I n accordance with a 
standing Loan Council resolution, this consul tation may be , 
and was almost without exception, by telegram between 1950 
and 19620 
The telegram does not contain the precise terms of 
t~ 
the{loano I~ad it seeks approval for the raising of a 
certain amount in a specified currency on terms no worse 
than those set out in the telegram, which - subject to any 
subsequent consultation - tben become the bargaining limits 
for the Commonwealth's negotiations. The terms include -
(a) The interest rate and issue price. 
(b) The duration or life of the loan. 
(c) The charges made by the underwriters or lenders. 
(d) If the amount is to be repaid during the life of 
the loan, the amortisation provisions. 
(e) The optional redemption provisions o 
At about the same time as this consultation takes 
place, the Commonwealth authorises a person to act on its behalf 
by an Executive Council Minute to carry out the actions required 
fo r raising the loano Authority is customarily given to -
(i) the Treasurer (a) to borrow a sum, not exceeding 
an amount specified, on terms and conditions 
concurred in by not less than three Premiers, and 
to determine the terms and conditions on behalf 
of the Commonwealth ; (b) to determine the form 
of the securities and to execute and issue the 
securit i es · 
r 
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(ii) certain persons on behalf of the Commonwealth 
to sign the agreements relating to the loan, to 
countersign the securitie s t o be issued and to 
take other nece ssary actionso 
One of the telegrams will propose a form of allocation of the 
proceeds of the loan o 
After the terms have been nego t iated the Treasurer 
i s consulted by cable or te l ephone by the Commonwealth 
r epresentative who is undertaking the negotiations. Subject 
to suitability of the terms, the Treasurer then determines t he 
terms, the loan documents are finalised and the Premiers and 
the public advised of the loano 
B. PUBLIC LOAN DOCUMENTS 
10 The Prospectus 
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The issue of a pros pectus is a pre-requisite to 
the floating of a public loan o Its purpo se is to invite 
subscriptions from investors, and the Commonwealth's 
prospec t uses have tended to include additional information 
designed to attract investorso The amount of information 
incl uded has largely depended on the practices in the 
diff erent markets o 
In London, the Commonwealth's prospectuses have 
generally consisted of f our. pages o Most of the space is used 
for a description of the loan, its terms, the authority for 
the flotation, a brief description of the Sinking Fund and 
advice on how to lodge applicationso A one page "Statistical 
statement " sets out the public debt, and the revenue and 
expenditure of the Commonwealth f or the immediately preceding 
financial year and for a financial year five years earliero 
The prospectuses are briefer t han those issued by the 
Commonwealth in any other oversea market - a result, not of 
the Commonwealth's long history of borrowing in London, but 
of the custom of the London market o 
Th€ greater detail involved in prospectuses issued 
in ot her centres can be seen from the summary of prospectuses 
contents set out in Appendix 1 0 However, the appendix does 
not show the extent to which the detail included under each 
heading differs from country to countryo The Commonwealth's 
SWi s s prospectuses have comprised 7-10 pages, with the 
Ne ther l ands prospectus being about the same sizeo In each, 
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the terms of the loan occupy two pages, with the remaining 
information , which r elates to Australia and its e conomy, 
being printed in the form of a letter from the Treasurero 
The Canadian prospectuses were twice as large ; they commenced 
with a statement that the information in the prospectus had 
been provided by responsible officials of the Commonwealth, 
and the Treasurer's signature appeared at the end of the 
document 0 
The most comprehensive and up-to-date prospectuses 
were those issued in New Yorko About 40 pages of information, 
with some of the statistics relating to events within days of 
the flotation, is provided, with the portions relating to 
oversea trade, balance of payments, public debt, Commonwealth 
finances, the Financial Agreement, the National Debt Sinking 
Fund and Central Banking Business being included on the 
authority of specified Commonwealth representativeso 6 
The reason for the detailed nature of prospectuses 
issued in New York goes back to the widespread fraudulent 
activities of issuers in the 1920s which accentuated the stock 
exchange crash of 19290 Under the Securities Act of 1933 
foreign borrowers are required to include in their prospectuses -
(i) The names of the borrowers, underwriters and 
agents, and the amount of proceeds and the 
expenses of the loan . 
(ii) The terms of the loan and the purpose of the 
borrowing 0 
6°The Secretary to the Treasury, the Commonwealth Statistician 
and the Chairman of the Reserve Bank Boardo 
(iii) 
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The amount of the debt of the borrower, with its 
date, maturity, character, interest rate, 
amortisation and securityo 
(iv) Government receipts and expenditure classified by 
purpose for the previous three years o 
(v) A statement saying whether or not the issuer had 
defaulted on any external security in the previous 
twenty years o 
(vi) The names and addresses of counsel who have advised 
on the legality of the issueo 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, which was 
established by the United States Government in 1933 , is 
empowered to seek information additional to that specified in 
the Acto The legal requirements to be met by issuers have led 
to the establishment of legal firms which concentrate on 
advising issuerso These firms, in themselves, have naturally 
tended to increase the complexity of prospectuseso 7 The 
prospectus and other loan documents must be lodged with the 
Commissioner up to twenty days before the loan is floated, and 
8 the Commissioner may prevent the issue of the prospectuso 
Because of the number of prospectuses required, as 
well as the time limit and, in New York, the legal requirements, 
7 0 See Nevin , 'Some Reflections on the New York New Issue 
Market ', Oxford Economic Papers Volume 13 Noo 1 February 1961, 
Ppo92-97 for a description of the legal vetting that 
accompanies the preparation of a New York prospectus o 
8°Annual reports in accordance with the form in Appendix II 
are also to be filed by borrowers o 
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prospectuses are printed in the lending countrYo9 Details 
are posted and cabled from the Treasury for inclusion, and 
the responsibility for the contents, as indicated, lies with 
the Commonwealth and its representative s o 
20 The Underwriting and Fiscal Agency Agreements 
All of the loans floated overseas by the Commonwealth 
between 1950 and 1962 were underwritten, and consequently 
contractual arrangements existed between the Commonwealth and 
its underwriterso The arrangements for servicing the loans 
were also embodied in agreements in all centres outside London. 
In New York and Canada the servicing of the loan was carried 
out by organisations which were not involved in the underwri ting, 
and thus two separate agreements were needed - one with the 
underwriters and the other with the fiscal agentso In 
Switzerland and the Netherlands one agreement was completed 
for each loan, because the underwriters were also the 
Commonwealth's agents for servicing the loano 
A copy of an underwriting agreement completed between 
the Commonwealth and Morgan Stanley & Coo - its managing 
underwriters in New York - is attached as Appendix III. It 
10 lists the underwriters and the amount underwritten by each, 
the price at which the underwriters will purchase the bonds, 
and the prices at which the bonds will be sold to dealers and 
9°Language is, of course, another factor in Switzerland and 
the Netherlandso 
10 0The contractual relationship of the various underwriters 
is contained in an "Agreement between Underwriters " o 
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others. The Agreement also lists certain conditions to be met 
by the Commonwealth, the most interesting of which are that 
the Securities and Exchange Commission will not have prevent ed 
the Registration Statement becoming effective, that the 
Commonwealth's legal representative will have supplied a 
satis factory opinion on the legality of the borrowing, and the 
Commonwealth is to be, at the time the bonds are sold, a member 
of the I.MoFo and the I.B.R. D. 
The Fiscal Agency Agreement, a copy of which appears 
as Appendix IV, provides for the commission payable to the 
fis cal agent for the pa~ent of interest, and to the sinking 
fund agent - which has generally been the same as the fiscal 
agent 11 _ for arranging the repayment of principal as well 
as for the initial authentication of the bonds issued. 
The agreements executed for Canadian loans with 
Wood Gundy & Co . are broadly the same as those in lew York, 
an important exception being that the one underwr iter was 
responsible for the full amounts of the loan. The underwriting 
agreement for the 1961 Canadian loan requir ed, in addition to 
the provision of a legal opinion which is required in all 
centres but London, that insurance companies could legally 
invest in the bonds , no tax would be withheld under Canadian 
law, and that no fur ther loans would be floated in North 
America for three months. The fiscal agency agreements were 
entered into with the Royal Bank of Canada , and have the 
unusual provision that either party may terminate the agreement 
on sixty days notice . 
11· See the note (b ) to Appendix VI of Chapter I . 
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The comprehensive agreements covering the Swiss 
loans changed slightly between 1953 and 1955, in that charges 
i ncreased and the position of the Underwriting Banks was 
i mproved in other ways. The later agreements, for example, 
contained a provision for the Banks to receive preference in 
handl ing the exchange transactions relating to the loan. 
The agreement s provided for the Banks to "take firm" the 
amount of the loan at the issue price less the underwriting 
commis sion. The underwriters were, however, permitted to 
withdraw from t he agreement .lshould events occur within the 
Commonwealth of Australia, or in Switzerland or elsewhere in 
the world of a political, economic, financial or other 
character, which, in the opinion of the Banks, would be such 
as to j eopardise the success of the issueo " 
The loan agreement completed in the Netherlands is 
similar to the Swiss Loan Agreements, and placed the under-
writers there (in their underwriting and fiscal agency 
activities) in a similar position vis-a-vis the Commonwealth 0 
In London the arrangements have remained almost 
astoundingly simple. The underwriting agreement is 
repr esented by a single page document, signed and sealed on 
behal f of Nivisons, which merely states that in return for a 
certa i n fee Nivisons will ensure that the issue will be fully 
subscribede The Reserve Bank's London Branch receives 
subscriptions to the loan , and makes the interest and 
redemption payments, so there is no fiscal agency agreement 
to be signed o Instead there is a standing agreement between 
the Treasury and the Reserve Bank of Australia under which 
payment s are made to the Bank in respect of its London 
Registry .. 
30 The Securities 
In London the securities issued by the Commonwealth 
t ook the form of inscribed stock, i .. eo an entry in a register 
maintained at the Reserve Bank's Registry. In all other 
cent res the Commonwealth issued bonds i.e. negotiable 
instruments which bore the terms of the loan, and constituted 
a contract between the holder and the Commonwealth. 12 Since 
securities were evidence of the debt, they were, as a matter 
of course, issued at the time the Commonwealth received the 
proceeds of the loano 
Subscriptions to Commonwealth loans in London were 
payable by instalments spread over 3 to 4 months o Until all 
instalment s were received, subscribers (or those who have 
purchased the obligation from subscribers) hold a Scrip 
Certificate , which had an interest coupon attached to cover 
the period until the final instalment was paid.. At ther time 
the Certificate was surrendered and the owners' names inscribed 
in the stock register 0 Since "stagging " (subscribing for a 
loan with an intention to sell early) is common in London, the 
Use of the Scrip Certificate reduced the tax otherwise payable 
during this period by the Commonwealth on transfers of stock. 
12. 8 d t ee Commonwealth of Australia, Prospectuses, various a es, 
issued in the different countries .. 
The form of bond issued in New York appears as an 
Exhibit attached to the Fiscal Agency Agreement in Appendix IV. 
Its content s are typical of bonds issued by the Commonwealth 
in all oversea loan markets, in that it conta ins the terms 
and conditions of the loan. For its early New York loans, 
t he Commonwealth issued temporary bonds when it received the 
r.,.,ideo( 
loan proceeds, and later issued more intricately ppesented 
definit ive (or permanent) bonds. During these early loans, 
the Commonwealth employed a firm in London to print the 
definitive bonds, as can be seen from the list of printers 
shown in Appendix V. For lat€r loans, and for all loans floated 
in other centres, the Commonwealth had its bonds printed in the 
country of issue, after the contents of the bonds had been 
decided in dis cussion with the underwriters. 
The only other country in which the Commonwealth did 
not immediately issue definitive bonds was Switzerland. The 
SWiss loan agreements provided for the Commonwealth to deliver 
a Scrip Certificate for the full amount of the loan when the 
proceeds were receivedo This Certificate merely said that it 
represented 60 million Swiss francs of bearer bonds, and would 
be exchanged for the bonds 2-3 months after flotation of the ~ 
loan. 13 
13. r See Loan (Swiss Francs) Act 190 4- , Annexure "A". 
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c. SECURING PUBLIC SUBSCRIPTIONS 
10 The Initial Survey 
The Commonwealth, as with the government of any 
other techni cally advanced country, has available to it many 
sources of information concerning the capacity of foreign 
count ries to export capital and conditions in the long-term 
loan markets in these countries. The most important sources 
are publications, contacts with oversea financial interests, 
and reports from Commonwealth officials overseas. 
Information on a national economy is published by 
government departments, central banks, the financial and daily 
press, international agencies , and financial houses and 
consultants. All developed countries publish balance of 
payment s information, and collated information is available 
from publications of the I.M.F. and other organisations. 
Details of public loans floated by domestic and foreign 
borrowers are contained in the financial and daily press. 
Personal contacts play an important role. The 
number and type of contacts that may be made during an 
oversea tour are illustrated by the Treasurer's report to 
Parliament 14 in 1959:-
14- • 
"I had discussions of a more general character in 
that city (New York) and also in London, Basle, Bonn and 
Washington on our needs for external capital and on the 
general situation in the world's capital markets~: 
H.E. Holt C.P oD . 10 November 1959 ppo2471-2481 
"my talks in Basle were directed to the possibility 
of further issues as circumstances permit. The matter of 
timing, however , is one for discussion with the Swiss 
authorities. ooo " 
"My talks in Bonn 0000 revealed a new attitude by 
German financial interests to external l ending arising 
from a growing consciousness of Western Germany 's strong 
creditor position~ The German capital market is in an 
interesting state of transition. In the long run it may 
well become a useful source for us to tap." 
"Finally, I took the opportunity while in Washington 
to talk over, with Mro Eugene Black, the outlook for further 
International Bank Loans to Australia." 
other opportunities for personal contacts occur at 
international meetings and when financiers visit Australia. 
Financiers whose visits were ,reported in the Australian press 
between 1950 and 1962 included Mr. Scott of Wood Gundy (Canada), 
Mr. Black of the International Bank and Mr. Nussbaumer of the 
Swiss Banking Corporation. All visited Canberra. Opportunities 
for personal contacts occur at international meetings such as 
the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank, which were normally attended by the 
Treasurer and the Secretary to the Treasuryo 
A constant supply of information comes from London 
and Washington where senior Treasury officials are stationed. 
There are Australian representatives in 50 other centres, any 
of whom would transmit details of an offer by a prospective 
lender or underwriter. 
However, it is not sufficient for a prospective 
borrower to ascertain that loans can be obtained from a 
particular country or even in that country's marketo The 
prospective borrower needs to ensure that foreign exchange 
controls will not only permit foreign loans, but that they 
will be applied in such a way that he has an opportunity to 
approach the marketo It is in this field that official 
contact at ministerial level is important - the Treasurer 
of the Commonwealth, for example, sought the approval of 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer each time the Commonwealth 
wished to raise a cash loan in Londono 15 In other markets, 
except New York where no exchange controls existed between 
1950 and 1962, the underwriters chosen by the Commonwealth 
appear to have acted as the Commonwealth's intermediaries. 
Once approval has been obtained in principle the 
underwriters also approach subordinate authorities, normally 
the central bank , to determine the exact timing of the 
operation. Since the queue of prospective borrowers is 
usually long, the goodwill of the authorities and the 
influence of the underwriters can be importantin determining 
the time that elapses before the loan is floatedo 
2. The Selection and Functions of Underwriters 
In each centre, the Commonwealth dealt with the same 
group of underwriters during the period. 16 They are de~cribed 
below -
15· C 
(a) London: Ro Nivison and Coo have underwritten all 
Commonwealth loans in London (except for 
some in the 1940s which were underwritten 
ommonwealth Departmental Papers. 
16. t 
. Commonwealth of Australia, Prospectuses, various da es, 
lssued in the locations namedo 
Z5Q 
by the Commonwealth Bank. 17) The firm 
underwrote for Australian states in the 
last century, and has been employed by 
U~Q We' r lea J and goverl:lIuQ;r;:J,t ag \"Ql.l • s by 
many County Councils and Corporations in 
the United Kingdomo 
(b ) New York: Morgan Stanley and Coo were the managing 
underwriters for all Australian loans 
floated in New York in the periods o On 
each occasion they had led a group of about 
60 underwriting firms, including most of 
the largest underwriters for domestic and 
foreign issues o The capacity of the firm 
may be judged by their handling, as managers 
and co-managers, of issues exceeding $20,000 
million in the period 1935-1960 0 Morgan 
Stanley and Coo was formed in 1935 - after 
investment banking had been divorced from 
commercial and deposit banking consequent 
on the passing of the Banking Act of 1933 _ 
by a group of people, most of whom had 
formerly been with J. P. Morgan and Coo, 
the bank which had underwritten Commonwealth 
loans in the 1920so 
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See, for example, Commonwealth Treasury , Budget Papers 
i950-51 Table Noo 59, pp.159 and 160, where no underwriting 
ee is listed o See also note (b) to the tables on these Pages 0 
18 
(c) Switzerland: The Commonwealth's managing under-
(d) Canada: 
writers have been, in turn, the Swiss 
Bank Corporation and the Swiss Credit 
Bank. These two banks, with the Union 
Bank of SWitzerland, underwrote all 
four Commonwealth issues. They have 
for many years maintained a virtual 
monopoly of foreign underwriting 
business. 18 
Wood Gundy & Coo, one of the three 
largest Canadian underwriting firms, 
managed and underwrote the two 
Commonwealth loans. At the time of 
the 1955 loan, this firm appears to 
have been t he only one capable of 
handling a Commonwealth issue and 
prepared to underwrite the 
flotationo 
(e) The Netherlands : The Amsterdamsche Bank and Messrs o 
R. Mees and Zoonen (another bank) 
managed the Commonwealth's flotation 
as leaders of a syndicate of eight 
banks 0 The Commonwealth had been in 
communication with the Amsterdamsche 
"The Economist of 19 January 1963 mentioned that a Swiss issue 
announced in January 1963 by Cadbury Brothers was negotiated 
1hrough Samuel Montague and the syndicate was headed by Julius 
ar and Coo of Zuricho This issue, it said, was noteworthy in 
that it was the first in recent times to by-pass the monopoly 
established by the three large banks. 
Bank (one of the four Netherlands 
banks which between them handle 90% 
of the count r y ' s commercial banking) 
since the early 1950s o 
The functions of the underwriters differ considerablyo 
Those differences can be s een from the part they played in 
Commonwealth flotations in New York, London and Switzerland o 
New York: 
The Banking Act of 1933 redu ced the financial basis 
of underwriting firms, and the relativel y slender cash 
resources of the underwriters explains the procedure that 
evolved of having a number of underwriters, each of which 
is r esponsible for only a portion of the loano The 
managing underwriter, Morgan Stanley, controls the 
dis tribution of the bonds to a dealer network, which would 
include some members of the underwriting syndicateo 
With their limited res ources, and the frequency of 
loans, underwriters cannot afford too many loans to be 
incompletely or slowly subscribed o Since public subscrip-
tions are sought over a short period, with the proceeds being 
handed to the Commonwealth about a fortnight after flotation, 
some inducement is necessary t o ensure, as far as possible, 
ear l y subscriptiono Part of this i nducement naturally lies 
in t he price of the issue, which has usual ly been slightly 
mor e favorable to investors than existing issueso Another 
important inducement is to dealers who, in the loans raised 
after 1957, received a commission of 1t% - a typical example 
of pushing a product by giving i t a high retail margino 
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The position of Morgan Stanley, and the respons-
ibility of dealers to earn their money by placing the bonds 
"firmly", are spelt out in the Agreement among Underwriters 
which provides -
(i) Morgan Stanley may retain as many bonds as they 
consider necessary for their own dealer network; 
(ii) Underwriters may be penalised if bonds they 
distribute as dealers are sold (to take a quick 
profit or to avoid losses) before the underwriting 
syndicate is disbanded. According to the Agreement 
"If ••• you (Morgan Stanley) purchase •••• in the 
open market or otherwise any Bonds which were 
retained by, or released to, us for direct sale ••• 
and which Bonds were therefore not effectively 
placed for investment by us, we authorise you to 
charge our account •••• " 
Dealers who were not underwriters would, of course, be 
subject to penalties (perhaps by being left out of future 
issues) if they proved to be unreliable distributors. 19 
London: 
In London, the Commonwealth is in an exceptional 
position in that the Reserve Bank has underwritten 
Commonwealth loans there20 , and subscriptions are received 
at the Bank's London Brancho The need to employ Nivison 
and Co. is therefore not as obvious as is the need for an 
1~·Commonwealth of Australia, Registration Statement,lodged 
wlth the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, 27 
June 1961, "Agreement Among Underwriters ", Article III. 
20. See Note 170 There was no desire for cash loans in London 
when the Commonwealth Bank underwrote the loans in the 1940s. 
The situat ion was different therefore from that in the period 
1950-1962. 
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underwriter in New York. Furthermore, the impact of a loan 
on the market is lessened by the practice of having 
subscriptions paid in instalment s. Dealers (brokers and 
banks) receive only t% on applications. 
On the other hand, Nivisons have a sub-underwriting 
network which includes many financial institutions. These 
institutions apparently found that thei % (for conversion) 
and 1% (for cash) sub-underwriting fee made Commonwealth 
loans sufficiently attractive for them to continue under-
writing despite the number of Commonwealth loans that were 
undersubscribed. 21 The institutions could add the securities 
Va.' 
to their portfolios, or feed them onto the market over a 
period. So Nivisons, in a different way from Morgan Stanley, 
effected the placement of the securities - when loans were 
undersubscribed - and their charges were much less than those 
in New York. 
While the approval for the flotation of a cash 
Commonwealth loan in London is secured by the Treasurer from 
the Chancellor, the actual timing of the operation is left 
for determination by the Bank of England. The refinancing 
of a maturing loan, which is subject largely to the date 
of final maturity, secures a degree of priority, but the 
timing of a cash loan is not so simple. Nivisons consult 
with the Bank to determine just where the Commonwealth will 
be placed in the borrowing queue. 
21· see , for example, Financial Times, London, 8 November 1956 
where 66% of the Commonwealth's loan was left with the under-
writers; also Australian Financial Review, 9 February 1961 
(the loan was 82% undersubscribed); and Financial Times, 
London, 6 August 1960 (52% left with the underwriters). Only 
one Commonwealth loan in the whole period was fully subscribed. 
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Switzerland: 
In both Switzerland (and the Netherlands) banks 
are customarily members of the stock exchange. 22 Their 
function therefore is similar to that of underwriters in 
New York before the Banking Act divided investment banking 
from commercial banking. Indeed, the way existing securities 
issued by a borrower tend to fall in price in advance of a 
new loan (when only the underwriters should be aware of the 
forthcoming flotation) suggests that those engaged in 
underwriting or sub-underwriting are significant holders 
of bondsc 23 
Arrangements made between underwriting banks permit 
the managing underwriter to reserve 30% of a loan to 
itself,24 and members of the syndicate need only make half 
of their quota available to the public. Such an arrangement 
indicates an interest by the institutions themselves in 
holding securities, and the existence of client-broker 
relationships, as would be expected when the banks are 
members of the stock exchange and wish to give their clients 
22 0The application for admission of a foreign issue to the 
Stock Exchange must be filed by a Swiss Bank, (See U.S. Treasury, 
Op.Cit., p.275) and this forces a borrower to have its loans 
underwritten. 
23· The suggestion is that these firms adjust their portfolios 
in anticipation of a fresh supply of the particular borrower's 
bonds being added to their portfolios. Other explanations are 
possible - e.g. that the market is deliberately depressed to 
increase the yield available on the forthcoming issuee See 
Chapter III - Excursis on the Swiss market. 
24·Emile Duperrex, E.F . T.A. Bulletin April-May 1964 , "E.F. T.A. 
Capital Markets : II The Swiss Capital Market~ p.5. 
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an opportunity to participate in a new issueo 25 
Underwriting banks approach the SWiss National Bank 
for ap proval of foreign flotat ions in excess of 10 million 
SWiss francs, but the underwriters appear largely to 
determine the sequence of flotations, probably by the order 
in which they place requests before the National Banko 
General: 
Because of their knowledge of the market, the advice 
of an underwriter must playa decisive part in the 
negotiation of loan terms, and well-established firms, such 
as the Commonwealth's underwriters are, or should be in a 
position to provide expert advice o The underwriters in all 
centres - including London, where so many Commonwealth loans 
have been undersubscribed - also play an important part in 
the placement of securities and the~E would be a natural 
tendency for the underwriters to build up a clientele interesUi 
in Commonwealth securities o Furthermore, the Commonwealth's 
legal procedure is complex and each underwriter requires 
some understanding of ito It is also possible that the 
termination of a relationship between the Commonwealth and 
its customary underwriter could lead to harmful inter-
pretations by investors o Small wonder, then, that the 
Commonwealth did not change its underwriters between 1950 and 
25 0 see Bank of England 7 OPoCit., po108 - "In Western Germany 
and Switzerland the large commercial banks engage in a wide 
range of activitieso They are large holders of securities 
and act both as dealers and as brokers for customers' account " . 
~~7 
3. The Negotiation of Loan Terms 
As mentioned, the Commonwealth must rely to a large 
extent on the advice of its underwriters in deciding the terms 
of a loano At the same time, the Commonwealth's representation 
in the negotiations indicates that it plays a significant part 
in deciding the terms in some markets o Variations from loan 
to loan in important terms and conditions in some markets also 
show that negotiations cover a wider field in some markets than 
in otherso 
The managing underwriters naturally become intensely 
interested in market fluctuations, particularly in the prices 
of existing Commonwealth issues, and of near substitutes and 
in factors that might affect the market, as the date of 
flotation approacheso They also have to ascertain the 
attitude of other underwriters, sub-underwriters or dealers, 
as the case may be, to underwriting or selling portions of the 
loan at different prices and conditions 0 In doing so they 
would be formulating demand schedules for the securities to 
be issued, and would be in a position to assess - but not 
necessarily with fine accuracy - the price at which different 
quantities of the securities could be soldo 
For its part, the Commonwealth Treasury receives 
frequent quotations, usually daily, of its existing and related 
issues on the market where it is floating the loano For London 
loans it has a senior officer available in London to advise the 
High Commissioner during negotiationso New York loans wp~e 
Usually negotiated by the Secretary to the Treasuryo The 
terms of the Canadian loans also reflect some solid bargainingo 
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The lack of Treasury representation in Switzerland suggests 
that there is little room for negotiating there, while it seems 
that from the issue price of par and interest rate (5%) of the 
Australian loan in the Netherlands, which carne on the market 
at a premium, the terms were not subject to much negotiation 
there o 
other important features of the loans, such as the 
amount , of the loan , its life, and the amortisation provisions, 
changed less in Switzerland than in New York, and less in 
New York than in Londono There were no changes in these 
features in Swiss loans, while the life and amortisation 
provisions in New York changed in the middle 1950s, and there 
were some changes in optional redemption termso In London 
the amounts of Commonwealth loans varied from £stg 7 to 20 
million final maturity dates have been anywhere from 10 to 
20 years after flotation and optional redemption provisions 
appear to have been adjusted to suit contemporaneous market 
conditions . Lack of concern, or of judgcment1 by underwriters 
could explain the inflexibility of some loan terms, but it is 
probable that market customs were an important influenceo 
Also of interest is the extent of change during the 
period in the charges the Commonwealth paid to its underwriters 
and fiscal agents o London charges remained uniform, but lower 
than in any other centre, possibly as much a result of the 
independence the Commonwealth had shown by having the Reserve 
Bank underwrite its loans in the 1940s, as of the efficiency 
of the London marketo New York charges were reduced during the 
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1950s from 2 5/8% to 2t% (and to 2 3/8% late in 1962)0 By 
way of contrast, Swiss charges dropped slightly in 1955 (when 
credit-worthy borrowers may have been more scarce than a few 
years later)26 but were noticeably increased - both for 
underwriting and fiscal agency work - for the last two loanso 
There is, in total, fairly positive evidence that 
the Commonwealth was able to achieve better deals in some 
centres than in others. Representation and the scope for 
negotiation indicate why the Commonwealth secured its best 
deals (out of the three locations in which it floated a number 
of loans) in London, and its worst in Switzerlando 
40 Listing on the Stock Exchange 
Listing on the st ock exchange is as intrinsic to a 
public flotation as the issue of a prospectus o The exchange 
provides a market for bond/stockholders, and hence makes their 
holdings more liquid o To facilitate dealings, and to protect 
investors, exchanges have establ ished conditions to be met 
by issuers wishing to have their securities quotedo 
In all markets listing was arranged by the under-
writers although normally a Commonwealth official had to sign 
the application submitted to the exchangeo The London Stock 
Exchange's Committee on Quotations receives the request for 
listing, and requires prospectus information to be inserted 
in the presso In Switzerland the application must be filed by 
26 'These points are substantiated in Chapter 1110 
e6G 
a Swiss bank, ~7 and the central stock exchange organisation 
consults with the National Bank before approving the listingo 
The United States has enacted the Securities Exchange Act to 
regulate the stock exchanges, but the requirements seem to be 
largely met by the rather stringent provisions for the 
registration of a prospectus under the scrutiny of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission o However, an annual 
report 28 covering subjects such as the borrower's public debt, 
balance of payments and controls on foreign exchange 
transactions is required to be lodged with the Commission by 
the borrower o 
27· See Note 220 
28· The form of the report is shown in Appendix II. 
D. SECURING NON -PUBLIC LOANS 
10 The International Bank 
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Accor ding to the Bank's Articles, loans can be made 
only to members, or within the territory of members. The 
loans must also meet other requirements of the Ar ticles in 
the way that these are applied, or interpreted, by the Bank's 
Executive Directors and staff. 
In order to ensure that a loan meets the Bank's 
requirements, the Bank staff undertakes a full-scale 
investigation of the economy of the borrower and into the 
economics of the project,to be financed with the loano 
In the period under consideration the r ate of 
interest charged by the Bank did not vary from borrower to 
borrower but was based on the rate which it would itself have 
to pay to borrow money plus a 1% annual Commission charge 
which was allocated to a Special Reserve and a fraction to 
mee t administrative costs o In practice, the long-term lending 
rate of the Bank varied between 4% and 6t%o 
Normally a prospective borrower t r ansmits a brief 
description of the project to be financed, and discusses the 
prospects of a loan with the Bank's staffo If the project 
appears to be satisfactory, the Bank arrange s for i ts staff 
to investigate and document the project. The final document, 
Which contains the results of the investigation de s cr ibed 
above and a draft loan agreement, frequently runs to over a 
hundred pages. When this document is prepar ed, subject to 
the Bank's staff being prepared to recommend the project, the 
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Governor who represents the borrower (i.ee, in the case of the 
Commonwealth, the Treasurer) makes a formal application for a 
l oan. 
This application, together wi t h the documentation 
prepared by the Bank, is submitted to a Loan Committee which 
includes a representative of the borrower o The Secretary to 
the Treasury has been Australia's representative on this 
Committee o After the Loan Committee has approved the 
application, the proposal is considered by the Executive 
Directors before the loan agreement is signed by the Bank and 
the borrower. 
The Bank's agreements follow a standard form,29 
and include -
(a) A definition of the purpose of the loan which is 
usually a project, and of the types of expenditures 
to be met from the Bank's loan. 
(b) The charges for the loan, including the interest 
rate and a commitment fee on the undrawn balance 
of the loan. 
(c) Conditions to be met during the life of the loan 
eog o reports on the progress of the project, that 
expenditure of loan funds is restricted to 
purchases from member-countries (or Switzerland). 
(d) The repayment of the loan in increasing semi-annual 
amounts which commence a few years after the loan 
agreement is signedo 
29 •See , for example, the agreement annexed to the Loan 
{International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) Act 1950. 
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(e) Conditions which must be met before the loan can 
be drawn - mainly the provision of a legal opinion 
by the borrower, and - for each Australian loan -
the passing of an act to approve the loane 
The loan was drawn as expenditure was made on the 
projecto The request for each drawing was accompanied by a 
certification by a Commonwealth representative that the stated 
expenditure had been made, that no other finance had been 
secured against the expenditure and that the drawing could 
not be used to purchase goods or services except from member 
countries or Switzerlande Where, as in the Commonwealth's loan 
for $100 million for the Snowy Mountains Scheme, the rate of 
drawing (in the Commonwealth's case 55%) was shown to be not 
sufficient to draw the full amount of the loan, the borrower 
could apply for the rate of drawing to be increased 030 
20 Commercial Loans 
All loans obtained from commercial sources by the 
Commonwealth between 1950 and 1962 were spent on the purchase 
of aircraft and equipment for ToA .A. and Qantaso The first 
loan secured for Qantas was placed by Morgan Stanley & Coo with 
a number of financial institutionso The remaining loans were 
negot iated between the Secretary to the Treasury and The Chase 
Manhattan Bank of New York (at which the Commonwealth Treasury 
account is maintained and where the Reserve Bank has lodged 
money on time deposit), the Morgan Guaranty ' Trust Company, 
30·Commonwealth Departmental paperso 
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the Commonwealth's fiscal agent (and formerly J . P . Morgan & Co o 
and the Guaranty Trust Company) or the Export - Import Bank 
(which provided one loan in 1960)0 31 
In addition to the negotiating banks, other 
organisations from time to time joined as co-lenderso No 
investigations were made along the lines of those customarily 
conducted by the International Banko The loan agreements 
provided for the drawing of money as payments were required for 
aircraft and equipment o Normally, the Consulate-General in 
New York, upon receiving advice from the Treasury that a 
drawing was required, would give the required notice to the 
lenders. On the appropriate date, the funds would be paid 
into the Commonwealth's account and a cheque drawn immediately 
in favour of the airline concerned and deposited in the air-
line's accounto Except with the first loan and the Export-
Import Bank loan, a commitment fee was payable on the un-
disbursed balance of each loano 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_A~c~t~s and Loan (Australian 
E. SERVICING THE LOANS 
All interest payments on overseas loans were made 
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, as provided by the Loans 
Securities Act and other legislation o Interest payments due 
from the States were recouped by this Fund as were those due 
on loans relent to Qantas and T.A.A . 
Although, in most of the legislation relating to 
oversea loans,the principal amounts of the loans were formally 
appropriated from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, in practice 
the money was usually provided by the National Debt Sinking 
Fund 0 Exceptions were ,limited to instances where the funds 
for redemption came from another loan, were reimbursed by 
Qantas or T.A.A. (when the Consolidated Revenue Fund paid the 
money and received the reimbursement), or where the proceeds 
of the loan had been paid into a special Trust Fund which 
became responsible for repaying the principalo 
The amounts provided from these Funds were credited 
to the Reserve Bank, which supplied the foreign currency 
required by the Commonwealth's agents for payment of interest 
and principalo These agents were, in London, the Inscribed 
Stock Registry, and, in the other centres, the Commonwealth's 
fiscal and sinking fund agents o Payments due on International 
Bank loans were made direct to the Bank (even if the Common-
wealth's obligations had been sold), and those due on loans from 
commercial sources were paid to the lender or , if there was 
more than one institution involved, to the lenders ' agent. 
, 
-
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Amortisation payments, ioe o retirement of a certain 
amount of principal annually or semi-annually during part of 
the life of the loan, were required by the terms of public 
loans floated in New York, Canada and the Netherlandso 32 In 
New York and Canada, this requirement could be met by providing 
funds either for the purchase of securities on the market 
(which was, in practice, employed when the price was below par) 
or by calling bonds for redemption at para The amortisation 
payments on the Netherlands loan had to be used in redeeming, 
at par, bonds whose numbers were drawn by lot. 
Al though none of the loans raised during the period 
in London or in Switzerland involved amortisation payments, the 
National Debt Commission nevertheless allocated amounts annually 
for repurchases in Londono These repurchases (and those in the 
centres already discussed) provided a larger market for 
Commonwealth securities, thus reducing price fluctuations, as 
well as reducing the principal amount to be repaid at final 
maturity. No portion of any of the Swiss loans was redeemed 
during the periodo 
32oSemi-annual or quarterly repayments had to be made on 
Inte rnational Bank loans and loans from commercial sourceso 
I 
J 
, 
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APPENDLK 1 
CONTENTS OF COMMONWEALTH PROSPECTUSES 
ISSUED OVERS EAS (a) 
Contents Of Pros12 ectuses Issued I 
New York Canada Switzerland Netherlands 
Description of bonds) 
Purposes of Loan ) 
) 
Aust rali a - ) 
) 
Area and Government ) 
Rural , mining and ) 
manufacturing ) 
industries ) 
Transportation ) 
Commonwealth ) 
expenditure ) These topics are common External trade ) 
International ) 
rese rves ) 
Publi c debt - ) 
aggregates ) 
Commonweal th ) 
receipts and ) 
expenditure ) 
Nationa l Income ) 
) 
CommunicA.tions IN TN IN 
Elect ricity gene ration IN IN IN 
Balance of payments IN IN 
Membe rship of I . M.F . , 
I. B.R.D . etc . IN IN IN 
Nationa l Debt Sinking 
Fund IN IN 
Money and banking IN IN 
Advantages for lending IN IN 
c01mtry 
Contingent Liabilities IN 
Description of 
Financial Agreement IN 
Details of Public Debt IN IN 
(a ) Between June 1950 and June 1962. London prospectuses 
are not included. 
I 
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COl·t!VjISSION 
WASHINGTON , D.C . 
FORi 18 K 
FOR -
l -
l' OrlZ1GN G0V ~nNM~NTS AND pC)'"Ci TICAL SUB~ ~l ISIONS THE EO} 
ANN U A L R 2 P 0 R T 
OF COEHONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
a at date of enQ of last fiscal year 
(as 
Name and address of person authorised to receive notices 
and communlcatlons from t e Securities and Exchange 
Commission : -
FORH 18-K 
T e information set out below is to be furnished:-
In respect of eacn issue of securities of the rebistrant 
registered, a briel statement as to : -
(a) The general effect of any material modifications, no 
previously reported, of the rights of the holders of 
such certificates 
(b) The title and material provlslons of any law, decree 
or administrative action not previously reported, )y 
reason of which the security is not being serviced 
in accordance with the terms thereof. 
(c) The circumstances of any other failure, not previously 
reported, to pay principal, interest or any sinking 
fund or amortisation instalmento 
2. A statement as to t.ie close 01 the fiscal year of the 
registrant oiving the total outstanding of:-
(a) Internal funded debt nf thp rpP'istrant. rrntal to be 
stated in th currency of the registr ant. If any 
internal funded debt is payable in a foreign currency 
it should not be included ~nder this paragraph (a), 
but under paragraph (b) of this item.) 
(b) External funded ebt of the re~istrant (totals to be 
stated in the respective curr ency in which payable). 
No statement need be furnished as to intergovernmental 
debt. 
J ,. 
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30 A statement glvlng the title, date of issue, date of 
maturi ty , inter est rate and amount outstanding, 
together with the currency or currencies in which 
payable of each issue of funded debt of the registrant 
outstanding as of the close 01 the last financial 
year of the registrant. 
4. (a) As to each issue of securities of the registrant 
whirh is registered, there should be furnisned a 
brEakdown of the total amount outstanding, as sown 
in Item 3 into the following: 
( i) Total amount held by or for the account of 
the registrant. 
(ii) Total estimated amount held by nationals 
of the registrant (or if registrant is 
otner than a national government by tr-
nationals of its national government); 
this estimate need be furnished only if it 
is practicable to do so. 
(b) If a substantial amount is set forth in answer 
to par agraph 4(a) (i) above, describe briefly the 
method employed by the registrant to re-acquire such 
secur ities. 
5. A statement as of the close of the fiscal year 1962-63 
of the registrant giving the estimated total of :-
(a) Internal floating indebtedness of the registrant 
(total to be stated in the currency of tne registrant). 
(b) External floating indebtedness of the registrant 
(total to be stated in the respective currencies in 
which payable). 
6. tatements of the receipts, classified by source, and 
of the expenditure classified by purpose, of the 
registrant lor each fiscal year of the registrant ended 
since the clcse of the latest fiscal year for whic _ such 
information was previously reported. These statements 
should be so itemised as to be reasonably informative 
and should cover both ordinary and extraordinary 
receipts and expenditure; there should be indicated 
separately, if practicable, the amount of receipts 
pledged or otherwise specifically allocated to any 
issue registered, indicating the issue. 
7. (a ) If any fo r eign exchange control, not previously 
reported, has been established by the registrant (or 
if the registrant is other than a national government, 
by its national government), briefly describe such 
foreign exchange control. 
~ 'ILJ 
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(b) If any fOJeign e~~nange control p~~viously 
reported has been di~ continued or materially modified, 
briefly describe the effect of any such action, not 
previously reported . 
8 . Brief statements as of a date reasonably close to the 
date of the filing of this report (indicating such date), 
in respect of the note issue and gold reserves of the 
central bank of issue of the registrant, and of any 
further gold stocks held by the registrant. 
9 . Statements of imports and exports of merchandise for 
each year ended since the close of the latest year tor 
which such infor ation was previously reported. SUCD 
statements should be reasonably itemised so far as 
practicable as to commodities and as to countries. 
They should be set forth in terms of value and of 
wei ght or quantity : if statistics have been established 
only in terms of value, such will suffice. 
10. The balances o'f international payments of the registrant 
for each year ended since the close of the latest year 
for which such information was previously reported . 
The statements of such balances should conform, if 
possible , to the nomenclature and form used in the 
IIStatistical Handbook of the League of Nations ll • 
These s'tatements need be furnished only if the registrant 
has published balances of international payments. 
EXHIBITS 
The following exhibits should be filed as part 
of the annual report : 
Ca) Copies of any amendments or modifications, other 
than such as have been previously filed, to all 
exhibits previously filed other than annual budgets. 
If such amendments or modifi cations are not in 
the English language, there should be furnished 
in addition a tran lation into English if the 
original exhibit was translated into Engli h . 
(b) A copy of any law , decree, or administrative 
document outlined in answer to item 1 (b). If 
such law , decree or document is not in the ~nblish 
language , there should be furnished in addition 
thereto a translation thereof into English. 
(c) A copy of the latest annual budget of the registrant, 
if not previously filed , as presented to its 
legislative body . This document need not be 
translated into English. 
The registrant may file such other exhibits as 
it may desire marking them so as to indicate clearly the 
items to which they r efer . 
,. -
4. 
This annual report is filed subject to the 
instructions f~~ Form 18- K for Foreign Governments and 
Poli ti cal SUb-d "_ visions thereof. " 
S I G NAT U R E 
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 , the registrant has duly caused this 
annual report to be signed on its behalf by the undersi gned, 
thereunto duly authorised, on the day of 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTHALIA 
BY : 
FIRST ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
DEPART T OF TH TREASU Y, 
CA BERRA, A. C. T. 
AUSTRALIA.. 
"- I 
I 
Dated April 10, 1960 
.lJPl'il 19, 1960 
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EXHIBIT A 
$25,000,000 
Commonwealth of Australia 
TWENTY YEAR 5 1,4% BONDS 
UNDERWRITING AGREEMENT 
- --~- - .-
A P.c;.I.llJL\. III 
DlJ~ April 16, 1980 
j 
~ FR ...................................................... ~ .. ~~~~~~ .. ~~~~~ .... -~~--.... ~ .. .. 
MORGAN STANLEY & CO., 
2 WALL STREET, 
NEW YORK 5, N. Y. 
Dear Sirs: 
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April 19, 1%0 
The Commonwealth of Australia (hereinafter called the Commonwealth) proposes to issue 
$25,000,000 principal amount of its Twenty Year 5}:1% Bonds, due April 15, 1980 (hereinafte r called 
the Bonds) . The Commonwealth has filed with the ecurities and Exchange Commission a registration 
statement including a prospectus relating to the Bonds. The registration statement as amended at the 
time it becomes effective, including exhibits, is hereinafter referred to as the Registration Statement and 
the prospectus as then amended is hereinafter referred to as the Prospectus. 
I. 
The Commonwealth hereby agrees to sell to the several Underwriters named below, and the 
Underwriters, upon the basis of the representations and warranties herein contained, but subject to the 
conditions hereinafter stated, agree to purchase from the Commonwealth, severally and not jointly, the 
principal amount of Bonds set forth below opposi te their names aggregating $25,000,000 at 95% of 
their principal amount- the purchase price--and accrued interest from April 15, 1960 to the date of 
payment and delivery. 
Name 
Morgan Stanley & Co....................................................... ........................ $ 
A. C. Allyn and Company, Incorporated ............................................... . 
A. E. Ames & Co., Incorporated ........................... .................................. . 
Arnhold and S. B1eichroeder, Inc .......................................................... . 
F. B. Ashplant & Co ................................................. .............................. . . 
Bache & Co ................................................. .. .... ........................................... . 
Baker, Weeks & Co .................................................................................. . 
Bear, Stearns & Co ........................... ....... .. ......... .. ..... .. ............... ............... . 
Bell, Gouinlock & Company, Incorporated .. ........... ...... ...... ................ .. . 
Blyth & Co., Inc ................... ... .................................................................. . 
Alex. Brown & Sons ............................................................. .................... . 
Burnhatn and Company ................................................. .. .. ........................ . 
Burns Bros. & Denton, Inc ...................................................................... . 
Clark, Dodge & Co ................................................................................... . . 
Courts & Co .............................................................................. .................. . 
Donlinick & Dominick ................................................................ .. ............. . 
The Dominion Securities Corporation .. ................................................... . 
Drexel & Co ........................................................ ........................................ . 
Eastman Dillon, Union Securities & Co ................................................ . 
Estabrook & Co .......................................................................................... . 
The First Boston Corporation ................................................................ . 
Folger, olan, Fleming-W. B. Hibbs & Co., Inc ..................... .. ........... . 
Gairdner & Company Inc ........................................ ............. .............. ..... . 
Goldman, Sachs & Co .............................................................................. . 
Green hields & 0 ( . Y.) Inc .... ..................................................... ...... . 
Gregory & Sons .. ............... ....................................................................... . 
Halle & Stieglitz ................................................................... .................... . 
I-Iallgarten & Co .................. .. ................... ....... .......................................... . 
Halsey, Stuart & Co. Inc ........................................... ............................... . 
Harriman Ripley & Co., Incorporated .............. ... .................................. . 
Principal 
Amount 
1,600,000 
200,000 
250,000 
500,000 
150,000 
200,000 
200,000 
250,000 
100,000 
750,000 
200,000 
150,000 
250,000 
250,000 
100,000 
500,000 
750,000 
500,000 
750,000 
250,000 
850,000 
150,000 
150,000 
750,000 
150,000 
100,000 
150,000 
750,000 
750,000 
750,000 
I 
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Name 
I-Iarris & Partners Inc ............................................................................... .. 
Hayden, Stone & Co ......................................................... ......................... _ 
Hemphill, Noyes & Co ..................................................................... _ ........ . 
H. Hentz & Co .. ................................. ............................................. . _ ........ _ 
Hirsch & Co ....................................................................... . _ ....... .............. . 
W. E. Hutton & Co ......... ............................. ........................................... .. 
Kidder, Peabody & Co .............................................................. ............... .. 
Kuhn, Loeb & Co .............................................. _ ... ........... ................ _ ....... .. 
Lazard Freres & Co ....... ...... ... ... ....... ........................ ....................... _ ...... _._ 
Lee Higginson Corporation .................... ....................... _ ................ ........ .. 
Lehman Brothers ....................... ............................................ ........... _ ........ . 
McLeod, Young, Weir, 1ncorporated ............................................ _ ........ . 
Merri ll Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated ......................... _ 
lVlills, Spence & Co. Inc ........................................................................... .. 
Model, Roland & Stone .................................................. .. ..... .. ............. ..... . 
F. S. Moseley & Co ............................................................................ ...... . 
esbitt, Thomson and Company, Inc ............................................. _ ....... .. 
ew York Hanseatic Corporation ....................................... ... ................ .. 
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis .............................. ............................ .. 
R. W. Pressprich & Co ........................................................................... .. 
Riter & Co ... ...... ........ .. .. ............... ......... ........................ .................... .... ..... . 
The Robinson-Humphrey Company, 1nc ...................................... _ ........ .. 
L. F. Rothschi ld & Co ................................................. ....... ..................... .. 
Salomon Bros. & Hutzler ........................................................................ .. 
Shields & Company ................................................................................... . 
Sn1ith, Barney & Co .................................................................................. . 
Stroud & Company, Incorporated ............................................................. . 
Swiss American Corporation .............................. ... ............... .. ................ .. 
Tucker, Anthony & R. L. Day ................................................................. . 
Joseph Walker & Sons ................ ............................ ................................. . 
White, Weld & Co ........................................................... ......................... . 
Dean Witter & Co ................................................................................... .. 
Wood, Gundy & Co., Inc .......................................................................... . 
Wood, Struthers & Co ............................................................................. .. 
II. 
Prillcipal 
A molmt 
$ 250,000 
250,000 
250,000 
2oo,000 
150,OOO 
250,000 
750,000 
850,000 
750,OOO 
500,OOO 
750,000 
250,000 
750,000 
100,OOO 
500,000 
250,000 
100,000 
100,OOO 
250,000 
500,000 
150,000 
100,OOO 
250,000 
750,000 
200,000 
750,OOO 
100,000 
5oo,000 
250,000 
100,000 
750,000 
500,000 
250,000 
150,000 
$25,OOO,000 
The Commonwealth understands that the Underwriters propose to make a public offering of their 
respective portions of the Bonds on or as soon after the effective date of the Registration Statement as in 
your judgment is advisable. The Commonwealth further understands that the Bonds are to be offered to 
the public at 97 ~ 70-the public offering price-and accrued interest, and to dealer at a price which 
represents a concession of 1 X 70 of the principal amount under the public oITering price, and that the 
Underwriters may allow and dealers reallow a concession not in excess of % 70 of the principal amount 
to certain brokers or dealers who are members of the National Association of Securities D ealers, Inc., or 
who are foreign dealers not eligible for such membership but who agree to conform to the Rules of Fair 
Practice of said Association in making sales to purchasers in the U nited States of America. 
III. 
Payment for the Bonds which the Underwriters have severally agreed to purchase shall be made to 
the Commonwealth or its order by certified or official bank check in New York Clearing House funds 
2 
amount 
Inc., or 
of Fair 
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at the office of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 23 Wall Street, ew York, N. Y., at 
such time and on such date on or after Apri l 28, 1960 but not later than May 5, 1960 as may be desig-
nated by you, upon delivery to you for the respective accounts of the several Underwriters of the Bonds 
in definitive form. The date and time of such payment and delivery are hereinafter referred to as the 
closing date. 
IV. 
The obligations of the Commonwealth and the several obligations of the Underwriters hereunder 
are subject to the condition that the Registration Statement shall have become effective not later than 
April 19, 1960. 
The several obligations of the Underwriters hereunder are further subject to the following 
conditions: 
(a) No stop order suspending the effectiveness of the Registration Statement shall be in effect 
and no proceedings for sllch purpose shall be pending before or threatened by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission; there shall have been no materia l adverse change in the financial, economic 
or political conditions of Australia from the conditions set forth in the Registration Statement and 
Prospectus; and you shall have rece,ived on the closing date a certificate dated the closing date, 
signed by the Ambassador of the Commonwealth of Australia to the United States or the Charge 
d'Affai res or Consul General in New York City to the foregoing effect. The person making such 
certificate may rely upon the best of his knowledge as to proceedings pending or threatened. 
(b) You shall have received on or prior to the closing date an opinion of Davis Polk Wardwell 
underland & Kiendl, counsel for the Underwriters (who may rely as to all matters of Australian 
law, including the due authorization of the Bonds and of the execution of thi l\greelllent on behalf 
of the Commonwealth, upon the opinion of Messrs. Blake & Riggall of l\felbourne, Australia), to 
the effect that ( i) the Bonds have been validly authorized and, when duly executed, counter igned 
fo r authentication, delivered and paid for, will be validly issued and outstanding; (i i) the Registration 
Statement and the Prospectus and any upplements or amendments thereto comply as to form in all 
material respects with the Securit ies Act of 1933 and the rules and regulations of the Securities anJ 
Exchange Commission thereunder; and (iii) thi ' Agreement has been duly authorized and executed 
in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth and the Order or Orders in Council applicable 
thereto, and is valid and binding on the Commonwealth. 
(c) You shall have received, on or prior to the closing date, a copy of a written opinion, satis-
factory to Davis Polk Wardwell Sunderland & Kiendl, of the Act ing Solicitor-General, to the effect that 
the Bonds have been duly authorized in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth and the 
Order or Orders in Council applicable thereto and that the Bonds, upon delivery thereof and pay-
ment therefor pursuant to this Agreement, will constitute valid, bindIng and unconditional obligation 
of the Commonwealth for the performance of which the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth 
is pledged, and also to the effect that this Agreement has been duly authorized and executed in 
accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth and the Order or O rders in Council applicable 
thereto, and that all of the provisions hereof are valid and binding on the Commonwealth. 
(d) The Commonwealth shall be on the closing date a member in good stand ing of the International 
Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and you shall 
have received on the closing date a certificate, da ted the clo ing date, igned by the Amba ador of 
the Commonwealth of Australia to the United States or the Charge d'Affaires or the Consul General 
in New York City to the foregoing effect. 
v. 
In further consideration of the agreement of the Underwriters herein contained the Commonwealth 
covenants as follows: 
(a) To furnish each Underwriter without charge a copy of the R egistration Statement ( including 
exhibits) and, during the period mentioned in paragraph (c) below, as many copies of the Prospectus 
as you may reasonably request. 
3 
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(b) Before amending or supplementing the Registration Statement or the Prospectus to furnish 
you a copy of each stich proposed amendment or supplement. 
(c) For a period of 40 days after the first date of the public offering of the Bonds and for such 
longer period as in the opinion of your counsel the Prospectus is required by law to be delivered in 
connection with sales by an Underwriter or dealer, if any event shall occur as a result of which it is 
necessary to amend or supplement the Prospectus in order to make the statements therein, in the 
light of the circumstances when the Prospectus is delivered to a purchaser, not misleading, or if it is 
necessary to amend the Prospectus to comply with law, forthwith to prepare and furnish, at its own 
expense, to the Underwriters and to the dealers (whose names and addresses you will furnish to 
the Commonwealth) to whom Bonds may have been sold by you on behalf of the Underwriters and 
to any other dealers upon request, either amendments to the Prospectus or supplemental information 
so that the statements in the Prospectus as so amended or supplemented will not, in the light of the 
circumstances when the Prospectus is delivered to a purchaser, be misleading or so that the Pro-
spectus will comply with law. 
(d) To endeavor to qualify the Bonds for offer and sale under the securities or Blue Sky laws of 
such States as you shall reasonably request. 
(e) To make generaIly available to its security holders as soon as practicable after the closing of 
its fiscal year ended June 30, 1961 statements of its revenues and expenditures for such fiscal year, 
which shall satisfy the provisions of Section 11 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
VI. 
The Commonwealth represents and warrants to each Underwriter that when the Registration State-
ment becomes effective the Registration Statement and the Prospectus wiIl comply in all material respects 
with the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the rules and regulations of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and that they wiIl not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to 
state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading, except that this representation and warranty does not apply to statements or omissions in the 
Registration Statement or the Prospectus based upon information furnished to the Commonwealth in 
writing by any Underwriter expressly for use therein. 
The Commonwealth agrees to indemnify and hold harmless each Underwriter and each person, if 
any, who controls any Underwriter within the meaning of Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, from 
and against any and all losses, claims, damages and liabilities caused by any untrue statement or alleged 
untrue statement of a material fact contained in said Registration Statement or Prospectus (if used within 
the periods set forth in Article V hereof and as amended or supplemented if the Commonwealth shall have 
furnished any amendments or supplements thereto) or any preliminary prospectus or caused by any 
omission or alleged omission to state therein a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading, except in so far as such losses, claims, damages or liabilities 
are caused by any such untrue statement or omission or alleged untrue statement or omission based upon 
information furnished in writing to the Commonwealth by any Underwriter expressly for use therein. 
In case any action shall be brought against any Underwriter or any person controlling such Under-
writer, based upon the Registration Statement or Prospectus or any preliminary prospectus and in respect 
of which indemnity may be sought from the Commonwealth, such Underwriter shaIl promptly notify the 
Commonwealth in writing, and the Commonwealth shall assume the defense thereof, including the employ-
ment of counsel and the payment of all expenses. Any Underwriter or any such controlling person shaH 
have the right to employ separate counsel in any such act ion and participate in the defense thereof, but 
the fees and expenses of such counsel shall be at the expense of such Underwriter or such controlling 
person unless the employment of such counsel has been specifically authorized by the Commonwealth. 
The Commonwealth shall not be liable for any settlement of any such action effected without its 
consent, but if settled with the consent of the Commonwealth or if there be a final judgment for the 
plaintiff in any such action, the Commonwealth agrees to indemnify and hold harmless any Underwriter 
and any such controlling person from and against any loss or liability by reason of such settlement or 
judgment. 
4 
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Each Underwriter agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Commonwealth to the same extent 
as the foregoin g indemnity from the Commonwealth to each Underwriter, but only with reference to 
information relating to such Underwriter furnished in writing by such Underwriter expressly for use in 
said Registration Statement or Prospectus or any preliminary prospectus. In case any action shall be 
brought against the Commonwealth, based on the Registration Statement or Prospectus or any preliminary 
prospectus and in respect of which indemnity may be sought against any Underwriter, the Underwriter 
shall have the rights and duties given to the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth shall have the rights 
and duties given to the Underwriter, by the preceding paragraph of this Article VI. 
The indemni ty agreements contained in this Article VI and the representations and warranties 
of the Commonwealth in this Agreement set forth shall remain operative and in full force and effect 
regardless of (i) any termination of this Agreement, (ii) any investigation made by or on behalf of any 
Underwriter or controlling person or by or on behalf of the Commonwealth and (iii) acceptance of and 
payment hereunder for the Bonds. 
VII. 
The Commonwealth agrees to pay all expenses in connection with the preparation, issue, execution, 
authentication and delivery of the Bonds, the preparation and filing of the Registration Statement (includ-
ing all amendments thereto), the listing of the Bonds on the ew York Stock Exchange, and the prepara-
tion and filing of the application for registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Common-
wealth shall not, however, be requi red to payor bear any of the advertising, legal or other expenses of 
the Underwriters. 
VIII. 
This Agreement shall become effective when notification of the effectiveness of the Registration 
Statement has been released by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
If this Agreement shall be terminated by the Underwriters, or any of them, because of any failure 
or refusal on the prt of the Commonwealth to comply with the terms or to fulfill any of the conditions 
of th is Agreement, or if for any reason the Commonwealth shall be una Ie to perform its obligations 
under this Agreement, the Commonwealth will reimburse the Underwriters or such Underwriters as have 
so terminated this Agreement with respect to themselves, severally, for all of their out-of-pocket c-'<penses 
(including the fees and disbursements of their counsel) reasonably incurred by them, in connection with 
this Agreement or the contemplated offering of the Bonds. 
Very truly yours, 
.'\("cepteel. April 19, 1960 
(Morgan Stanley & Co.) 
Acting severally on behalf of itself and 
the several Underwriters named herein. 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
By 
S ecretary fa tire Treasury 
5 
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$25,000,000 
CommoDl¥ealth of Australia 
TWENTY YEAR 5 1/4% BONDS 
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
Twenty Year 5Y4% Bonds, due October 1, 1980 
FISCAL AGENCY AGREEMENT 
FISCAL AGE CY AGREEME T , dated September 27, 1960, between the Commonwealth of 
Australia, hereinafter sometimes called the "Commonwealth", party of the first part, and Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, party of the second part, hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
the "Fiscal Agent". 
ARTICLE 0 E. The Commonwealth has covenanted in an agreement dated September 27, 1960 with 
~1organ Stanley & Co., and the other several underwriters named therein to issue $25,000,000 principal 
amount of the Commonwealth of Aust ralia Twenty Year 5 ~ % Bond , due October 1, 1980 (herein-
after called the "Bonds"), the text of which is to be substantially the text hereto attached as Exhibit 1. 
ARTICLE Two. The Commonwealth hereby appoints Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New 
York as F iscal Agent for the payment of the principal of and interest on the Bonds. The sums required 
for payment of principal and interest will be placed by the Commonwealth with the Fiscal Agent at 
its corporate trust office at least th ree full business days before the date on which said sums respectively 
become payable. 
The Commonwealth will pay the Fiscal Agent compensation for its services as Fiscal Agent for 
the Bonds as follows: 
(a) A sum equal to 5 cents for each coupon paid up to 10,000 coupons due on any interest 
date, 40 cents for each of the next 10,000 coupons due on such date, and 4 cents for each 
coupon in excess of 20,000 coupons due on such date. 
(b) I n the case of any optional partial redemption of outstanding Bonds, % % of the prin-
cipal amount of Bonds redeemed 
( c) In the case of the repayment of the principal of the Bonds on the due date thereof 
(except to the extent that payment be made out of Sinking F und moneys) , or in the case of any 
optional redemption of outstanding Bonds as a whole, ~o % of the principal amount. 
The Commonwealth will promptly reimburse the F iscal Agent for out-of-pocket costs and expenses 
incurred by it in connection with the service of the Bonds. 
ARTICLE THREE. The Commonwealth hereby appoints Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New 
York as Sinking Fund Agent for administration of the Sinking F und for the Bonds. Payment of 
sinking fund instalments will be made by the Commonwealth to the Sinking F und Agent at its cor-
porate trust office in ew York City on or before the semi-annual payment dates set forth in Exhibit 1 
and the Commonwealth hereby authorizes and directs the said Sinking Fund Agent to administer the 
sinking fund payments in accordance with the provisions therefor set fo rth in said exhibit. 
The Commonwealth wi ll pay Morgan Guaran ty T rust Company of New York as compensation for 
its services as Sinking Fund Agent a sum equivalent to % % of the principal amount of all Bonds pur-
chased or called for redempt ion through the Sinking Fund and will reimburse Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York for any expenses ( including brokerage commissions) paid out with respect to 
the acquisition of Bonds. Such expenses and any accrued interest payable in respect of the Bonds so 
Purchased or called for redemption through the Sinking Fund shall not be paid out of semi-annual sinking 
fUnd payments but shall be paid by the Commonwealth out of other funds. 
2L 
The Commonwealth will promptly payor Cause to be paid to the Sinking Fund Agent all out-ol-
pocket costs and expenses incurred by it in connection with the administration and operation of the 
Sinking Fund. 
ARTICLE FOUR. The Bonds shall be countersigned for authentication by Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York, which is hereby appointed Countersigning Agent. 
The Commonwealth will pay the Countersigning Agent (a) for authenticating the Bonds 25 cents 
for each $1,000 principal amount of the issue, and (b) for sorting, listing and cremating Bonds and 
coupons $15 per 1,000 Bonds and $7.50 per 1,000 coupons. There will be no charge for checking, proving 
and posting out of records pursuant to Article Six, paragraph (d) hereof of Bonds paid or purchased. 
The Countersigning Agent will authenticate and deliver the Bonds so authenticated to the pur· 
chasers thereof upon the written order of the Consul General, the Consul or a Vice Consul of the 
Commonwealth of Australia at ew York City or of such other person as the Treasurer of the Common· 
wealth 'of Australia appoints in writing. 
In case of the loss, destruction, theft or mutilation of any Bond or coupon, a duplicate will be issued 
upon proof of such loss, destruction or theft or upon surrender of the mutilated Bond or coupon, as the 
case may be, and upon giving of proper indemnity satisfactory to the Commonwealth and the Counter· 
signing Agent, and upon payment by the applicant for such duplication of the cost of the preparation 
and issue thereof. 
ARTICLE FIVE. The Fiscal Agent or the Sinking Fund Agent or the Countersigning Agent may at any 
time resign upon sixty days' notice to the Commonwealth, but the Commonwealth in any such case 
shall appoint in substitution a new Fiscal Agent or Sinking Fund Agent or Countersigning Agent in 
the Borough of Manhattan, The City of ew York. 
ARTICLE SIX. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York hereby accepts its appointments as 
Fiscal Agent, Sinking Fund Agent and Countersigning Agent under this Agreement upon the further 
terms and conditions hereinafter set forth: 
(a) If the Fiscal Agent, the Sinking Fund Agent, or the Countersigning Agent shall at any 
time be in doubt with respect to its rights and obligations under this Agreement or with resped 
to the rights of the owner or holder of any Bonds, such Agent may consult with its legal counsel 
and shall not be answerable or responsible to the Commonwealth or to the owner or holder of any 
Bond for anything done or suffered by it in good faith in accordance with the opinion of such 
counselor in the exercise of its reasonable discretion. 
(b) In acting under this Agreement, the Fiscal Agent, the Sinking Fund Agent and the 
Countersigning Agent are acting solely as agents of the Commonwealth and do not assume any 
obligation or relationship of agency or trust for or with any of the owners or holders of the Bond 
or interest coupons, except that all funds held by the Fiscal Agent or Sinking Fund Agent fo~ 
payment of principal, premium or interest on the Bonds shall be held in trust, subject to the pro-
visions of the following paragraph (c). 
(c) Any moneys deposited with the Fiscal Agent or the Sinking Fund Agent for the pay-
ment of the principal of and premium, if any, or interest on any Bond remaining unclaimed 
six years after such principal, premium or interest shall have become due and payable shall 
repaid to the Commonwealth on demand and the holder of such Bond or coupons shall there-
after look only to the Commonwealth for any payment which such holder may be entitled to 
(d) All Bonds and coupons paid by the Fiscal Agent or by the Sinking Fund Agent 
purchased for the Sinking Fund shall be cancelled by the Fiscal Agent or Sinking Fund 
paying or purchasing the same and delivered to the Countersigning Agent for cancellation 
record and a certificate of cancellation thereof given to the Commonwealth. 
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(e) The Fiscal Agent or the Sinking Fund Agent or the Countersigning Agent may become 
the owners of any of the Bonds with the same rights as any other bondholder. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the date first men-
Trust tioned above. 
preparation 
t may at any 
such case 
Agent in 
COMMO WEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
By .............. ....... .......... ................................................ . 
Secretary to the Treasury. 
MORGAN GUARA TY TRUST COMPANY OF 
NEW YORK 
By .......................................... ~ .................................... . 
Chairman of the Board. 
3 
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EXHIBIT 1 
[FORM OF BOND] 
COMMONWE ALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
T wenty Year 51'4% Bond 
Authorized and I ssued 
$25,000,000 
due Oct ober 1, 1980 
No. 
The COMMO WEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (hereinafter termed the "Commonwealth"), for 
value received, hereby promises to pay to the bearer the principal sum of 
o E THOUSA D DOLLARS 
on the 1st day of October, 1980, and to pay interest on such principal sum at the rate of 5 ~ % per 
annum semi-annually on the 1st day of April and the 1st day of October in each year until such principal 
sum shall have been paid but until maturity of this Bond only upon presentation and surrender, as 
severally they mature, of the coupons hereto annexed. Such principal sum and interest instalments, 
when due respectively, will be paid in the Borough of Manhattan, The City of New York, State of 
New York, United States of America, at the corporate trust office of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of 
ew York, in such coin or currency of the United States of America as at the time of payment is legal 
tender for public and private debts, and will be free of all taxes now or at any time hereafter imposed by 
the Commonwealth or by any taxing authority thereof or therein except when this Bond is beneficially 
owned by any person residing in or ordinarily a resident of Australia or of the Territory of P apua or of 
the Territory of New Guinea. 
This Bond is one of an issue of Twenty Year 5 ~ % Bond of the Commonwealth dated October 1, 
1960, all due October 1, 1980, of an aggregate principal sum of 25,000,000 all issued in bearer form 
in the denomination cf $1,000 each. 
The Bonds of this issue are subject to redemption at the option of the Commonweal th as a whole 
or in part by lot at the said office of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of ew York at any time on or after 
October 1, 1970, at the following percentages of the principal um thereof: to and including October 1, 
1974, at 1020/0 ; thereafter to and including October 1, 1977, at 101 % ; and thereafter at 1000/0; in 
each case together with accrued intere t to the date fixed for redemption. otice of intention to redeem 
shall be given by advertisement thereof in two daily newspapers printed in the English language and of 
general circulation in said Borough of Manhattan, at least twice prior to the redemption date specified 
in such notice, the first publication to be not less than thirty days prior to the redemption date specified in 
said notice. After the redemption date specified in said notice, provided payment is made or duly 
provided for pursuant thereto, interest on the principal sum hereof shall cease to accrue and any coupons 
for interest maturing after such date shall be null and void. 
On October 1, 1962 and on each A pril 1 and October 1 thereafter to and including April 1, 1980, 
the Commonwealth will make a sinking fund payment to Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of 
ew York, as Sinking Fund Agent, of cash in the amount of $675,000. The Commonwealth may 
deliver Bonds of this issue in lieu of all or any part of such cash payment at the cost thereof to 
the Commonwealth (exclusive of accrued interest and brokerage commissions) but not in excess of the 
sinking fund redemption price hereinafter set forth. For a period of 120 days after each uch sinking fund 
payment date the Sinking Fund Agent will apply cash held in the sinking fund to the purchase of Bonds of 
this issue at a price not in excess of the sinking fund redemption price. Cash on hand in the sinking fund, 
provided it amounts to $25,000 or more, at the expiration of said period of 120 days will be applied by the 
Sinking Fund Agent to the redemption of Bonds of this issne by lot on the next ensuing interest payment 
date at the sinking fu nd redemption price, except that any sinking fnnd moneys on hanr! at the end of the 
120 day period following April 1, 1980 will be appJie to payment of the principal of the maturing 
1 
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Bonds. Amounts of cash in the sinking fund not applied to redemption of Bonds by reason of the sum 
therein being less than $25,000 will be added to the next sinking fund instalment. The Commonwealth 
will pay to the Sinking Fund Agent on reque t amounts sufficient to pay accrued interest to the purchase 
date of Bonds purchased for the sinking fund and to the date fixed for redemption of Bonds redeemed 
for the sinking fund. Redemption of Bonds for the sinking fund will be made upon the notice, in the 
manner and with the effect hereinbefore provided for optional redemption of Bonds, except that Bonds of y 
this issue shall be redeemable for the sinking fund only on April 1, 1963 and any interest payment date 
thereafter at 100% of the principal urn thereof together with accrued interest to the date fixed for 
redemption. 
The Commonwealth agrees that, if in the future it shall sell, offer for public subscription or in any 
manner dispose of any bonds or loans constituting external debt of the Commonwealth secured by lien 
on any revenue or asset of the Commonwealth, the Bonds of this issue shall be secured equally and 
ratably therewith. 
This Bond shall not be valid or obligatory for any purpose until countersigned for authentication 
by Morgan Guaranty Tru t Company of ew York or its successor duly appointed by the Commonwealth 
for such purpose. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Commonwealth of Australia, pursuant to due authorization by law, has 
caused this Bond to be duly executed by the engraved facsimile of the signature of its Treasurer and 
by the manual countersignature of a duly authorized representative of the Commonwealth of A ustralia 
and coupons for the interest on the principal sum hereof bearing the facsimile of the signature of its 
Treasurer to be annexed hereto. 
Dated: October 1, 1960 
Countersigned: 
Authorized Representative of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 
Countersigned for Authentication: 
COMMO WEALTH OF AUSTRA LIA 
By . .................................................. . ............ .. .. . . ... ............ .. 
Treasurer 
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK 
By ................................................................... . 
Authorized Officer 
[FORM OF COUPON ] 
$26.25 o ......... .... ... .. .. . 
On ,19 unless the Bond below mentioned shall have been called for previous 
redemption and payment duly provided for, the Commonwealth of Australia promises to pay to bearer 
in the Borough of Manhattan, The City of New York, State of ew York, United States of America, at 
the corporate trust office of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York the amount shown hereon, free 
of all Australian taxes, present and future, except when this coupon is beneficially owned by any person 
residing in or ordinarily a resident of Australia or of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea, in such 
coin or currency of the United States of America as at the time of payment is legal tender for public 
and private debts, being six months' interest then payable on its Twenty Year Sy,; % Bond o. 
due October 1, 1980. 
COMMONWEALTH OF A USTRALIA 
By ........................................................................... . 
Treasurer 
2 
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APPENDIX 1. 
BOND PRINTERS FOR COMMONNEALTH ISSUES 
IN NEW YORK 
Year of 
Issue 
1954 (a) 
1956)(b) 
1957 ) 
1958;( ) 
1962) a 
(a) 
(b) 
Printers of Definitive Bonds 
American Bank Note Company 
Waterlows (London) 
Security-Columbian Banknote Company 
No temporary bonds were issued 
Temporary bonds were printed by the 
Security-Columbian Banknote Companyo 
-287 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Commonwealth did not begin borrowing until 
after the outbreak of the first World War. By that time 
some of the States had been borrowing in the London market 
for almost half a centuryc New South Wales , which kept aloof 
from schemes designed to co-ordinate Australian governmental 
borrowing in the early 1920's, continued to be a heavier 
borrower overseas than the Commonwealth until 1927 even 
though the Commonwealth was borrowing from time to time 
, 
for other States as well as itself . Over this period the 
location of Australian borrowing changed: in 1901, 86% 
of Australian government debt was located in London, and in 
1928 , 52% was located in London and New Yorko 
The Financial Agreement of 1927 ushered in a new 
era in oversea borrowing, in that the independent borrowing 
authority of the States and the Commonwealth (except for 
defence borrowings) was surrendered to the Australian 
Loan Council. Under Clause 3(8) of the Agreement, the 
Commonwealth and each State submit to the Loan 'Council a 
new money borrowing programme for each financial year. 
The governments also submit statements of the amounts 
required for refinancing maturing debt. The Financial 
Agreement requires borrowings in Australia and overseas 
to be undertaken by the Commonwealth unl ess special approval 
is granted to a StateG Thus the Agreement, while restricting 
the Commonwealth's right to borrow on its own behalf, made 
the Commonwealth virtually the sole borrower for the 
Australian gove nmAnt s. 
-- -
The Financial Agreement became effective in time 
for the Commonwealth to float a few cash loans in London 
and New York before those markets were closed to foreign 
borrowers o In the following years~ the Commonwealth's 
oversea borrowings were, perforce, limited almost entirely 
to refinancing existing debt at the low rates of interest 
prevailing in London. However, two cash loans were 
floated in 1938 and 19390 From close to the end of the 
1939-45 war until the end of 1949, the Commonwealth redeemed 
~ , 
about £stg80 million of London debt and $17 million in 
New York o 
The Commonwealth floated 43 loans overseas, 
including 32 involving the raising of new money, in the 
following twelve years o The largest portion of new money 
loans came from the International Bank, which provided 
$418 million (£187 million) between 1950 and 1962 . Only 
two cash loans totalling £Stg34 million were raised in 
London, but £Stg124 million was obtained in refinancing 
loans. The New York market was the most constant source 
~ 
of loans after 1954, and provided $190 million in cash 
and~$90 million in refinancing loans o Four loans equivalent 
to £25 million were raised in SWitzerland , two (totalling 
£15 million) in Canada, and one (for £5 million) in the 
Netherlands. Private loans from commercial sources in 
the United States provided five loans aggregating~~66 million 
(£29 million). These were secured to finance aircraft ' 
purchase s by ToA.A. and Qantas. 
j 
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The purposesof the loans were defined for legal 
accounting purposes o £165 million was used to refinance 
debt maturing overseas , a little more was used for 
specified imports, while the foreign curre~cy equivalent 
of the remainder was not allocated for any particular 
purpo se o For all loans except those for Qantas and ToAoAo 
and those set aside f or redeeming maturing debt the 
Commonwealth was credited by the Reserve Bank wi th Australian 
currency equivalent of the proceeds o Most of these proceeds 
were contributed to State Works and Housing programmes , 
either directly through the allocation of portion of the 
loans to the States, or indirectly through Commonwealth 
advances under the Commonwealth~State Housing Agreement , 
or by Commonwealth subscriptions to loans raised in Australia. 
The Commonwealth ' s borrowing activity from 1950 
was in marked contrast with the nature of the Commonwealth ' s 
borrowing overseas since 1930 0 The policy from 1950 has 
been regarded as an immediate change in attitude resulting 
from the assumption of office by a Liberal Party government, 
which continued in office for the full period 1950~1962 o 
Although the Labor Party had maintained a strong 
stand against foreign borrowing, particularly since the 
depre ssion, such a conclusion is a little to o ;J"" It/dt", It 
overlooks changes that took place around the same time in 
the availability of foreign loans, and over looks the period 
of transition before the new policy took effecto 
No matter what government was in power, the period 
19~5 to 19~9 could well have been one in which sterling debt 
was redeemed and dollar debt remained stationaryo Australia 
was unable to use her increasing sterling reserves to buy 
dollar goods or, for that matter, to buy goods from the 
United Kingdomo Consequently, the most appropriate use for 
these reserves was the redemption of London debt as it fell 
due 0 No matter what desire there may have been to borrow 
dollars in order to purchase dollar imports, it is doubtful 
if Australia could have obtained any worthwhile amount of 
new money loans from the dollar area at the timeo Indeed, 
the Labor Government itself appears to have sought , in 
vain,for~ a long-term dollar loan in 19~9o 
As it was, the incoming Government secured its 
first dollar loan in August 1950 when the lending policies 
of the International Bank had become a little easier 
(following the appointment of Eugene Black as Pre s idento) 
Supply factors therefore appear to have played an essential 
part in determining when the Commonwealth secured its first 
dollar loan o At this time also the government emphasised 
the value of the loan for securing dollar imports. 
It was a few years later in 1953 , when the first 
Swiss loan was secured, that the Treasurer made clear, in 
his speech on the Bill, that the Commonwealth's policy then 
was to borrow overseas in order to increase the total 
amount of resour~es available to Australia, and not merely 
to secure dollar goods o This change in policy was a 
logical outcom~ (; Ghe extension of impor t licensing 
in 1952 from dollar goods to cover lmports from all 
sources. The policy, as it was stated at this time, 
undoubtedly differed qualitatively from any that may 
have been in the mind of the preceding Labor government o 
In the same way as, during the early post-war 
period , any government would have been inclined to redeem 
debt , so, during the period 1950-19621 there were 
circumstances which encouraged borrowing overseas . The 
Commonwealth ' s policy of borrowing overseas stemmed , not 
only from Australia's stage of development (which attracted 
an inflow of capital) but also from factors peculiar to 
Australia ' s situation after 1950. 
Australian governments, for example, had the 
equivalent of £200 million of debt maturing overseas 
in the twelve years after June 1950, and f aced an immediate 
shortage of dollars o SUbstantial government and private 
investment was _ecessary to overcome years of wartime 
neglect, and for the absorption of a large number of 
migrants . In addition9 the Commonwealth government was 
committed to a full employment policy and, in the early 
1950 ' s, to the provision of a high l evel of "defensive 
expenditure ". 
The International Bank was the Source of the 
first loan of the period, and supplied more in loans to 
the Commonwealth than all other sources combined unti~ 1957 • 
.men though the internAtional markets became more important 
after 1956, the I nt 8 national Bank was still the largest 
single suppJl}r of loans to the CommonwealLh at 30 June 1962. 
The Commonwealth received about 7% of the loans 
made by the Banko The group of member countries in Asia 
and the Middle East received between them the greatest 
amount of loans9 the Western Hemisphere came next, while 
Africa received somewhat more than twice the amount lent 
to Australia. There were marked differences also between 
the amounts received by individual members within each 
geographical group. During the whole period 1950~1962, 
four of the leading borrowers were developed countries o 
The Commonwealth, although it had received no loans 
before 30 June 1950, was the biggest borrower from the 
Bank in 19570 It received no loans from then until 
January 1962 and in June 1962 it was the fourth heaviest 
borrower from the Banko 
The Commonwealth's early predominance among Bank 
borrowers, and its subsequent decline were largely due 
to the manner in which the Bank 's policies were applied, 
and their effect on Australia vis~a-vis other members . 
These policies were determined by the Board of Governors 
of the Bank who represented individual members and had voting 
power according to the capital subscription made by each 
member.. At 30 June 1962, the United States had 29% of 
the voting power, and the United Kingdom, with 12%, had 
the next largest number of votes.. The PreSident, who is 
in charge of the ordinary business of the Bank, was el~cted 
by the Board of Governors, but the position has always been 
filled by the per ~ol nominated by the United States ' government. 
- --
ThE' International Ban}"'- di not lend all the funds 
it controlled between 1950 and 1962~ In 1950 it held, 
either in cash or in other investments, almost a : ill ~h as 
had been lent to members o By 1962~ he amount held in 
cash or investments had fallen, relatively, to 65% of the 
amount on loan to members~ bu in the meantime the funds 
available to the Bank had grown considerably~ 
Some members ~ the underdeveloped countries ~ 
could not afford to service large borrowings on the Bank's 
terms o Although it charged interest rates which were often 
lower than developed countries had to pay in the iiternational 
markets, these rates still rose to 6% in 1957=58 and 1958-59, 
and climbed to 6t% in the following year o In addition, 
the Bank required repayment to 0omm8nce fairly early in 
the life of each loano The Bank, rather logically, did not 
leave it for individual members to decide whether they could 
afford to service the loans o "f.he Bank had to satisfy itself 
on each borrower ' s capacity to repay the loan, and it took 
into account he effectiveness of government and business 
adminis ration in the member ' s territoryo 
Another requirement \vas that lender s had to submj t 
a specific project for Bank finan~ing, and the Bank would 
lend the foreign exchange requirements of this projecto The 
Commonwealth met these req irements only for the Qantas loan 
in 1956 0 The earlier loans were not for particular projects 
but f or " general" purpO'leo:> , while the last loan covered 
both the local ani ~ ~~elgn currency expenditure of a portion 
of the Snolory l't ( ain ~ . ( 1 em 9 Othe r dev,,-' l'')'npd :ountries 
.... ~. ~ .. ------------------------------------------------------------------------~ ... 
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were also exempted from these requirements. On the other 
hand, this policy, combined with the Bank's dislike for 
projects of a social or welfare nature, must have 
discouraged some underdeveloped countries from seeking Bank 
finance because they could not afford to concentrate much 
of their available capacity ~~ the one project. 
The Bank's main policies were therefore quite 
substantially biased in favour of the more developed capital-
importing countries like Australia. The Commonwealth, up 
to the end of 1956 9 could either meet the Bank's requirements 
or was absolved from complying with them. At the same time 
many members were unable to satisfy the Bank's criteria, 
thus reducing the effective competition for loans o 
Australia did not secure her next loan from the 
Bank until 1962, by which t ime India and two other countrie s 
had secured loans for greater amounts. This fall in the 
rate of Bank lending to t he Commonwealth is not fully 
explained by the Bank's policies, but resulted in a much 
more equitable situation. After al1 9 Australia was a 
developed country with a population of only 10 million? 
so for it to have been the leading borrower at any time 
was anomalous; it was far more logical for India to be 
in that positiono 
After 1956, the Commonwealth had to rely primarily 
on the international capital markets. It succeeded in 
, 
borrowing in five countries, including Canada, whose market 
was not international in character. The Commonwealth obtained 
36% of the f or 19t.l. loans f l oated in London between 1950 and 
... ~. ~ .. --------------------------------------------------------------------.... 
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1962, but only 5% of those floated in New York and 
Switzerland, and 3% in the Netherlands o Comparatively, 
the Commonwealth was a successful borrower, yet the 
amount of loans it secured overseas does not seem higho 
There were specific reasons for markets providing only 
a limited amount of loans, and for the Commonwealth and 
other borrowers sharing unevenly the funds that were 
available. 
The countries whose markets made a significant 
amount available to other countries in the form of 
public loans were, understandably, exporters of capital. 
Ten nations were net exporters of capital during the 
period and, of these, only f~ had a sUbstantial net 
outflow - the United States, West Germany, the United 
/et~ 
Kingdom ~ France ~.~~,~ Switzerland lOQ tAo ~OmaiBQOPo 
/ 
These five nations contained the international markets, 
which through the institutional framework associated 
with stock exchanges, supplied an appreciable amount 
in foreign loans. Other capital-exporting countries 
supplied occasional public loans only, as did a few 
capital-importing nations such as Canadao 
Towards the end of the period, market issues 
in London were 23% of the United Kingdom's Capital 
Formation, while the percentages in the remaining countries 
which contained international markets ranged from 10% to 16% • 
.. ~~. ~ .. ----------------------------------------------------------------------~ .. 
The distribution of savings was partly responsible for 
these differences, because the bulk of the ufree" funds 
in a country are derived from personal savings o On the 
other hand, the international markets were helped by 
inflows of foreign capital, which compensated in part for 
domestic savings invested elsewhereo The funds flowing 
to the markets were also affected by the tencency ~ 
stronger in some countries than in others ~ for institutions 
which acted as deposltories for savings to make loans other 
than through the marketu There was also a dearth of 
investible funds in the European countries for some years 
after the War" 
During the first part of the period the 
internationalpolLtical and economic scene was not 
encouraging in many ways and investors regarded foreign 
loans a~ being I1Sky propositions in the early 1950so 
The effects lay not only in the higher yields demanded 
on forelgn bonds, but also in the relu~tance of firms to 
underwrite foreign loans o However~ there were noticeable 
improvements in the relative regard for foreign bonds later 
in the periodo On the other hand, a substantial proportion 
of subscriptions to foreign loans floated in New York came 
from foreign sources, and these non-resident investors 
would not have usually had the same reservations about 
foreign bonds o 
The lack of free competition between the mar~ets 
was shown by the wide disparity between the interest rates 
of the differ ... n t '" '1.trie 0 Fo eign exc ange controls 
restri(' ed (r'rJ[ cition by forpign horrower- i 1 ,.11 markets 
II 
I: 
-
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but New York and, later, the German market, leaving the 
markets available to foreign borrowers only to the extent 
of providing capital exports surplus to domestic needs 
(that were to be met by the market), and supplementary 
to funds required for direct investment and official 
donations and loans. 
Governments also used their foreign exchange 
controls to give preferred access to certain foreign 
borrowers and, in addition, the flotation processes 
themselves tended to prevent competition. 
The capital markets in general displayed a lending 
pattern which was more conservative than the International 
Bank ' s , vlhose prominent borrowers included India, Mexico 
and Pakistano Except in London~ developed countries, 
including capital-exporting countries, were the main borrowers 
in all centre . Of the fifty under~developed countries that 
obtained loans from I . B. RoDo 7 the IoD.A. or the markets? 
only fourteen borrowed on the markets o Predominantly these 
borrowed in London~where they obtained 30% of the loans . 
They secured only 7% in Switzerland and 1% in New York. 
Under-developed countries had little choice of raising 
loans except when these were guaranteed by developed countries. 
Between 1950 anu 1962 Australia secured 36% of 
foreign loans in London, 5% in New York and Switzerland, 
and 3% in the Netherlands . Only in Switzerland therefore 
did Australia raise less than all under-dev l oped couptries 
put togeth ro CompetItion fo loans in S\vitzerland, 
--
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however, came prim8~ily and particularly in recent 
years 9 from capital-exporting countries~ In New York 7 
but only if Canadian and International Bank borrowin~~ 
are excluded, Australia secured as much as all other 
capital-importing countries combiaed and half as much 
as did capital-exporting countries o 
As we have seen, restrictions on access to 
all but the New York markets prevented uniform supply 
conditions for all borrowerso In London the Commonwealth 
, 
had advantages which secured her favoured treatment o 
Other borrowers secured access more easily than the 
Commonwealth to the remaining markets o 
A comparison of the average yields offered on 
securities issued by the Commonwealth and other foreign 
borrowers indicates that a quire high credit standing 
was ach~eved by the Commonw alth in all markets o New 
Zealand's securities seemed to be a little more in demand 
in London 9 and Belgium's in Switzerland and the Netherlands. 
The Commonwealth's securities carried a lower yield than 
either of these countrie~ in New York, but were not 
as low as Canadian or International Bank securities in 
that market o 
With supply conditions being as restricted as 
they were between 1950 and 1962, it is difficult to be 
conclusive about the prjcesthe Commonwealth would have 
been prepared to payo As it was, the highest-cost loans 
in each year rose fron 402~% in 1950 5L to 6. 15% in 
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1961-62, with a peak of 60 41% in 1960-61 0 This cost 
classification does not fully explain why the Commonwealth 
borrowed where it did and when it dido 
In particular, the Commonwealth sought loans 
with a life of nine years or more, and secured no loans 
of a shorter duration except when these were to be Itrelent" 
to TgAoAo and Qantaso The Commonwealth was apparently 
prepared to pay as much for one loan as another, so long 
as the duration exceeded nine years e 
, 
In addition, the geographical pattern of the 
Commonwealth's borrowings was also affected by considerations 
other than priceo The source of commercial loans was largely 
predetermined by decisions to purchase aircraft in the 
United States and als0 9 in part, by the pre-existing 
relationship between the Commonwealth and two large New 
York banks o The timing and the number of London loans were 
influenced by the existence of maturing debto The 
Commonwealth's borrowing pattern in New York, and the 
small am01mts it was prepared to float loans for in other 
centres,wer based on a desire to develop asteady flow of 
loans at reasonable prices for the future o 
However, there seems to be little danger, in the 
absence of any available alternative, in regarding the 
highest interest costs of loans in each year as being close 
to the maximum that the Commonwealth was prepared to payo 
Probably thiq assumption is not too far out7 although ~t 
must be suspect for the years up to 1955-56, when the 
Commonwea.lth "" , .. _s .red of a flow of f unds from the 
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Internat10nal Bank. By comparing the movements in these 
costs, some support can be secured for tentative conclusions 
on the important influences, from time to time, in 
determining what interest costs the Commomvealth, as agent 
for the Loan Council, was pre pared to payo 
When oversea costs are calculated as percentages 
of Commonwealth bond yields in Australia in the same year, 
the percentages point to a moving, but nevertheless 
noticeable, relationship between internal and oversea costs. 
The broad relationship indicated by the percentages would 
have been brought about, in all probability, by subj ective 
evaluationSG As oversea costs rose in relation to costs in 
Australia, it could be expected that there would be a 
growing feeling that Itcosts were getting too high overseas ll • 
The particular point at which this feeling became effective 
in prevencing borrowings would depend on the countervailing 
pressure from time to time for additional funds . 
During the period to 1956-57 , when the Commonwealth 
took virtually all the proceeds of new money loans overseas, 
.'YJ~~ c.<?7v~ ~'i-r?~'Te~~ 
the greatest ~Fe6!Wp€- os prj c~!seems to have been the 
current condition of the balance of payments. In particular, the 
high relative cost of the first International Bank loan was 
directly influenced by the dollar shortage . Understandably, 
the costs did not at any time rise to correspond with the 
extent of each balance of payments cris~s , primarily because 
long-term loans were not as a equate as the resources bf the 
International Monetary Fund to meet these crise s . 
In subsequent years, when the States bore 
their share of the costs of oversea loans , the States' 
interests appear to have been more influential than tne 
current condition of the balance of nayments o When the 
States were more dependent on Commonwealth assistance 
towards their borrowing programmes, higher prices were 
paid for oversea loans o When the States were not so 
dependent on Commonwealth assistance, oversea loans did 
not carry as high a cost as in other years o It is of 
some interest that the States, apparently , could exert 
their influence on the Loan Council when conditions were 
favourable to themo 
In examining the quantitative effects of the 
borrowings on the aemsstic economy, the most appropriate 
figure to use is £193 million ioeo the amount of the net 
increase in Commonwealth and State debt overseas o The 
use of this amount allows comparison with the effects of 
a policy under which there would have been no increase in 
debt ~ a condition which has precedents in Australian 
historyo The next most appropriate figure would be 
£426 million, representing borrowings (net of repayments 
on these borrowings) secured during the periodo 
In relation to Gross National Product, £193 million 
_ which, for convenience, can be termed the amount borrowed ~ 
was not important historically, and it was also minor by 
comparison with foreign investment in Australian companies 
during the period o Nevertheless it contributed 13% of the 
defici t on ('UI l J.t account over the t't-J'elve years and thereby 
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permitted the Commonwealth to defer or ameliorate action 
that would otherwise have been regarded as necessary to 
protect Australia's reserves o Hard currency borrowings made 
a much more significant contribution to Australia's dollar 
resources up to 1956-570 
Servicing costs increased with the growth in debt 
and rising interest rates, but, due to the explansion of 
Ii exports and of Gross National Product, the burden of oversea 
debt changed little o While interest liability rose 76%, 
contemporaneous lncreases in export earnings and Gross 
National Product resulted in interest liability falling 
from 207% of current credits in the balance of payments in 
19~9-50 to 203% in 1961-62, and from 007% of Gross National 
Product to Oo~%o Corresponding percentages in 1929 were 
18 0 6% Cof current. credits) and 3o~% of Gross National Producto 
Consequently foreign debt by no means rose to dangerous levels, 
although the average life of the debt decreasedo The main 
problem for tbe Commonwealth will be in trying to obtain 
sufficient loans to maintain a net inflow in future without 
paying much higher rates of interesto 
Leaving asiG@ tse loan~ from Gommercial soupeos, 
which had distinctive trait~~ A figure of £500 million to 
£800 million appears an appropriate estimate for the 
increase in domestic expenditure permitted by the amount 
borrowed overseas o This figure makes some allowance for 
I periods of import licensing in varying degrees and 
II diminution of exports s a result of increases in domestic 
I: 
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expenditure e The dollar and hard currency loans 9 particularly, 
must also have helped con~i(erably in making Australian 
industry more efficiento They a.llowed Australian inves'" v t 
to be directed more towards the manufacture of goods which 
could be more economically produced in Australia. 
If the loans used for aircraft purchases had not 
been obtained, the Commonwealth had the choice of not 
permitting the airlines to equip or of finding alternative 
funds 0 The costs of the loans for Qantas and ToA.Ao were 
, 
not measurably hlgher than the income the Commonwealth 
received on the investment of her international reserves 
so it would not have paid for the Commonwealth itself to 
have made the loans to the alrlines o The alternative course 
of not permitting the airlines to re-equip would have caused 
a net drain on the balan~e of payments in the case of Qanta~. 
TheI e would al ~, o have been obViouS disadvantages in pursuing 
any of "he available alternatlves to the rourse the government 
took in relation to ToA. AQ 
The assistance given to the economy through the 
longer~term loans sei"'ured by the Commonwealth could not have 
been replaced through any monetary action on the Commonwealth's 
parto The possibility, perhaps remote, that a balance of 
payments crls~s could ~rise on a scale worse than any actuallY 
encountered gave good reason for not permitting reserves to run 
at a lower average level than they did between 1950 and 1962e 
This means that t.he government had to reduce spending in either 
the public or private 81 ctor of the economy if it had not 
obtained loan., 1 ". ~aso 
I' 
1 
I I 
I; 
I! 
I: 
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Reductions in Commonwealth and State capital 
expenditure would have caused serious difficulties to 
the whole economyo As it was, real public capital expon lture 
per head sagged during the period, despite the capital needs 
of a fairly rapidly increasing population o 
While private fixed capital expenditure per head 
increased much more than public capital expenditure, there 
is no reason to believe, in the political climate then 
existing, that the least socially or economically desirable 
industries would have been the ones to suffero Consequently 
a reduction in investment would have led to a proportionate 
reduction in production with a consequent fall in resources 
subsequently available for consumption or investment o 
There was less scope for a reduction in consumption, 
which had increased at a rate slightly above 1% per annum 
per capIta in real terms over the periodo Taxation increases 
would, it seems, have been unpopular but politically acceptable, 
and the increases could have been fashioned to produce a 
more equitable tax structure, but would also have reduced 
private investment as well as consumptiono Reduction in 
consumption, on the other hand, would have required (it seems) 
a more inequitable tax structure and made it harder for the 
Commonwealth to attract migrants from some countries o 
A comparison of the cost of direct i nvestment with 
the cost of governmental borrowing is worthwhile, primarily 
because capi t al jnflow during the period was in the 
form of direct investment o There is little doubt that 
direct investrrl n las more expensive t.o the Australian 
J 
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economy than governmental borrowing overseas between 1950 
and 1962 0 Nevertheless~ experience shows that a country 
can interfere, although Australia did not, with the 
repatriation of private capital and earnings and have less 
repercussions than if it defaulted on a foreign loan secured 
by its government o In some cases, direct investment could 
not be compared in all respects with the borrowings (excep t 
perhaps the aircraft loans ) because it provided no immedia te 
assistance to the balance of payments in that he decision 
to make the investment was dependent on the provision of 
particular foreign capital goods o 
During the period 1950 - 1962, the government 
rej ected the idea of national planning 9 in even a mild fo rme 
At the same time it did not hesitate to initiate deflat ionary 
measures, make use of indirec t taxes~ alter tariffs and u e 
taxation to influence product ono 
This combination of philosophical detachment f r om 
planning with active interference in the economy showed 
itself in a reluctance to take action until the need became 
urgent o As a result t he government ' s interventions were 
general rathe r than specif i c and curative rather than 
preventative 0 Considerable production was lost to 
consumption or investment both through the misdirection of 
investment and through the deflationary measures invoked 
to protect the balance of payments o 
-Australia's current account balance during the 
twelve years contains years of extravagant spending overseas , 
followed by brief but sharp periods of defl ation when 
external balance was improved o Had the government conserved 
its external resources and made them available to the economy 
at a roughly average rate, over the period, there might 
well have been no need for increases in foreign debto 
It also seems essential that a country which is 
intent upon securing additional resources should ensure 
, 
that the wastage of resources is reduced to a minimum. The 
establishment of adequate forecasting machinery (to assist 
the government in making its own decisions on matters of 
general monetary and fiscal policy), accompanied either by 
direct control or control by suggestion of the direction of 
~ private investment appears to be am eS5@Rtial requisite fo r 
the efficient use of resources o 
National planning would not however make borrowing 
overseas undesirable 9 even though it would have helped 
Australia to cope with a failure to securelo~nso Additional 
imported goods bought with hard currency loans helped to 
prevent wasteful allocation of resources during the dollar 
shortage o In the same way, subsequent loans would have 
assisted national planning in permitting investment to be 
directed towards the industries most economically viable 
in Australiao 
30 7 
It is doubtful i f a universal formula exists 
for determining how much borrowing and what interest 
costs would be acceptable for a nation at Australia's 
stage of development e What might have been appropriate 
in the 1880s or 1920s for Australia, or appropriate for 
India today, may not be suitable for Australia today. 
However, one lesson can be learnt from experience. 
Nations which have secured additional resource? in the 
past have so frequently used resources wastefully, that 
each capital-importing country should long ago have 
recognised the need to establish an effective watchdog 
on public and private spending e 
I 
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